Bail decision-making : law and practice in Scotland by Clark, L.
BAIL DECISION-MAKING : LAW AND PRACTICE IN SCOTLAND
LYNDA CLARK
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 1975
PREFACE
The consequence?of refusal of pre-trial release were impressed
upon me during a study visit to the untried prisoners' wing of
Saughton Prison in 1971* This experience sparked off my interest in
pre-trial release procedures and led to the bail research project.
I am indebted to my supervisors, Mr. N.H. Avison and Professor
F.H. McClintock for their advice and constructive criticism.
Mr. Avison left Edinburgh University to take up an appointment in
Canada in September 197^ and from that time Professor McClintock acted
as supervisor. Dr. R.J. Wilson corrected many of ray misconceptions
about sociology and research methodology and his encouragement helped
me to continue. Professor G.H. Gordon and Mr. O.J. Brown, Clerk of
Justiciary, saved me from many mistakes about criminal procedure.
Mr. W.D.H. Sellar helped by pointing out non-existent kings to which I
had referred in the historical discussion.
The police and court staff with whom I came into contact were
always helpful. The information and refreshments which they provided
were much appreciated.
Mr. R.N. Mowe deciphered and typed my often confused and sometimes
illegible manuscript. Ms. C. V/hite typed the final copies and bore
with me through seemingly endless revisions. I am most grateful for
their assistance.
Despite the help which I have received, errors no doubt remain.
For the errors and views expressed, I must be held responsible.
SUMMARY
Bail is ail ancient institution and in the first chapter the major
theories about the origin of bail and the development of bail in
Scotland up to the seventeenth century are considered. This leads on
to a description of the formative period of modern law which culminated
in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1888.
Before embarking on a study of the modern law and practice a
perspective in which the Scottish system may be judged is provided.
Attention is directed to the attempts made by other countries to deal
justly with the untried accused. This survey includes countries which
presently operate a system of bail, countries in which the bail system
has fallen into disuse and countries in which bail has been abolished.
The findings and recommendations of recent bail research projects, the
disillusionment with bail and alternatives which have been developed
are described.
The common law and statutory provisions regulating the modern bail
law are considered in the third chapter. Particular attention is paid
to the discretionary powers of the Lord Advocate, the police and the
courts and the opportunities to apply for bail which have been provided
by the law.
As the law in the case and statute books could provide only
limited information about the bail system, a research project was
devised to study the operation of the law in practice. For reasons
described in the fourth chapter, the research was directed to the bail
decision-making of the police and the courts. Both observation and
record research were used. Bail decisions are not considered in
isolation but an attempt is made to describe bail decision-making at
all the different stages in the legal system at which this matter is
considered. Thus in subsequent chapters the bail decision-making
situations at the police level, in a burgh c urt, a sheriff court and
in the High Court of Justiciary are described. Issues considered are,
for example, the relative importance of officials involved in the
decision-making situation, the accuracy, relevance and sufficiency of
the information given to the decision-maker and the variables which
influence the decision-maker. Soae important consequences of the
bail decisions are also examined. These include, for example, the
money security implied in bail, the time spent in pre-trial custody,
the success of the bail decisions and the effect of the bail decision
on the outcome of the case.
In the last chapter the findings of the study are drawn together and
bearing in m_nd the experience of other countries, an assessment is made
of the Scottish bail syotea. Reference is made to the different
patterns of decision-making and some important consequences of these
patterns. The availability of information ia critically cjnsidered and
possible improvements canvassed, Kxtensions of the right to challenge
custody are put forward. Changes in the criteria governing the bail
decisions which include the introduction of a right to release and
preventive detention are advocated. The dependence on money security
as a basis of release is criticised and alternatives are considered.
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Bail, "soma expedient of this sort
seems always t j have been a part
of our customary law".
— Hume
SOMu TH.X.;Ld3 ABOUT Mia HliTOdlAL i JOIN OF BAIL IH XOTLAItD
Ihe antiquity of bail has often boon asserted, notably by
Hume, but no consideration appears to hove been given to the sort of
exoedient which anticipated the institution of bail known to modern
Scots law.
Although the historical development of bail in Scotland has
been neglected a considerable literature exists on the origin of the
institution of bail.
In this section we outline the main theories which havo been
advanced -and with these theories in mind describe the results of our
research into the early Scottish records.
Thq, ' IflenUfied gg frfta Griffin of Bqifr"
Some scholars have attributed a very ancient history to bail.
They have identified in the hostage cu torn of early Germanic tribes
a similar idea to bail, in that a hostage wa3 held as guarantor or
surety of the obligation of a third party. An example of a
2.
proponent of this vie# was Gierke who founded hin theory on the
results of his research on Germanic tribes. Describing Gierke's
theory De Haas wrote»
"The personal responsibility of the surety for his own debt
or that of another was tantamount to hostugeship of the body.
•suretyship i3 incorporeal hosta oship; ideelle. Ver jisolunr. which is
on obvious result of an evolutionary process from hostageship itself -
Abaaaltun-T dor realen Vergoiaelun,":. The surety does not, in other words»
become the debtor; his sole duty is the assumption of liability." 3
Holmes has expressed a similar view. He argued thati
"when hostages are given for a duel which is to determine the
truth or falsehood of an accusation, the transaction is very near to
the giving of similar security in the trial of a case in court. This
xi o, in fact, the usual course of the Germanic procedure". 4
Talking more specifically about jngliah custom, Holmes referred to the
old rule of -ngliah procedure which stated that a defendant must
cither give security or go to prison. According to Holmes this
security was the hostage of earlier days, and later, when the actions
for punishment and redress were separated from each other, became the
bail of the criminal law'. -e Ha .s has argued that the pledge could
not be considered a hostage in the liberal sense of the word, as the
pledge, in the view of most proponents of the theory, V7as not liable
to the same consequences as the defaulter.^ For Gierke, hov/ever, the
pledge was envisaged as a literal hostage, because he considered the
liability of the surety extended even to b >dily injury.
Opposing views have also been strongly supported by those who
have adhered to some form of the theory, that the origin of bail is
to be found in the early form of settlement, which replaced the blood
feud, and was based on a system of set payments for injury. Thus a
relationship similar to the modern bail relatiunship has been identi¬
fied in the ancient practice of giving pledges for the payment of the
wargeld, and in the later development of giving pledges for the
7defetidant's presentation in court.
■Among those who identified the pledges for presentation of the
defendant in court, as the prototype of bail, disagreement has arisen
as to the nature of these pledges. One view supported is that the
8 „
pledges derived from the frankpledge system. oupporters of this
vie..' ho.ve argued that the Qystorn of general suretyship, which was
evolved on a tltiling basis by the Anglo-3axons and which was developed
unu.er the Herman influence into the frankpledge system, incorporated the
arrangement of pledges who bore responsibility for holding the
defendant to answer accusations at trial. Critics of this view,
however, have argued that for this special purpose, separate surety
arrangements were made out.ith the system of general suretyship.
Holdsworth proved to be an adherent of the former view when he
wrote:
1*e can see therefore, the importance of the system of frankpledge
from the point of view of the lav? of procedure. It made certain persons
responsible for the production of a defendant. It provided pledges
for his appearance. It did the work of the policeman, the bail, and
the prison of more civilised times''. 9
he iiaa3, however, has doubted whether the frcuikjlodge system
was ever used to guarantee the defendant's appearance in court for
trial, in her book, Antiquities of -f-.il. she attempted to demonstrate
that 'frankpledge and bail are probably not immediately connected}
10
neither are they interchangeably associated". " ->omo of the evidence
she adduced in support of this vie./ was that, despite the general
suretyship arrangement, laws made specific provisions for an individual
suretysidp arrangement to guarantee the future appearance of the
11
defendant. She also pointed out that in the majority of cas ;s which
she had oxanined in the twelfth and thirteenth century Pipe Holla
the surety was a single individual r ther than a number of persons.
Only the latter, she said, would be consistent with an organised surety
system. In addition, the frankpledge system was limited in its applic-
12
ati m to parts of -ngland and also suffered a rapid decline in the
fourteenth century, fhe conclusion supported by De Haas waa that
"frankpledge was called upon to present offenders, rather than to hold
the individual for trial, which constitutes the underlying principle
13
of the modem bail surety'.
3oth the hostage and pledge theories have been criticised by
Beyecle '.ho attacked the historical basis and the probability of
such theories. According to Be Haas, except in a war situation
Beyerle could not "envisage a situation so extreme or pre;sin* as to
induce anyone to expose himself voluntarily to the possibility of
1 /
seizure of his body and the loos of his liberty".
Beyerla's view was that the surety protected the debtor or
wrongdoer from the ven ;eance of the injured party. In describing
the evolution of this relationship he argued that from the early
position, where the surety waa responsible for the appearance of the
debtor, a more complicated system had evolved. Under this the surety
guaranteed payment in the event of the default of the debtor and in
such a cuss the surety had power over the debtor's property and body.
The fin;_1 stage in this process was reached when the surety's own
property could be attached by the creditor to satisfy the payment owed
by the debtor. According to Beyerle, ther fore, the evolution was
15
from a trustee relationship to a substitute payer. He argued that
the hostage theory implied that the surety or hostn :e, in the
event of the debtor's default, would become subject to the demands of
the creditor, but he did not believe that this described what happened*
In his view it was the debtor or his property that came under the
control of the surety ;aid it was only ultimately that the property
of the .surety could be attached.
fhe question of which early form of suretyship beat represents
modem bail is further confused by the necessity to consider the
emergence in -ngland in the thirteenth century of two distinct
forms of suretyship called bail and mainprise. Hale has stated that
the terms bail and mainprize 'are used promiscuously often times for
the some thing, and indeed, the words import much the same thing ...
16
but yet in a proper and Legal sense they differ". Bail appears to
have been a far stricter form of suretyship than mainprize. In bail,
the prisoner released from gaol was roleaoed into the custody of the
person who had given bail for him and the consequence of hi3 state
as a person in custody remained unaltered. In mainprize, however,
the mainpenors acted as sureties only and the person so released had
the privileges of a free man. Modern bail seems, therefore, to be
related to raainprize rather than the concept of thirteenth century
bail in its technical sense.
It is obvious even from this outline of the main controversies
that the origin of bail has provoked considerable disagreement. The
opposing camps of hostage versus pledges for wergeld theorists hsvo
themselves contained important internal divisions. In the former,
some supporters of the ha8^3#6 theory considered bail as a metaph¬
orical hoatageship, with the suroty liablo only to a property finej
others envisaged a literal hostugeship with the surety liable to
6*
suffer the penalty incurred by the defaulter. In the latter there
was no agreement as to the forms of pledge which foreshadowed modern
bail. Both main theories have been criticised and the origin of bail
has instead been identified in the special relationship said to have
existed between the debtor and surety.
Bearing these theories in mind we now consider the various forms
of hostageship and pledge, suggestive of bail, which have existed in
Scots law.
Considerable obscurity surrounds the nature of Scots law before
the fourteenth century due to the loss and destruction of many of the
records and documents which wore taken from Scotland by lidward I. In
view of this the adoption of a somewhat speculative attitude towards
the fragments of information which can be obtained about this early
law may be justified.
Scots law, must be understood in the light of the various foreign
legal systems influential in Scotland at different historical periods.
Speculation about the history of Scottish bail need not detain us
however, until after the fifth century. Despite infiltration of
17doman forces into Scotland,' any 'ioman law influence dating from
this period is not considered to have survived the withdrawal of
itonan forces from 3ritain in the fifth century. Coopor, however, has
a sorted that the influence of itoman law in lator centuries was
crucial in shaping the law of pledging in Scotland.
"Prom the frequent references in de.?iam est, item and other
procedural treatises, to the ologius at all stages of civil process,
It would appear that the laws of cautionry must have been considerably
developed at an early stage. And all the evidence which survives
indicates that in both countries that development resembled ^toman
doctrine which still supplies the common basis in general principles
for both the Scottish law of cautionry and the English law of
suretyship^ f8
7.
This view is we think, open to question. Although doman law is
known to have been taught in England as early a3 the sixth century it
19
has not been suggested that these itoman law ideas spread to Scotland.
The view generally accepted is that the Church was the channel, through
20
which the influence of Homan law flowed into Scotland.1" The
tradition of the early Church, however, was Celtic in character and
Gaelic was the language of the churchmen. Smith has pointed out that
it was not until the twelfth century that the Celtic traditions and
usages were suppressed when the church refashioned itself on the xioman
21
model. Nor was it until after the twelfth century that the practice
of studying doman and Canon lav/ at foreign universities was established.
Because of this we are of the opinion that if pledging was known in
Scotland before the twelfth century it must have boon of indigenous
growth, or influenced by 3ome law system other than the koman system.
The period between the fifth and twelfth century lias been deB-
cribed by 17.P. Skene." lie outlined the emergence of the four kingdoms,
Balriada, the Picts, the Britons of Stratholyde and Bornicia, from the
Celtic and Teutonic races populating the northern part of Britain.
Although the next five centuries witnessed an unending struggle for
power within the kingdoms and a succession of battles and truces which
led to a constant shifting in the respective power positions of the
original kingdoms, according to Skene some settled form of government
did exist. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume the existence of
some form of law in the kingdoms. Innes has argued that thi3 is
confirmed in the most ancient records "where we find references to a
still earlier coaumn law, Ausiza. terra - the lav/ of the land -
21
rex Gcotia evidently of definite provisions and received authority".
8.
.«ith Gaelic as the common language of this period and contact maintained
with Ireland the influence of Celtic custom seems very likely. Such
a view has been adopted by Bannerman who has stressed that common
OA
customs were shared by the Scots and the Irish end has argued that*
"the culture of the ^cots of ualriadu, as might be expected,
mirrors that of contemporary Ireland. And indeed, Gaelic-speaking
Scotland and Ireland constituted a single culture-province down into
tho seventeenth century'. 15
The Celtic influence has been described by Innes in the following
terms, "whilst under a Celtic sway, Scotland's laws wore those which
have received a certain shane and definiteness from thoir longer use
2£
and greater cultivation in Ireland". Cameron has also supported
the existence of a Celtic system of law and has argued that sufficient
proof may be found in the Celtic fragments which have survived to show
27
the exist nee of a Celtic system of law up to the eleventh century.
As proof he cited the dcots lew of succession and marriage and more
important for our present interest, the honor orico form of criminal law
embodied in the Leges inter rebtos et Scotos.1-0
The existence of the Le.goo inter drettos et ^cotos indicates that
some development from personal retaliation and the concurrent blood
fauu, had occurred by the twelfth century. The distinction between
civil and criminal law was still blurred, however, and the role of a
public official to prosecute cx-ime was not defined until the sixteenth
century. An honor; orice form of compensation for wrongs suffered,
which detailed compensation or cro according to the wrong and rank of
the victim or wrongdoer, was r cognised. This type of tariff system
was often found in early legal systems and existed for example, not
only in Irish law but also in elsh and ~>axon law. Unfortunately the
Leges inter Brefctos et ;cotos give no information as to how the system
of fines was implemented. Looking to the Gaxon laws, however, the
operation of a similar system can be studied. A law of Edmund I
described the Saxon practice*
"The slayer shall give security to his advocate, and the
advocate to the kinsman (of the slain main) that he (the slayer) will
make the reparation to the kindred. After that it is incumbent upon
the kin of the slaim man to give security to the slayer's advocate
that he (the slayer) nay approach under safe conduct and pledge
himself, accordin; to forms of lav, to pay the wergeld. Vn'hen he has
pledged hinr.elf to thi3, ho shall find a surety for the payment of
the worgeld". 29
That there must have been some arrangement existing in Scotland for
the payment of cro is unquestionable but no record remains describing
it. It seems plausible that the arrangement adopted in Scotland was
also based on pledging. This plausibility is enhanced in two ways.
The ho -as inter 3retto3 et ..cotos stated, for example, that if the wife
of a free mm wao slain, her husband should have the kelchvn. and her
kin should have the cro and the yalnon. Gaines according to J. Gkene
30
was like cro. a form of compensation for slaughter. It muy not be
without significance that the term 'yalnas ' is connected with the
310. Ir. " "all' meaning pledge. More significant perhaps, io a
procedure described in the Le -rea fiarchiarum.^ It was ordained by these
laws that /here a defender^ had found pledges and had been convicted
on a charge of robbery or theft, his /ledges were liable for the sum
specified in the charge, but in cases of homicide the pledges wore
liable for the full manbote. -<ith the diffe enoe that pledges became
liable when the defender failed to appear, a statute of dobert III
provided that pledges were answerable for ass./thment.^ A similar
v*
procedure was also described by Balfour and J. Skene.
37In earlier discussion we pointed out that some theorists have
identified the pledges for wergeld a3 the origin of bail. A similar
theory presents itself as one explanation for the development of bail
in Scotland if the plausibility of a pledging system to axasuro cro
payments io accepted.
Without wishing to suggest that the Irish law of pledging was
wholly adopted in Celtic Scotland it seems profitable, if the import¬
ance of its influence is accepted, to give some consideration to that
law. Such an inquiry leads to a consideration of the ancient laws of
Ireland contained mainly in Jenaohua Mor and Liber Aicill.^
The hostage theory of bail seems at first glance to receive
strong support from tho Irish laws, where considerable discussion of the
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law of hostage surarties takes place. This hostage surety system,
however, appears to have had a special function in Ireland. Ireland
at tills period oonsisted of a number of distinct kingdoms and sub-
kingdoms and the law of hostage sureties seems specifically designed
for the situation where the defendant belonged to one sub-kingdom and
the injured party to another. According to those old Irish laws both
parties wore required to give hostage sureties. An apportionment might
4
extend to the defendant, the hostage surety and the tribe which supplied
the hostage surety.
This hostage surety system seems, however, to have existed in
conjunction with another pledging system under which either the
defendant or hostage sureties themselves could offer pledges for tho
hostage sureties. Failure to accept such pledges resulted in body-
fine being owed to the hostage surety.
"If the defendant gave notice to tho hostage surety of tho
plaintiff that neither pledges nor sureties were accepted from the
hostage surety or the defendant, and the hostage surety of the
plaintiff did not offer to glvo pledges himself, body-fine is due
from the defendant to his own hostage surety, and body-fine la due
from the plaintiff to the hostage surety of the defendant, and
body-fino is due from the plaintiff to his own host go ourety". 40
Those pledges appear to have been a form of protection for the hostage
surety, hence the body-fino payable to the hostage surety when such
pledges were not offered or accepted. This protection seems to have
boonextended even to bodily seizure, for example, the defendant was
11.
advised by law that, "if pledges or securities hove not been accepted
from him for his own pledge, to take hostage surety of the plaintiff
until what is lawful is given him".^ It was possible, however, to
givo hostage suroties without any additional pledges.
In tho event of the default of the defendant, Jcnachus Mor
prescribed that five sods, honor price and double compensation were
due by tho defendant to the plaintiff. If then, the plaintiff gave the
hostage surety time to seek the defendant and the defendant absconded
from tho surety also, five ^ed,s, and honor orlce were due to the surety.
After this unsuccessful pursuit of the defendant, the law allowed the
plaintiff to proceed against the hostage surety and unless "equal
forgiveness of debt" could be negotiated, it was rovided that
A ?
"death seizure shall take place".
There was nothing metaphorical about this fom of hostageship
but two features make it difficult to use in support of the hostage
theory of bail. The first objection is that it applied only to the
special situation whore disputing parties belonged to different sub-
■kihgdoms and was not part of the procedure where one royal power had
jurisdiction. Another difficulty is the fact that the hostage systam
waa itself often hedged with another pledging system not based on
hostageahip.
The Scottish reserablanoe to Ireland at this period is striking -
the cluster of small kingdoms and the clans aping sub-kingdoms.
Although it is known that hostages from different kingdoms were taken,
♦
particularly in war, and indeed this practice existed between Sngland
and Scotland until as late as the eighteenth century, this is rather
different from the situation envisaged by writers concerned with the
hostage theory of bail. In Scotland, as in Ireland, there is little
evidence to suggest that hostages were taken to ensure settlements
of disputes arising within the jurisdiction of one royal power. In
mony cases, however, the weakness of royal power and the frequency of
inter clan disputes, makes the utilisation of clan hostages soem a
solution which was likely to have been adopted.
Vi'here one royal power had jurisdiction the forris of pledge used
in Ireland were those described in the Breho-h laws, Coven different
forms were listed,43but as a largo number of Heptads were used as
teacliing aids for law, Atkinson has given a justified warning that
"tho limitation to seven must have been achieved at the cost of a
little procrustean violence".^ The purpose and result of standing as
pledge was described thus, "if ... to prevent the spoliation or
arrost ono has gone security, and if the person for whom he has gone
45
security does not accept tho law, he must pay for him". deference
was also made to the necessity of suing the pledge, a procedure which
would hardly be necessary if the pledge was held in hosfcageship.
One of the seven forms described, gives added credulity to the
thesis that early pledging systems in Scotland were influenced by
Celtic law. This is the form of pledge known in Celtic law as
cul-raith. "Cul-raith" has boon defined as a back security that is
A&
a surety which goes to back the first surety. The form seems to
have been well defined with liability emerging only if both the defender
and the first surety failed to meet their respective obligations.^
The teia appeared in Scots law as 'culreach" and was defined in much
the sme sen«e as back security i.e., "backborkh".^3 The two terras
49
cannot be identified, however, ob easily as Cameron has attempted.
It is not possible to say to what extent the Irish conception of
cu-l-raith influenced the evolution of the culreachin Scotland.
The oarlist surviving description of the culreaeh is contained in the
HeMan. ^aieatatem by which period the culreach was firmly established
within a system of repledging which we discuss below. It is only
within this context that the Scottish form can be understood#
As a result of the overlapping jurisdictions of the various
feudal, justiciary, sheriff and burgh courts, cases could be compet¬
ently tried in more than one court. The grant of power to hold court
usually included, therefore, the powers of realegiation and of finding
50
caution £& colreach. Shis meant that where a case was brought in
ono court, the defender could plead that the case should be taken in
his master's court. If his master was willing the defender could then
be ropledged by his master or tho meter's representative from the
first court. It was possible also for a master on Ms own initiative
'
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on finding caution to repledge his man to his own court. The power
of replegiation extended only to the master's liege man, men borne or
dwelling on his lands, or a member of his family. Abuse of the power
provoked legislation in the thirteenth century to prevent the bribery
52of masters to repledge any malefactor. The result of unscrupulous
repledging by the lords to their own courts, sometimes meant that the
disputed issue would never receive a fair hearing as the injured party
would find it impossible to compel the defender's appearance in a court
where the issue would be tried. The special form of pledge, the
culreach appears to have been designed to prevent tills. It was there¬
fore required that where the defender was repledged it was necessary
for Mm to leave a culreach in the court from wMch he was repledged.
If thereafter the injured party did not receive justice in the master's
court he could return to the first court and continue his action against
the defender. Where this occurred the culraach was liable to a fine,




In the records we found reference to leaving the pledge behind
in the first court and to making the culreach answerable in place of
the defender if the defender did not appear, which suggests the
applicability of the hostage theory. Nevertheless»doubt is cast on
the persuasiveness of this interpretation,in viow of our failure to
find any provision relating to custody or restrictions on the liberty
of tho culreach. The culreach is,however, consistent with a watered
down version of the hostage theory, in which it is sufficient for a
third party to be held responsible for the default of the principal.
It is difficult to say on the basis of available material in
what way the culreach was attached to tho court, dafcher, however,
than interpret the culreach as hostage, we put forward another
possible intepretation. It seams clear that the law requiring the
provision of a cul.reach was a method of ensuring that the first court
could if necessary obtain redress for the injured party. A situation
in whioh it was possible for tho court to enforce its judgement against
an absent defender was where the defender had property within the
jurisdiction of the court. There is evidence that in some circumstances
relating to freemen, where such property existed, the court did not
54
require the usual provision of cautioners. In our opinion therefore
the culreach was more likely to have been a cautioner with property
within the jurisdiction of the first court, than a hostage.
oome clear examples of hostageship as a method of ensuring the
appearance of a defender may be adduced from the sixteenth century but
55
this will be considered below.
The Celtic influence, though wo would argue very important in
this early period,was not the only foreign influence affecting
Scotland. According to Ititchie*
'There can be no question of inviolate Celtdon... in Fife and
further up the Sast Coast there had been Shglish infiltration.
Norwegians occupied Orkney, Shetland, Caithness and the *Southern
hand'} they had settlements all around the West Coast, held the
liebridies and controlled the Irish Sea. Thus surrounded, 'Celtic
Scotland* was permeated with Snglish feudalism. and Norse custom'1.5®
Trying to detect any possible Norse influence is problematic.
From the system existing in the Orkneys and Shetlaado in the early
seventeenth century, we are induced to conclude either than a similar
system existed in Norse law or that the influence was in the opposite
direction ;.that -is Scots law influenced the Norse law of pledging.
Information which we extracted from the Court Book of Shetland
57
illustrated a pledging arrangement of that period. Thus in a case
of manslaughter, datod 1602, of the 3ix persons thought to be respon¬
sible, each produced a cautioner from whom security of one hundred
pound Scots was taken for thoir appearance in court. It would be
unwise, however, to infer the existence of a similar system in early
58Norse law if bohie's caveat is accepted. bobie hae emphasised the
uncertainty which surrounds the early Norse law because of the
destruction of early records and the possible taint of Scottish
influence in surviving records. For tho earlier period,as there is
no material from which Norse criminal law can be reconstructed, it
is impossible to say with any authority whether a similar or different
system of pledging existed. liven granting the existence of a
different system, however, it seems likely that its influence was
localised andfin the absence of any evidence to suggest the contraryf
it seems reasonable to discount Norse influbiOa in this field.
The feudal influence to which Ritchie referred^0 did not
represent a sharp break in the development of Scots law, as a system
alzin to feudalism existed in Celtic Scotland as in .Anglo-Saxon England.
Nevertheless from the eleventh century the Celtic influence was ousted
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by a new influence which may, with reservation, be termed Anglo-Norman#
This new influence in Scotland was one of the repercussions of the
Norsnan oonquest of England. Scotland in absorbing many Norman settlers
from England also absorbed new ideas and institutions# And with events
dictating long sojourns at tho Rqglish court for some royal heirs and
members of the Scottish court, thiB process was encouraged. The
influence became a deliberate policy in 1124 with the accession of
Ravid I who while being a deacondant of the Soots kings was also one
of the most powerful barons in Norman England. The more developed
Anglo-»Norman system commended itself naturally and much of this law
was absorbed into Scots law. By the end of the thirteenth century,
however, the political ambitions of ^dward I had aroused considerable
concern in Scotland, Resistance culminated in the Wars of Independence
and after Scotland succeeded in establishing her independence, direct
influence from Sngland ceased.^
It is arguable however that an indirect influence permeated the
development of Scots law due to the use of the Region i-Ialeatatom and
other texts. The kftgflnfl waa a compilation of law and custom drawn up
in tho thirteenth century and was very much influenced by an Anglo-
Norman treatise written by Glanville and other foreign materials
notably Roman and Canon law Theso 3oui © materials wore adapted to
Scottish needs. Although some doubt surrounds the question fto what
extent the surviving texts represent tho early law ,it is clear that
by the fifteenth century the kerslam was muoh used by practitioners
and greatly influenced later law.°^
While attempting to assoos an Anglo-Norman influence on the
Scottish law of pledging, we noted that the Scottish term "boroh' or
"borrowes ' (pi.) is derived from the O.E. 'borges meaning pledges or
sureties.^
The earliest records reveal that considerable similarity must
have existed between the Scottish and English system of pledging.
Dating from the twelfth century, if not earlier, there grow up between
Scotland and England a body of law, the March Law^ which regulated seme
of the special problems created by the clash of two separate jurisdic-
tions. These laws, as might be expected, reflected the laws found
in Scotland and England atthis period. A special feature of the early
Earch Laws was the land tenure held by serving as Iriborch or Uttorch.
This office seems to have been designed to facilitate the enforcement
of judgements based jn the Liarch Laws. Thus pledges given by either
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Englishmen or Scotsmen could be distrained in both realms. Based
as it was on mutual assistance, the offices of Inborch and Utborch
do not appear to have survived the hostility generated by the Wars of
/Try
Independence. Noteworthy also is the procedure which related to
cases where a person from either Scotland or England was challenged
for injury touching life or limb, robbery or theft. The procedure
involved the giving of pledges who were answerable not only for the
production of the defender, but also in the case of robbery or theft
for the amount appealed, and in the case of slaughter for the full
manbote.^
One of the earliest descriptions of the use of pledging in
criminal matters which we found was contained in the -i.giant maiestatem.
Book Four of the Bagiam was concerned mainly with criminal matters
and owed le; s to Glanville's Tractatus than the other Books, but the
18.
description of pledging contained therein was clearly based on the
69
Tractatus. 7 The two pledging systems were not identical, however,
and the .English frankpledge system was never adopted in Scotland.
Nor was borrowing from England always successful, for example, rtobert
Ill's attempt to introduce limitations to the types of offences in
which pledges might be accepted similar to the limitations contained
70
in the Statue of >'estminster 1275.' Some reference, which has not
been identified as of English origin, to a pledging system was also
contained in the ^tegiam for example the lax? in Bock Two which stated
71
that a master might lose his serf if he refused to stand as pledge;
It is our opinion that pledging must have been lenown in
Scotland in view of the Celtic influence. The taking of borch was
therefore unlikely to have been an Anglo-Norman procedural innovation,
though the Anglo-Norman influence may have provided a sophistication
to Scottish procedure. The fact that the Neariarn. with its description
of Anglo-Norman pledging was absorbed into Scots law does not we
think necessarily merit the conclusion that later Scots law was
based on the English law of pledging.
Though we found differences, the early similarity between the
two systems is striking but developments after the decline of Jnglish
influence deserve independent consideration.
In the post Independence period of Anglo-Norman influence it
becomes much easier because records exist to discern and interpret
pledging arrangements. To avoid confusion,the use of the word "pledge'
to mean a thing given in security,and "pledge" used as a synonym for
"borigjh" which implied a surety or cautionary relationship between
12
people,ought to be noted. It is the latter meaning which must be
Given to references to pledge in the following pages.
A striking feature of the procedure of the period was the
import: .ace of >1edging in the operation of the various courts, fhus
wo find that at various stagOB of court procedure, a pledge or borgh
was demanded. For example, the admission of essormies (excuses for
n\
non appearance) pled by suitors was subject to the finding of pledge,
similarly for frivolous exceptions."^ A pledge had to be found for
75
the amount disputed in a court case' andfwhere applicable, for
«*/
assythment. Where the defender elected for trial by battle, again
a pledge was demanded, in this case to guarantee the Gtiinagea ©1 aimed
77
by the injured party in case tits defender was killed.
One of the most difficult problems in an age which looked the
centralised power and police organisation at the disposal of a modern
state, was ensuring the attendance of the disputing parties. The
method adopted to ensure such attendance was again Hedging. fhus
the injured party in most cases had to find a pledge to guarantee
78
his attendance and pursuit of tho case,' though some parties, e.£.
79
ecclesiastica, widows, orphans and pupils were exempted. This
pledging requirement might be waived also in capital c ses where
. sometimes a faithful promise was accepted, rather than risk deterring
80
serious accusations. Generally, however, an injured party without
pledges or with pledges but failing to pursue the case, fell into the
01
ding's mercy.' It was possible, therefore, for an injured party
without pledges to be detained in prison until tho case was completely
Such detention was not feasible as a general solution to the problem
of ensuring the appearance of reluctant defenders in court. Society
had not yet "advanced" sufficiently to oroduc© a orison system.
Gaols wore few in number and excepting perhaps castle dungeons, were
8 ^
not considered secure. Certainly they were not capable of contain¬
ing the numerous defenders for the months, or in some cases years,
they awaited trial. Pledging arrangements were therefore utilised in
place of custody. According to the usual practice the defender was
freed, provided he found sufficient pledges, and was imprisoned only
84
if he failed to find such pledges.
It may be remembered that some writers have identified in the
English context a pledging arrangement for the defendant's appearance
35
in court as the prototype of modem bail. In view of the use of
pledging which we have outlined above a similar claim may be made in
the Scottish context. To evaluate the resemblance it is necessary
to give further consideration to the Scottish pledging arrangements.
Consideration of the early function of pledging soon reveals a
more extensive scope than bail. The question of bail generally arises
only when the accused is in custody, or if not technically arrested,
at least within the physical confines of the court (o.g. in the case
of a person summoned to appear and pleading not guilty). In earlier
times however the arrest of a reluctant accused often posed greater
problems than pre-trial custody. It appears, that from the eleventh
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century the crowner bore much responsibility for accepting pledges
from the accused in place of pre-trial custody. The crowner had
power to arrest the goods of the accused until a pledge was offered,
or if tie accused fled, he was obliged to pursue him and the citizens
were under a duty to assist. In some cases, however, the crownar
did not dare, nor did he have the povrer, to arrest tlie accused. In
this situation the sheriff either had to send sufficient men to make
the arrest, or himself act as pledge for the accused's appearance.®^
These difficulties were reflected in the early form of prosecution
21.
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by criminal letters. By criminal letters the accused was ordered
to oorae on a certain day, to find caution for his appearance to
underlie the law. Failure to find caution as directed, resulted in
an automatic sentence of outlawry.^' The necessity for this use of
pledging seems, however, to have diminished and eventually fallen
into disuse as the government grew more effective and the powers of
its officers were consolidated. Today the same problem is met by an
organised police force. By the time of Hume, prosecution by criminal
letters was indistinguishable from prosecution on indictment, except
in the form of words, and automatic outlawry no longer followed
90
failure to come and find caution.'
Though at first the law allowed pledges to bo accepted for almost
any offence, by the beginning of the fifteenth century a more
restrictive attitude prevailed and many offencos which today are
considered bailable were excluded. In cases where tliere had been no
91
arrest pledges were acceptable for every type of offonce.' '.7here
an arrest had occurred ^owevor,it was ordained in the earliest
legislation that those accused of manslaughter were not to be allowed
their freedom on giving a pledge, though a provision allowed accept-
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ance if permission was granted by King's letter.' Generally pledges
were not acceptable for accused who were caught redhanded committing
manslaughter, theft or robbery because such persons wore to be
summarily condemned. If justice was delayed it -was possible to accept
a pledge unless the offence was a great transgression against the
King or lords of the realm. In cases where no pledge was accepted the
91
accused was kept in custody until the trial.' Although Acts of
dobert III in 1397 and 1398 affirmed that pledges were acceptable for
94.
theft, robbery, slaughter and burning of the country, strict
95
limitations were introduced in 1400." By this legislation it was
forbidden to grant pre-trial liberty to accused arrested for mans¬
laughter by the King's command or that of his justiciaries, breakers
of prison, common and notorious thieves, those taken for burning or
felony, falsifiers of money or the king's seal, excommunicated
persons taken by command of the bishop, men taken for treason, or for
wickedness touching the King, or willingly resisting the king's
command by word or writ, and bailees making short account to their
masters. In ^cotlanu, however, it seems unlikely that the limitations
ware always heeded in practice even in the case of treason. Only
fifty years after liobert Ill's net it was necessary to pass another
act, to the effect that those ouspected of treason were to be kept
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in prison.' Later Acts in the sixteenth century provided that a
pledge might be accepted in serious coses e.g. fire raising, and
°7
ravishing of women, as in manslaughter.* Indued by the ond of the
sixteenth century, Jaiaes VI felt it necessary to increase severely
the unlav/ (fine for failure to appear after a pledge has been found
to underlie the law) for 'slaughter and other odious crimes", because
QQ
the fine was so small that it did not deter non-appearance.' The
practical inefficacy of these limitations is supported also by
Jumett who wrotes
"3uch continued to be the situation of the country and
insufficiency of its police that ... caution 'to underlie the law'
was received in almost every case, treason alone excepted, sometimes ,
without even an attempt to arrest the person in the first instance."99
Despite the fact that bail is not used, as pledging was sometimes,
as a substitute for arrest the similarity of function is still
striking. And although the rules for accepting pledges and granting
bail are not the same, it is easy to identify the reflection of the
former in modem bail.
For those attracted to this theory, it is not sufficient merely
to locate the origin of bail in this type of early pledging arrangement,
as controversy has surrounded the question of which specific form of
pledge anticipated hail. The controversy, as explained above,
centred round whether the origin of hail was to be found in the frank¬
pledge system. Or according to the less traditional view whether it
was to be found in a suretyship arrangement constituted for the
special purpose of guaranteeing the defendant's appearance for trial.
Unless willing to Ignore Sottish development and attribute the
form of bail solely to adoption of English ideas, it is not possible
to identify the frankpledge system as the origin of bail in Scotland
because frank pledge was confined to England and indeed only to parts
101
of -ngland. Nevertheless although frankpledge did not axist in
Scotland it is very easy to draw a parallel, as a system somewhat
similar did exist.
Under the feudal aystem every person was bound to be under a
master and the law ordained that each earl,, lord, baron and freeholder
102
should be responsible for entering his own men in court. The law
dealt strictly with idle men, beggars and othero without means of
support who did not have masters. Uuch men were ordered to find a
master and if they failed to do so, they were subject to unlaw and
101
also might be kept in custody until a master was found. This
severity extended to those accused of a crime. Thus where a man was
accused of theft and did not hove a master the law >rosuaed he was a
proven and convictod thief and treated him accordingly."*0^ There was
then,an extensive surety arrangement resembling and poasiMy inspired
by the frankpledge system.
Respite the existence of this system, there is no doubt
that individual pledging arrangements were competent for the purpose
105
of guaranteeing the accused's appearance in court. * rhus a law
oxiatou covering' the situation where the master refused to bo a pledge
106
for his jwin. % later law it was even provided that the master must
compensate the pledge, if the pledge had been fined because one of the
107master*a men hau fled instead of appearing in court. fhis obviously
illustrates thai the master and pledge were not necessarily identical.
Other examples of someone other than the master acting ao pledge may be
found in provisions relating to a person acting as a pledge for a
stranger who was staying in his house,an unmarried woman or widow
109
acting as pledge, a freaoan acting as pledge for liimself in minor
110 111
matters " or in some serious cases if he owned heritage. fhis
obligation of the master to st old as pledge appears to have formed part
112
of the superior's feudal duty to defend his vassal. ~ but this duty
did not preclude other arrangements.
It would seem reasonable therefore to identify the individual
pledging arrangements which more clearly resemble individual bail
arrangements as the prototype of bail, especially as similar arrange-
menta seem to have antedated the general pledging system inspired
by feudalism.
Ihoae theorists who identified the origin of bail in pledging
arrangements were divided about the identity of the person st nding as
pledge, fhey did not appear to consider the possibility thut the same
function, that is,guaranteeing the appearance of the accused in court,
:oight be achieved by more than one type of pledge involving different
consequences.
According to early loots law it was possible for an accused to
obtain his pre-trial freedon by offering a person as pledge either as
113
a forthcumand bor,?h or to answer as lav/ will to tho pursuer.
Standing as a forthcumand borfch the pledge was only liable to enter
the accused, if he waB fit and well, in court on the day appointed,
114
By entering the accused the pledge fully discharged Ms obligations.
If the accused did not appear in court, the pledge was liable for unlaw.
Me might also become liable to the pursuer for the accused's obligation,
though he could relieve him3;lf of this obligation by entering the
accused in court, at any time before or after the pronouncement of the
115
decree. In cases, however, where the pledge stood "to answer as
law will" his obligations went beyond the mere presentation of the
accused in court. Such a pledge was responsible until the end of the
case, and was answerable to the court and to the pursuer if the accused
was of insufficient means or insolvent. If the accused did not appear,
the pledge was liable to bo fined for the accused's non-appearance and
116
was also liable for the amount claimed by the pursuer, The earliest
reference to these two types of pledge which we found was in the
■Uoniar;i Attachp.amenta but from the information available it is not
possible to say whether they evolved separately, or whether one
117
evolved from the other,
Ihe theory of the origin of bail which we consider to be most
persuasive is that which identified the origin in the system of
presenting pledges for the appearance of the defendant in court. In
our research we found that the obligation undertaken by the forthcumand
borgh.unlike hostagesMp or the variois forms of pledging i.e. pledges
for wergeld, the "culreach1, pledging "to answer as law will",
encompassed only the duty to present the defender in court, This is
similar to the modern bail obligation. The obligation of the
forthcuaond bor-di also similar to bail, was extinguished when the
defender was brought before the court. We are of the opinion, there¬
fore, that the forthcumand borgh represented a significant stage in the
development of pledging. It is this form we would argue which best
represents tho prototype of modern bail.
To do justice, however, to the opposing view held by supporters
of tho hostage theory of bail some consideration must be given to the
use of hostageship in the sixteenth centuiy.
Throughout Scottish history parts of Scotland, particularl the
Highlands and Lowlands, were notoriously lawless. James VI, confronted
by this ago old problem, renewed efforts to enforce law and order
towards the end of the sixteenth century. As part of this policy he
instituted a system of precautionary suretyship similar to the feudal
system of general suretyship discussed above, dolls were compiled
containing the names of suspect d depredators and all landlords and
bailees in the Lowlands were charged, under pain of outlawry, to find
as surety and caution landed men outwith the Lowlands. Luty was laid
upon the landlords to present in court tony of their men, tenants, or
people dwelling on their land who were accused of any crime, and this
113
duty was extended to satisfying tho party harmed if necessary.
119
Simil i' surety had to be found by chieftains und principals of clans.
James's policy also authorised tho taking of host-ages. General
responsibility for the inhabitants of tho border lands devolved upon
*120
the wardens. It was ordained, however, that a warden might relieve
himself of some of this responsibility by handing over hostages,
representative of th© different clans, to be kept in custody. As a
result, the responsibility of a chieftain to present for trial any
member of his clan .vho was accused was confirmed. If the accused did
not appear the hostage held in custody was liable to suffer the
punishment, erven to d rath. In 3uch a case the chieftain's responsibility
to the injured party still remained and ho was also obliged to hand over
121
another pledge into hostageship. The person into whoso custody the
hostage was entrusted was under a considerable burden to prevent escape.
The extensive use made of this practice of ho .stageship led landowners
and barons to refuse to accept the responsibility. This provoked
retalitory legislation placing such refusal under the pain of fines
122
up t-> two thousand pounds Scots.
This legislation illustrates well a pledging system based on
hosta eship used as a method of compelling the appearance of the
accused in court, with the hostage liable to suffer the punishment
designed for the accused. It is also of interest in that it is an
example of a prospective general hostageship compared with the more
usual form of hostage, taken retrospectively after a particular
offence, to guarantee the appearance of a particular accused.
In this attempt to clarify what 3ort of expedient anticipated
bail in T-cotland, it is hoped that the early forms have been successfully
identified and that the juxtaposition of these forms and the competing
theories of bail has been illuminating. The form which in our opinion
most closely resembles bail has also been indicated.
The inquiry does not extend beyond the seventeenth century. The
term "bail ' did not appear in loots law before this time but reference
was mad© to various forms of borch. pledge, and caution, deference to
123
bail occurred in the latter part of the seventeenth century and
124
this was the terra used in the important Act of 1701 whioh
according to Hume, organised the law "into a new, clear and a more
provident order
REFORMS BSHAHBED DURING ggg S'jy.iTTilSNTH TO THIS NINiir^rgl CEKTPgr
"The matter of bail is one of the most




In view of the barbarities prescribed by some of the early
criminal laws, it is perhaps surprising to find that the law made
provision for pre-trial liberation. Although thi3 may originally
have been due to lack of any custodial alternative rather than
concern with protecting the individual, by the nineteenth century
bail was recognised as one of the most important civil liberties of
the subject.
In the following section we describe the ways in which the
institution of bail was abused and the liberty of the subject eroded
during the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.
The main abuses criticised namely undue delay before trial, high
bail money and wrongful imprisonment, are regrettably only too
similar to abuses identified by the critics of modern bail systems
which we describe in Chapter II.
In the Doolarati n of hstat >s of 1639, the Scottish Parliament
expressed its disillusionment ith Stuart rule nnd offered the Crown
to PiHiam end Clary. Tv7o of the abuses libelled in this declaration
127
were delaying trial and exacting extravagant bail. These
criticisms and the demands contained in the Claim of Itight success¬
fully provoked reforming legislation.
For those in custody committed in order to trial, the Act of
123
1701 instituted severe penalties for wrongfu. imprisonment,
provided jafeguards for the accused in custody and a time limit
within which ho had to be brought to trial or released. "The inequal¬
ities in the granting of bail, whereby murderers and other serious
offenders were sometimes released on bail while lesser offenders
might be kept in custody or granted bail to a 3um which they c-uld
not r ise, were also attacked by this Act. In this attack the Act
delineated those crimes which wore to be bailable declaring 'that all
orimes not inferring capital punishment shall be bailable • Phis
129
provision, however, did not affect the lord Advocate'a power to
consent to bail in any case, nor the po er of the High Court of
130
Justiciary to grant bail even in cases not bailable under the Act.
To prevent demands of exhorbitant bail which made the grant of
liberty iliusory in many oases, the Act laid down maximum bail amounts,
131 _
the maximum varying with the social status of the accused. Because
of fluctuating money values the court a 'were later given the power
to double these maxima. The maxima wore again increased^ after a
„ 134
minor candal caused by the case of Cameron. At the cane time
a law was passed which allowed the High Court of Justiciary, on
applic tion to the Lord Advocate, to extend these maxima in caso3 of
135 136
sedibion. This latter power was soon repealed, however,
137
"as savouring too much of arbitary power". Application for boil
30
under the Act, had to be in writing to a magistrate oompetant to try
the offence. The magistrate was subject to severe penalties if he
133
neglected to .grant liberation on bail to a person so entitled.
The wording of the grsuvt of bail, that the panel be liberated
"to answer at all diets", ensured that bail was extended to the trial
139
diet in cases where the accusod had appeared at an earlier pleading diet.
3ut the protection of the Act only applied to accused who had been
committed in order to trial and did not extend to the earlier :eriod
1 AO
where a person wa3 committed for further examination. llor did it
apply to the period after committal in order to trial. It did not
cover, therefore, application for bail once the trial had commenced,
though the court still had discretion with the consent of the
141
prosecutor to grant bail to any amount. Bail was never competent,
however, for the period after the verdict but before the pronouncement
142
of sentence. In capital cases bail was clearly incompetent, but
the case of suspension or an appeal from a sentence of impris nment
presented special problems, as the sentence was in daily execution before
the appeal was heard and perhaps granted, iluiae in raising those
doubts saidi
'the coxnplainer ... is truly denied the benefit of the low if he
is not released on finding surety, which may be fix d at the discretion
of the court, to return to gaol in case the sentence shall be affirmed"143
Apart from some legislation which was applicable in special
circumstances, i.e. the talcing of bail under warrants endorsed between
Scotland and other parts of the United idJagdom,^^ the petition for
'45
bail by a . e ;r, the taking of bail by a designated police officer
for any offence which might be competently tried before a justice of
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the poac court, the 1701 uot regulated the law of bail for almost
two centuries.
Abuses, however, continued to exist under the Act and it was not
unknown Tor persons who were incarcerated for lory periods before
trial, to enact themselves for transportation rather than remain in
custody awaiting trial,fhe criterion laid dov/n by the Act,
"that ali crimes not inferring capital punishment shall be bailable
also led to some serious anomalies, which wore highlighted as a more
restrictive attitude towards the use of capital punishment evolved.
fhus some capital offences were deemed not capital for the purpose
of bail and vice versa. Aor example, legislation was enacted to
allow bail to be granted to a revenue officer who killed in the
course of his duty, because if the charge was murder, this was a
140
capital offence and not bailaole. ' Similarly, when capital punish-
14r
laont was aoolished for forgery, forgery became a bailable crime,
but the abuse of forgers absconding nhile on bail necessitated more
legislation declaring, that for the purposes of bail, forgery was to
150 „
oe treated as if still a capital crime. Other anomalies which
occurred were for example the perpetrator of serious theft, a capital
crime, was not entitled to bail, yet the resetter who might be a
serious and persistent offender was so entitled, reset not being
caiital. A similar situation existed in relation to the crimes of
151theft and breacn of trust and embezzlement. in addition, many
152
crimes capital in theory were no longer so in practice. "
a Law Commission gave socio consideration to oaii in 1071 but did
not suggest altering the criterion of Dailabia and non-bailable
crimes, i'he commission contented itself with the proposal, that
applications for bail should always be intimated to the prosecutor
ane that limitations as to the amount of bail shouiu be abolished, the
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amount to be in the discretion of the court. itneoaes before the
Commission,however, had proposed that discretion whether to .-rant
bail should be a matter for fcho sheriff subject to appeal to the High
Court of Justiciary, ieform whan it did come in 1380 was along
similar linos to this latter proposal.
The 1333 Act, like tho 1701 Act, was particularly concerned with
bail in cases committed in order to trial. The earlier law, however,
marked off certain areasf for example cororaitta! for further examination,
after verdict before sentence pending appeal, as beinp subject to
special policy considerations. Theuo lines of division have survived
in modem law and partly account for the different considerations which
attach t bail decisions at certain stages of procedure.
The 1701 Act attempted reform by limiting the discretion of the
court, thus the Act not only restricted tho court' ability to grunt
or refuse bail, it also placed limits on the amount of bail which
could be demanded. Indeed tho possibility of a court demanding
unlimited bail was considered as 'savouring too nuc: .? arbitrary
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power". 3y contrast, the reforms of the 1383 .ct in the main
swept awuy these limitations. This Act, which foms tho basis of
modem law testified to tho increased confidence placed j>n the dis¬
cretion of the court.
The use made by the courts of this discretion will be among the
questions examined in followin chapters, where we consider whether
such confidence is justified or whether a modern demand for reform
is necessary.
II
LID. Di^MAND.'j FQd BAIL .CI7 ;U
A COM. V-R'TIV-, DJ3CRI TIJN
To provide a perspective in -which the Scottish bail system may be
judged we consider the attempts made by some other countries to deal
justly with the untried accused. 3y examining different approaches
to the problem of pre-trial custody we hope also to provide a fruitful
source of ideas for improving the Scottish system.
'bur examination was of course limited by the availability of
suitable source material. From the information available, however, we
hvo selected some of the more interesting variations and alternatives
to bail including examples of scrae countries which h;.rve dispensed with
a system of bail. Because of Scottish similarities we pay considerable
attention to Anglo-American legal systems in w- ich bail has recently
been the subject of a major re-examination.
C )UIfjam WHICH H. v.! AN 0 >V( TIVS BAIL SYGTSLi
(li -hirlo-American Legal Systems
Although the bail provisions in America and Canada -re baaed m
%glish law, the law and practice in the three countries has diverged.
The modern demand for reform of the bail system originated in
America in the nineteen fifties >and perhaps grew out of a more
general concert! about poverty and its discriminatory impact in
the administration of justice. Successive studies vfhich resulted
booause of this interest, revealed so many iniquities that major
changes in the American bail system were implemented. The reverber¬
ations of the American demand for reform encouraged other countries,




A right to be .granted bail in non-capital cases is given to the
defendant in the vast majority of American states, either in the state
3
constitution or by statute. For defendants who are to bo tried in
non-capital cases before a federal court, a right to bail has existed
since the Judiciary Act 1739* This right to bail recognised by the
lav/ i3 enjoyed by a defendant in all circumstances, except where there
is a risk that he is unlikely to appear for trial. Violation of this
right can be remedied by legal process. For example, it has been
decided that a judge is not justified in refusing bail on the grounds
that a defendant is dangerous to the community^ or is likely to commit
offences, if at liberty, before the trial.'
-oamandlng ''excessive bail'1 is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and similar provision is made in all
but one of the state constitutions.^ This provision has been restrict-
ivoly interpreted. The courts have said that it doos not give a right
7to an indigent defendant to be released on his own recognisance.
The security traditionally demanded by the judges is money
deposited with the court and subject to forfeiture if the accused
fails to appear. Bail amounts tend to be high, for example, bail set
at 5000 dollars or above is not unknown for offences of burglary and
3 _
assault. The provision of bail mousy has, however, become "big
business" due to the growth of the commercial bail bondsman, The
bail bondsman provides the bail a noy, on the payment of a fee, for
defendants who do not have the m ney. The fee oaid for this service
is in the region of 10 to 15 per cent of the f ce value of the bond
and is not returned to the defendant when he appears for trial,
doldfarb has described the growth of this business and its vulner¬
ability to criminal infiltration and corruption. He pointed out that
'in practice the judge's ruling oan be defeated by the caprice of the
bondsman who ccin refuse to provide bail for good reasons, bad reasons,
9
or no reasons".
The power to grant and fix the amount of bail is confined to the
judiciary and, therefore, the rrrjcit of bail on the authority of the
police or prosecutor is not competent.
Tiie system of money bail came under attack when the rosults of
etaoirical studies by, for example, i?oote and Ares, dankin and Jturz
were published.
The studios highlighted the plight of the poor accused and
attacked the existence of this financial discrimination in the system
of criminal justice. It was found that in many oases bail was set
without reference to the question whether the accused could raise the
amount and was related instead to the seriousness of the offence.
Another practice criticised was the manipulation by judges of the
amount of bail to achieve a result not sanctioned by the law, namely
11
the preventive detention of some defendants. Thus some judgas who
were unwilling to authorise bail because they believed, for example,
that the defendant might commit offences before trial, paid lip
service to the defendant'a right to bail and granted bail. By setting
bail at a very high amount, however, these judges attempted to ensure
•j >
that the defendant would not secure release.
The unsatisfactory conditions and length of pre-trial imprisonment
were also revealed by the studies. The defendant was found to be
prejudiced by this not only in social terms, for example, by causing
him to lose employment and disrupting family life, but also by making
it difficult for him to prepare his defence. In addition, evidence was
adduced which suggested that the bail decision might influence the
plea made, the finding at the trial and the sentence imposed. One of
the most important findings of the studies was that only a very small
number of defendants did in fact fail to appear in an effort to avoid
trial.
deform efforts followed two main directions. Firstly, efforts
were directed at improving the existing system and secondly, an attempt
1 3
was made to provide an alternative to bail as a method of release.
An example of an attempt to reform the existing system is the
Illinois scheme v?hich it was hoped v?ould "put the bail bond man out
of business and restore the control of pre-trial detention to the courts
Under this scheme provision was made to allow the accused to post bail
by depositing 10 per cent of the bond with the court instead of paying
this as a fee to the bondsman. If the defendant appeared the deposit
was returned with a small deduction to cover administration costs.
This scheme, of course, left unsolved the problem of defendants who
are unable to raise even 10 per cent of the bail money set.
In another reform effort, in this case directed by the Vera
Institute, the reformers attempted to break away from the traditional
reliance upon money bail as the criterion of release and developed
a different system. The system developed was based on the hypothesis
that the stability of a defendant's position in a town was a better
indicator of the likelihood of his appearance than his ability to
raise "bail. An attempt v/as made to measure this stability by
developing a scale, reproduced below, based on factors relating to
the family ties of the accused, his employment record, length of
15
residence and criminal involvement.
EXHIBIT I
To be recommended, a defendant needs:
1. A New York area address where he can be reached, AND
2. A total of five points from the following categories.
Int Vcr
PRIOR RECORD
2 2 No convictions
1 l One misdemeanor conviction
0 o Two misdemeanor convictions or one felony conviction
— l —l Three or more misdemeanor convictions or two or more
felony convictions
FAMILY TIES (In New York area)
3 3 Lives with family AND has contact with other family
members
2 2 Lives with family OR has contact with family
1 i Lives with nonfamily person AND gives this person as
reference
EMPLOYMENT
3 3 Present job one year or more "
2 2 Present job a months OR. present and prior job 6 months
1 l On and off job in cither of above 2 lines
OR Current job
OR Unemployed 3 months or less with 9 months or more
prior job
OR Receiving unemployment compensation or welfare
OR Supported by family
RESIDENCE (In New York Area: NOT on and off)
3 3 Present residence one year or more
2 2 Present residence 6 months OR Present and prior 1 year
1 1 Present residence 4 months OR Present and prior 6
months
TIME IN NEW YORK CITY
1 1 Ten years or more
DISCRETION






Reason(s) for discretionary point.
The first operational achono organised by the Vera Institute was
the Manhattan Bail Project which came into effect in 1961. Under the
scheme all arrested defendants, if they gave consent, were interviewed
by the Vera staff who were usually university law students. The Vera
staff completed a standard information sheet which is reproduced
overleaf.^
The defendant'3 "community roots" score was derived from this
information on the basis shown in the Vora scale. An attempt was then
immediately made to verify this information, usually by telephone. It
was hoped that if verified information could be presented to the court
about the "community roots ' of tho defendant the court might be induced
to release the accused on his own recognisance (d.O.d.J. ii.O.R.,
according to American legal theorists, differs from b:iil in that no
obligation is incurred by any third party. Under R. l.R. a defendant
may be released without any financial conditions as envisaged in the
Vera scheme or the defendant alone may sign a bond with or without cash
17
deposit. If release after a Vera recommendation, was granted by the
court the staff attempted to keep in contact with the defendant in
ordur to remind him of the date and time of his next court appearance.
According to Goldfarb, within three years 65 per cent of those
interviewed were being recommended for R.O.R. and about 93.5 per cent of
those released appeared in court on the appointed date. This compared
with a success rate of about 95 P©r cent for those released by the
10
traditional method of bail.
Despite this apparent success, the scheme was not without its
critics who said that the scheme left the bad risks to be released, if
19
at all, throu-h the bondsman service. y A related criticism was to the
effect that the defendants, who were released with Vera backing, would
EXHIBITI
1.Nor:.;.QNo lostfir tmiddle DoteCtofcppccrcnce.D.N .., ReasonforExclctn1 PvlAllyVNInvcstinater Co-DcfJLNj(Ncxcs)A3cs_. .DescriptionNV/S/HFtY .EnglishJUL. 3.ArcYouondrutsNEverY/h nlost, 4.Presentlylivi gat no.streetbo oopfl r PerOnr.-JoffYNPh no Y.'iih(Namecr.dRnl-.l r.nl 5.Previouslylivedot 6.NYCresidentfe 7.RelctivcsInNYCthe!ke pi loseconte tv/ith.H w NomeRelationAddressPhoneOfSe 8.Ncwmarried?LCLStatusTSHclonq? SChildrenSpouseNam ,.Address 9.Presentlyemployedb .........^ .company&address PerAsa 10.Ifunemployed,howla g HowsupportedU1Y/SavpousOther 11.Previouslyemployedb PerAsa 12.ffemployed,sup ortanyone? 13.Y/hctisyourl tofhealth?, Evl:hosp'df rphysicaloment ldisorder?YN/he Howlong?Y/hcreR1N R3N R.JN CTANA 2.Aje.
EXHIBITI(continued)





Doesthecomplaincntkn wvouYNIsitC!<t eakh? _
IAGREETOLL Y/HVE AFOUNDATIONCALLTHP P ELIST DIMMEDIATELY ABOVEINCUESTCN20FTHFOUNDA IONWI HESECKMYREFERENCES. Signature,
have been released and appeared without the intervention of Vera
personnel. The scheme, it w&3 said, did not help a forest number of
defendants who were poor and less likely to satisfy the essentially
middle-class criteria based on "community roots". dven some comment¬
ators who accepted the success of the project raised a caveat. «<ald,
for example, pointed out that research had verified tho hypothesis
that defendants with good community ties would not flee but this did
not prove the opposite, namoly that defendants without good community
ties vfould flee. Because of this, ^aid argued that many of the
conditions imposed routinely might be unnecessary, expensive to enforce
and provoke resentment.^
3uch criticisms were, however, outweighed by praise for tho Vera
scheme which was generally considered as having provided a solution to
some of the much criticised faults of the bail system. Other Vera
inspired projects soon followed in many of the states. In these
projects a wide variety of different people, comprising law students,
probation officers, prosecuting attorneys, defence counsel, public
defenders and court staff, wore given the task in one or more states
.22'
of fact finding and verification.
Another attempt to alleviate the plight of the untried accused
was made by the Vera Institute in 1964 when it initiated the Manhattan
2 1
Sir,mono project. In this second project, an attempt was made to
circumvent the necessity for bail, by Vera staff recommending to the
police in suitable cases that a person after a police interview should
not be arrested but summoned to appear for any future trial. This also
23
stimulated states to reconsider their traditional practices.
At the federal level, tho demand for reform led to the passage of
the Bail Heform Act of 1966. 'This legislation, described by Wald,
created a statutory presumption in favour of d.O.R. before trial
>4
without any financial conditions. Introducing an innovation the
Act also provided for a 'scale of conditions of release". These condi¬
tions ranged through S.O.il., third party custody, limitation of travel
residence or association, cash deposit, a surety bond and release
into the community by day with return bo custody at night. The Act
also gave discretion to the judges to impose other conditions.
'The early attempts at reform were given much favourable attention
in 1964 when a report was made to the National Conference on Bail and
25
Criminal Justice. In 1963 the philosophy and many of the provisions
of the reform projects were adopted by the American Bar Association and
26
published as recommended minimum standards for pre-trial reler.se.
Later studies of the results of the reform efforts have not,
however, been encouraging. Wald reported that studies from 1968-71
have shown that some 40 per cent of defendants were still being
detained -md in one study it was found that the number of defendants
detained was greater than before the implementation of reforms. In
assessment Laid argued that the bail reforms;
'have probably had their greatest impact in releasing good risk
defendants who might otherwise have had to pay a bondsman or go to
jail. They did not, however, do very much to solve the problem of the
defendant who needs supportive help in the community to succeed on
release. Nor have they reduced the stag ering costs society and the
individual still pay for detaining persons not et convicted of an/
crime. Finally, the abhorent conditions under which presumptively
Innocent men are detained, have on the whole, gotten worse, not
better, due to overcrowding', physical deterioration of facilities,
and a steadfast refusei to allocate adequate funds to this part of
our criminal system". 27
dhe considered that future reforms ought to be concerned with
ameliorating the conditions of pre-trial detention for defendants
who are not released. In this respect some limitations on the time
liable to be spent in custody wa3 considered essential. Agreeing with
earlier researchers that money bail was inequitable oer so. she also
argued that its continued existence was preventing the concentration
of attention and resources necessary to make alternative conditions of
release work.
It seems unlikely, however, that the bail system will be abolished
until sane solution is found to the problem of protecting the community
from defendants considered to be dangerous because, for example, they
may commit acts of violence or other offences while at liberty.
Preventive detention is not legally sanctioned in America but in some
casos the judges have attempted to provide this protection by manip-
28
ulation of the bail system. It has been recognised, however, that
this practice not only unfairly discriminates against the poor but is
also unreliable in the protection it affords, as the orofessional
criminal who may be the most dangerous to the community is the most
likely to have "contacts'' ablo to orovide bail. Considerable resist¬
ance to the philosophy of preventive detention and, in view of the
Eighth Amendment, doubts surrounding its constitutionality at present,




There is no right to bail in Canada but the Canadian Bill of
Bights has a provision to the effect that the law 3hall be construed
so that no person shall be deprived of 'the right to reasonable bail
31
without just cause". This provision has not, however, been judicially
interpreted and it is uncertain what protection it affords the defend¬
ant. Although it is accepted that the main purpose of bail 3s to
ensure that the defendant will appear for trial other criteria enjoy
30
a limited acceptance. It has been pointed out by Friedland that bail
may be competently refused on the grounds that the accused may inter¬
fere with witnesses or the prosecution case or may commit other
offences while on bail.^
The form of bail is described in the Canadian Criminal Code as a
recognisance entered into by the accused before a justice, with
sureties to the amount directed by the justice. Although this form is
similar to that found in iinglish lav/, which makes provision for the
creation of a debt owed by the surety if the accused fails to appear,
the practice in Canada resembles American rather than English practice.
In Canada the courts demand deposit of security before the release of
the accused. Both cash and property bail are accepted. The amount
of b ii demanded may be high, for example, Friedland described the
median amount of cash bail set for offences of breaking and entering,
auto theft, joyriding and possession of burglar tools, respectively as
1001-2000 dollars, 301-500 dollars and 501-1000 dollars."^
Unlike America, the operations of the professional bondsman are
36
illegal though in many cases their activities are ignored, A
similar function, with less taint of illegality, is also carried out
by professional money lenders.
One of the most important studies inspired by the American
research, was Friedland*s study of the extant and nature of custody
before trial in the Toronto 'iagistrate* s Courts.
■ulany of Friedlaad's findings were similar to the conclusions of
the American studies, ifost importantly, Friedland found that although
only about 5 P®r cent of defendants were refused bail at first court
appearance, about 22 per cent of defendants pleading not guilty to a
summary offence and about 66 per cent of defendants pleading not guilty
to an indictable offence spent some time in custody after the first
37
court appearance. Friedland submitted that if the defendant was
44.
deemed to be a good risk by tho magistrate he ought to be released and
not kept in custody because of his inability to raise bail. If the
defendant wa3 not considered a good rialc, this ought to be stated and
bail refused, instead of attempting to achieve the same result by
38
demanding high bail. Attention was also directed to tho need for a
reassessment of the criteria regulating the refusal of bail.-^friedland
argued that if it was decided, that an estimate of the likelihood of
the defendant committing further offences while on bail ought to be
included in the criteria, the implications of this form of preventive
detention ought to be discussed and safeguards provided for the
defendant. Possible safeguards which he approved wore the placing of
the onus of proof on the Crown and a duty placed on the courts to give
reasons for their decision.^0 The practice of requiring security in
advance was also subject to severe criticism and adoption of the English
41
practice was urged." Like the American researchers, Friedland argued
that more use ought to be made of R.0.A. To achieve this he advocated
the adoption of a scheme,similar to that employed by the Vera Institute,
to collect information about the defendant's background and ties in the
42
community and to make recommendations to the court.
(<?/ ,4¥"l<an4
A right to bail in misdemeanour cases wa3 established in ->ngland
in 1275 by the Statue of Westminster, but no provision was made for the
release of an arrested person in more serious cases where a felony was
charged, This right to bail was abolished by the Indictable Offences
Act 1848^ and replaced by provisions which gave a single magistrate
the power to grant bail at his discretion in all cases excluding
treason cases. A similar provision in the magistrates Courts Act 1952
forms the basis of the modem law.
The law states that bail may be refused on the ground that the
defendant may abscond, and in this respeot factors such as the nature
of the offonce and the likelihood of guilt are considered relevant.
Other grounds, particularly the likelihood of the defendant committing
offences while on bail or interfering with the administration of
45
.justice, have also gained recognition.
The demand of excessive bail was prohibited in the Bill of Rights
1639 but there was no appeal possible on this ground. The only remedy
46
given until 1967 was to apply for a writ nf habeas corpus and this
was competent only if the amount demanded was so excessive as to 'mount
47
to a refusal of bail.
To find bail the defendant must enter into a recognisance in which
he undertakes an obligation to appear and may also undertake an oblig¬
ation to pay over a specified sura of money if he fails to appear. If
requested the defendant must also provide sufficient and satisfactory
sureties. Historically the defendant was handed over into the custody
of the surety and the obligation of the surety was to present the
defendant for trial.^ Although some reference to this still exists
in the law, for example,the surety's right to arrost the defendant if
the surety believes he intends to abscond, the obligation which is now
undertaken is the payment of a specified sum in the event of the non¬
appearance of the defendant. In no case does money have to be deposited
in advance. Due to this practice, and the prohibition against contracts
of indemnity between a defendant and his surety, notiling similar to
49
the bondsman system has evolved.
Unlike America and Canada the granting of bail is not limited to
judicial officers. The police are also vested with discretion to
release a person arrested without warrant, provided the offence does
50
not appear to the police to be serious. The decision lies with the
police officer in charge of the police station. This officer must
consider bail whenever it is not reasonably practical to bring: the
arrested person before a court within 24 hours, and even if this is
reasonably practical he may still consider and grant bail. Mother
practice which may aid the quick release of a defendant is the
acceptance by the police of the bail specified in the arrest warrant.
It is an accepted practice that a magistrate in granting a warrant
may if he thinks fit make provision for bail, i.e., he may 'back the
51
warrant for bail.
Public concern about bail and pre-trial imprisonment led to the
52
publication in i960 of a Home Office report. This study described
the excessive use made of custodial remands and the time spent by
53 •
defendants awaiting trial. It was estimated that custodial remands
before final disposal were applied in one year to about 9000 persons
54
who did not subsequently receive any sentence of detention.
A number of research efforts wore al30 directed at the decisions
55made about bail by the courts and some disturbing results were produced.
These studies were unanimous in their conclusions that the information
given to the court was in most cases totally inadequate and could not
56
support a rational bail decision. In this context the plight of the
unrepresented defendant at the bail hearing vas particularly criticised.
Indeed one writer was moved to conclude that the situation is "not that
the unrepresented defendant is not given a fair hearing but in effect
57
he is given no hearing at all".
Considerable interest was shown by the researchers in the American
Vera Institute bail experiment, Bavi s and Bottomley, for example,
produced ''community roots" scores for the cases in their samples and
reported that a much greater number of defendants were eligible for
CO
release on Vera criteria than were in fact released. A warning note
against the over enthusiastic reception of the Vera schema was, however,
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sounded by Aander. He pointed out that "community roots" criteria
related more to the likelihood of reappearance than other factors, for
example, the commission of offences while on bail, which -hglish courts
also consider relevant to the bail decision. Perhaps with this or
similar objections in mind, most writers did not advocate the adoption
in -fogland of the Vera scoring scheme, fhe writers did, however,
believe that Vera type information ought to be placed before the court
and advocated the adoption of standardised information sheets which
would be given to the magistrates. Unfortunately no suggestion was
made as to who would complete these information sheets, whether the
information would be verified, and if so, the manner in which this
could be achieved. It was indeed proposed that in practice this task
might have to be left to the police. ^ dome support, however, may
still be found for the adoption of a scoring system. The argument
put forward by ICing ?/as that8
"in spite of assertions to the contrary there really appears to
be no valid reason why a points score system similar to the Vera
method should not be adapted to the English situation. It is true of
course that courts in this country may refuse bail for reas ns which
involve 30 much uncertainty and guesswork that they defy scientific
evaluatio . Yet this does not mean that it would be a waste of time
to assess objectively those items of information which relate to the
defendant's record and community ties, A recommendation for or
against bail based on a points score assessment does not necessarily
exclude the exercise of magistrate's discretion'. 61
Following the American work, -nglish researchers also inquired
into the effects of the refusal of or failure to find bail. The
tentative results recorded bore out the American findings that
custodial remands adversely affected the plea, finding and disposition
of the case. Other adverse effects, for example, disruption of
family life, loss of employment and difficulty in preparing a defence
wqre also described.
Comparatively little attention appears to h ;ve been given to the
financial aspect of bail, includin; the provision of sureties. In
the .ample -iescrib d in the Heme Office report, sureties ere found for
sums between 25 and 200 pounds by about 42 per cent of defendants
cortEdtted for trial, and by about 15 par cent of defendants tried
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summarily. Sureties for suras over 200 pounds wero f und respectively
by 1.5 per cent md 0.4 per cent of defendants.^ It was concluded
65
that the "sureties demanded •.» ere not abnormally high". Failure
to find a surety was recorded as the sole reason i'or refusal of bail
66
in respectively 1 per cent and 7 per cent of the cases. Ho statistics
wero given, however, about the number of defendants refused bail where t
inability to provide a satisfactory surety was a contributory reason
for the refusal, fhe delay caused by finding sureties willing to act
and satisfactory to the courts or police and the result at time
spent in cuat dy by the defendant, we re also not recorded, The criteria
era loyed by the oourta or p lice to reject uneatisf sotory sureties
67
have been criticised by King as sometimes arbitrary ai unfair.
King :-&bo drew attention to the fact that in his san le of courts there
was a great disobcity ranging from 15 to 70 per cent in the proportion
60
of cases in which sureties se.-e considered necessary. fhis
suggests that the necessity to provide sureties may impose an
inequitable and perha s unnec?ssary burden on some lefendnnte.
Legislative action to i:a3jior"te some of the un tiof ctory
features of the bail system » s taken in the Crimin .1 Justice Act 1967.
Interestingly this Act reintroduced a right to bail, buch a ri?ht,
however, is given only to defendants charged with a sucsaary offence
punishable with not more than six months imprisonment. ' fhe scope
70
of this ri,ght is further limited by additional qualifications.
It has been suggested that the application of these provisions may
not result in an increase in the number of persons released, because
the existence of the wide qualifications may surest to magistrates
71
reasons why bail should be refused. Cortainly the provisions
guarantee release only to an insignificant minority of defendants,
and in view of the attitude expressed by the Lord Chancellor, it seems
12
unlikely that this right will be extended.
An innovation, perhaps more profitable to the defendant, is the
duty placed on magistrates to pLve an unrepresented defendant written
notice of the grounds on which bail was refused. Such notice must
also be provided on the request of the defendant's l9gal representative.
In res arch undertaken after the Act, however, the criticism has been
made that in practice this notice is not always given to unrepresented
rj «
defendants.
A provision authorising soma experimentation with the conditions
75of ralea e is also contained in the Act. This was not in effect
an innovation as the practice of imposing conditions, though of
dubious legality, was well established before the Act. Conditions
attached to bail, such as periodic reporting to a police station or
surrendering of a passport, represent a form of restricted liberty
which the .merican researchers advocated to enable some poor risk
defendants to be liberated.
In a study completed after the implementation of the 1,67 Act,
King found that special conditions were imposed in 14»7 per cent of the
cases. lie also found that despite come exceptions, the evidence did
not suggest that the power to impose conditions was being used
1 tS
unreasonably or without restraint. He was alarmed, however, at the
wide powers to impose conditions authorised by the words ''in the
77
interests of justice or for the prevention of crime', and argued,
that this might "lead to a substantial curtailment of freedom for
those on bail and even to a system of house arrest which wa3 far
78
removed from anything contemplated by Parliament.' He proposed,
therefore, that seme restraint should be placed on the type of
7Q
conditions which may be imposed.
80
In 1971 the Home Office supported proposals to open "an
establishment, on em experimentalii basis, of a bail hostol for defendants
on remand who would otherwise be refused bail because they had no fixed
31
abode". Such an establishment, providing twelve beds for male
defendants, was opened in London in November 1971* It has been argued,
however, that the provision of such accommodation even on an extensive
scale is not the solution. King has criticised the bail hostels
arguing that»
"remarkably little thought soems to have been given either to
the nature of 'bail hostels' or to the type of prisoner who will live
in them. It is clear enough that the groat advantage of hostel
accommodation is that it allows a person to carry on working and does
not shut him off from the remainder of the community. Yet the man
with 'no fixed abode' is unlikely to havo a regular job, nor will his
commitment to society or his roots in the community be particularly
strong. In short it is this type of remand prisoner who is least
likely to benefit from temporary hostel accommodation". 32.
In King's opinion the provision of bail hostels merely detracted
attention from the real need, namely complete reform of the conditions
under which prisoners are remanded. The success of the bail hostels
has been considered in a Home Office survey. This revealed that of those
men granted bail with a hostel condition, 70 per cent honoured that and
all other conditions, and committed no further offences while on bail.
About 39 per cent answered to bail but 19 per cent were in breach of
some - though perhaps minor - conditions."
The major problems of insufficient information, irrational
decisions and the adverse effects of pre-disposition custody, though
now well documented, have not yet been resolved. The question of bail
51.
is being examined, however, by a working party set up by the Home
Secretary in 1972. Ho doubt some of these problems will be tackled
fiA
in the working party's recommendations.
(2,) q
w 35gEaasa
There is no right to bail in France. Accordin: to Vouin there
is, however, provision for mandatory release where the offence is a
petty offence, or a correctional offence not legally punishable by a
tern exceeding two months imprisonment. In addition, mandatory release
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is required, subject to rather wide conditions, when the maximum
penalty prescribed by law i3 less than two years imprisonment. V/here
mandatory release is required the defendant must be granted release as
of right and such release is not sub ect to the imposition of any
financial conditions.
In all other cases the defendant may be granted release only at
the discretion of the competent judicial authority. It is possible for
the judge to grant such release on his own initiative, or on the motion
of the prosecutor or of the defendant. Application for release may be
made at any stage of the proceedings.
Preventive detention is recognised by French law. The judge,
in exercising his discretion, is entitled to consider whether the
defendant will abuse his liberty if released. The grounds justifying
refusal of liberty because of fear of abuse are wide, and include the
prevention of the flight of the defendant, prevention of interference
with the course of justice (by for example preventing the commission
of further offences) and calming the community. To impose preventive
detention the judge, in addition to the requirement of fear of abuse of
liberty, must be satisfied that there exists serious indications of the
guilt of the defendant. To protect the defendant the Code of Penal
ihrocednre allows appeal from the refusal of release and limits prevent¬
ive detention to a period not exceeding two months. Release is compuls¬
ory if this limit is exceeded without an order being made for the
extension of the period. There is, however, no limit to the number of
orders of extension which may be made and in effect, therefore, no
limit to the time which a defendant may spend in custody under prevent-
*
ive detention.
In comparison to the Anglo-American legal systems, there are
some Interesting variations in the conditions of release. Under French
law release is without exception "subject to the proviso that the
defendant undertake to appear again at every stage of the proceedings
as soon as he may be required and to keep the examining judge informed
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of all his movements'. From this it may be seen that the defendant's
racognisance imposes a more onerous obligation than that usually
required by Anglo-American systems. A second condition relates to the
election of domicile by the defendant to facilitate the service of
documents and notices relating to the proceedings. The imposition of a
third condition relating to the provision of financial security lies in
the discretion of the judge.
Security in the form of recognisance by a third party, similar
to the present English surety system, was competent before 1959 but was
so rarely applied that it was abolished. Now, if security is demanded,
it must be furnished in 'coin, banknotes, certified cheques or bonds
issued or guaranteed by the 3tate and must be deposited",0^ with an
officer of the court. The security recognised by French law is,
however, composed of two parts, only one of which bears any resemblance
to the Anglo-American form. The first part of the security deposited.
guarantees the defendant's appearance at the different procedural
stages and. is ultimately refunded by the court of the defendant
fulfills this oondition. The second part of the security however|
"guarantees according to an order of priorities fixed by law,
the cost- Jtcurred by the public authorities (the state), then such
fines as may be imposed and, finally, the restitution and reparation
which the court orders in favour of the victim." 90
It is obvious that in order to cover these guarantees the amount of
security required alight be very high. Although there is no provision
in the Code that the security oust be based on the defendant's means,
according to Vouin, the judges do take the financial resources of the
defendant into account. Although the imposition of security is,comp¬
aratively rare in practice, Vouin has argued that more use ought to be
91
made of this condition.
(l) Variations in a Legal ->v:ton of tho ^ast
JaoanQ2
In Japan a right to bail ha3 existed since 1943* This right does
not apply, however, to the period of investigation and this restricted
application has been subject to some criticism, a9 the period of
detention during investigation may extend to 25 days. The right to
bail is further restricted by wide exceptions including an exception
for offences punishable by a minimum imprisonment of not less than
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one year.
Discretionary release by a judge is also possible, though this is
less common. The judge may grant such release without any application
from the defendant which is useful, for example, in the case of an
unrepresented defendant who may be unaware of the release procedure.
In exorcising his discretion the judge may take into account,
circumstances justifying preventive detention, for example, [suggestions
that the defendant may tamper with evidence or commit further offences
if released.
Although there is no prohibition against excessive bail, the
judge in setting bail is directed by the Code of Criminal procedure
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to take the financial ability of the defendant into account. Both
deposit of cash or negotiable sureties, and a written promise to pay
the sum undertaken by a third party, are recognised ways of finding
bail. It may be appreciated, therefore, that the Japanese system
combines features of the English surety system and the American and
Canadian deposit system.
The judge ha3 discretion to impose other non-financial conditions
but it is laid down by law that some conditions are i iroper and such
conditions are prohibited, for example, a condition that the defendant
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must be of good behaviour.
In addition to bail Japanese law makes provision for a non¬
monetary system of release called suspension of the execution of
detention, .suspension has been described an a peculiarity of Asian
law, called at various times in its liistory 0a2uke and Jakiku. Under
this forra of release the judge releases the defendant into the protec-
96
fcive custody of a person or institution."' This resembles the histor¬
ical institution of English suretyshi > but differs from it, not only
due to the absence of a financial guarantee, but also because in
suspension the entrustee uoe3 not have any legal right or duty to
apply force to ensure the defendant's appearance. The only sanction
applicable to suspension i3 the rescission of the order, which of cours
makes the defendant liable again to detention. According to Dando and
Tamiya suspension 13 now of little importance, but the;/ have argued
that this method of release might increase in importance with the
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expansion of social welfare agencies.
couimtr.£ '.viiich HAVE A BAIt DYITS.I OH PAPER
In some legal systems, although provision i3 made for bail the
institution has fallen into disrepute and disuse. Indeed, in some
jurisdictions bail now enjoys little more than a paper existence
enshrined in a statute.
Ill Sgasgsk
In ->enmark although the law makes provision for ball and other
kinds of conditional release, these forms of liberty are never
authorised. Persons are either released without any condition or
held in custody. According to a report written by Botein and dturz
this failure to use bail stems from the belief that bail :,is an
instrument oppressive to the poor b it convenient for the rich and well
98connected".
QQ
'flie results of one Danish study quoted by 3otein and dturz
showed that in 19o1 only 6600 persons wore arrested and of these
500C we-e released by the police within 24 hours. In the whole of
Denmark detention hearings were instituted in only 3200 cases. As
such hearings are confined to the most serious cases, release is
rare and was granted in only 200 cases. The Danes prefer to avoid
the necessity for conditional release, by avoiding arrest whenever
possible, and using instead summons procedure to initiate prosecu fcions.
•'hen compared with re .onmendafcions made in other countries that
greater use should be made of different forms of conditional release to
enable the greatest number of defendants to be released, the Danish
experience would appear to suggest that the emphasis ought to
be shifted, from the isvising and utilisation of new forms of
conditional release, to the avoidance of unnecessary arrest.
(2litaS£101
fh© Norwegian experience has resulted in a disillusionment
with bail which Bratholm has suggested was due to the refusal of the
courts to accept that bail could achieve the legally proscribed purp¬
oses of detention, namely the prevention of the flight of the defendant,
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of interference with witnesses or of repetition of the offence*
Although provision is made for bail it is according to Bratholm,
10 <
"rarely used - probably indeed no more than once or twice a year."
Norwegian law tries to limit the use of detention by providing
that arrest and detention are only competent when the offence
charged carries a maximum statutory penalty of more than six months
and in addition one of the legally prescribed purposes of detention
can be shown to exist.
Despite this limitation, a study by Bratholm revealed that the
use of detention and length of custody gave cause for concern and
if) 4
compared unfavourably with the practice in Denmark and weden.
Bratholm argued that in practice other purposes not recognised
by the existing law were being achieved by covert manipulation of the
lav/* Hie solution he advocated was the reconsideration and redefinition
of the purposes of detention. If, he argued, it was considered
necessary and acceptable that detention be used to aid investigation,
or for general preventive purposes, or as a "shock ' in certain
individual cases, this should be explicitly'^cognised by the law.
This would allow the necessary protection for the defendant, which was
lacking in the existing law, to be provided. Much of the manipulations
of the law could also be avoided ho argued, by requiring judges to give
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very specific reasons to support a detention order.
Bratholm did not make any recommendations to revive the bail
system, probably agreeing with the courts that bail was unruited for
the realisation of the functions expected of it.
(3) The .ovist Union
After the Hussion revolution of 1917 the existing bail system
was abolished on the principle that the wealthy ought not to be given
any opportunity to buyttheir freedom. The superceding law made
provision for release, in suitable cases, either on the defendant's
promise to appear, or on the provision of a surety by a third party
or social organisation."'^0
ilelease on these terms continues to apply, but a provision
authorising bail has been reintroduced to the law. Under Article 39
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of the soviet Code of Criminal -hrocoduro bail may be granted at
the discretion of the prosecutor or as the discretion of the court.
Article 99 states that the amount of bail should be date Mined by the
official granting bail who must take into account the circumstances
of the case. Bail may consist either of money or valuables and must
be deposited with the court. The deposit may be supplied by the
defendant himself, or by a third party or by a social organisation.
An explanation of this change in policy relating to bail has
been given by Busis. Ha stated that the reintroduction of bail was
possible because the capitalist elements in Husaian society had been
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eradicated. In view of this the suggestion that the deposit of
money might in some cases be an effective way of backing up the
obligation undertaken by the defendant had proved acceptable.
According to Husis, however, the bail provisions have provoked




cjmmgijs vmicg jakd ho '.voviimfoh a but, srags :
ilie weaknesses of systems of release dependent on money security
have been detailed above at some length. It is perhaps surprising that
such forms of release are to be found in so many legal systems repres¬
enting such a diversity of legal development. Although there is
consider ble ex erimentation with a wide variety of alternative forms
of release in the countries which v/e have described, these countries
still cling to a system of bail#
In a few countries, however, the bail system has been completely
rejected by both law and practice. W'e turn now to outline the exper¬
ience of two of these countries.
(1/ 'wodffl? 110
Despite the fact that Jwoden has no system of bail, the country
has a record of length and frequency of pre-trial detention which
compares very favourably with the practice of countries, described
abrvo, which operate such a system.
fhe results of a 3fcudy of arrest in Dtockholm in iyS'2 were
reported by Botein and Sfcurz. It was found that 57 por cent of persons
arrested were released within 24 hours. For the remaining 43 per cent
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the average length of pre-trial custody was 19 days.
Swedish law attempts to safeguard the defendant by definin; the
circumstances in which a person may be detained and placing strict
Limitations on the time which the defendant may be liable to spend in
custody#
-he police may detain a person for investigation for 12
hours after which period the person must either be released or
arrested# A person must bo released if a minor offence, carrying
only a fine or temporary suspension from office, is charged. After
arrest, jurisdiction passes to the prosecutor. The prosecutor also
has power to release the arrested person, "but if he does not
authorise release, he must within 5 days file a detention petition
with the court. The circumst rxcas which the court must take into
consideration are defined by statute. The court may order detention
if "probable cause" exists to suspect a person of committing a crime
punishable by imprisonment and "if there is reason to fear that the
suspect may flee, dispose of evidence, prevent investigation or
112
continue his criminality". In cases where the crime charged
carries a minimum penalty of two years imprisonment detention must
be ordered "unless it is clear that no reason exists (for this pre-
11^
caution)". The court must give a decision within 4 days.
A safeguard against prolonged and unnecessary detention is to
be found in provisions to the effect, that the judge must set a trial
date at the detention hearir^, end if trial is not held before the
expiry of 2 weeks another detention hearing oust be held unless waived
by tho defendant. Failure to comply with these provisions oust result
in the release of the defendant. According to Botein and dturz these
provisions have ensured that in practice trial is usually held within
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a 2 week period.
Although Botein and aturz reported that mo3t defendants are
released unconditionally, it is competent for either the prosecutor
or the court to impose a variety of non-financial conditions, for
example, periodic reporting to the police.
44C
{h)
Vargha, in describing the treatment of the untried defendant in
Hungary pointad out that Hungarian law, although it does not make any
provision for boil, does provide for unconditional release.
In no circumstances, however, has a right to unconditional
release been created, Heleass is discretionary, and may be refused if
custody is consid red necessary "to guarantee the success of criminal
procedure or to prevent a further criminal offance from being committed"
Hungarian law draws a clear distinction between cu3tody before
trial and after a sentence of imprisonment, and this is reflected in
the treatment of the two types of prisoners. Phis distinction does
not, ho..-ever, prevent the courts from taking time 3pent in pre-trial
custody into consideration for sentencing purposes and the pre-trial
custody period must be calculated as part of the sentence.
Instead of custody or unconditional release Hungarian law, like
Swedish law, makes provision for a variety of forms of conditional
release. Vargha has explained that these preliminary safety measures,
for example, prohibition against the abandonment of domicile, are
designed to replace remand vthen a minor limitation of freedom w>uld be
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sufficient to ensure the presence of the defendant.
In the following chapters we describe the provisions of dcots
law which regulate the treatment of untried accused and, bearing in
mind the defects and problems encountered in other countries, we
examine the way these provisions work in practice.
Ill
MODSSEf SCOTS LAW
TH3 LAW IISLATIES TO BAIL
2hq discussion of the legal provisions regulating boll assumes a
familiarity with Scottish criminal procedure which not '11 readers may
possoss. In the following section, therefore, we attempt to provide
soma background information by giving a brief description of relevant
procedure and the criminal court hierarchy.
AH jUKJJfe. OF ;C0rfI3h CjilMINAL 'ilOChgl.iE1
In Scotland there is a system of public prosecution headed by the
Lord Advocate and staffed by Advocates-Depute in the High Court of
Justiciary and procurators-ficoal in the sheriff courts. ! a justice
of the peace and the burgh prosecutors, who staff the la/ courts, also
prosecute in the public interest but are not under the control of the
Lord Advocate. Private prosecutions are rare, and with a few statutory
exceptions, will not be entertained by the courts unless consent to the
prosecution has been obtained from the Lord Advocate or the High Court
of Justiciary. The police have no power to prosecute and imist report
the results of any investigation made by them to the appropriate public
prosecutor, who has the duty to oversee or conduct the later preparation
of the case* It is the public prosecutor who i3 vested v?ith discretion
to decide whither a prosecution will be brought, v/h t offence will be
charged and subject to legal limitation, the type of procedure.
There are two types of procedure, summary and solemn, hich may
be followed at trial. The ty e of procedure selected has implications
for bo.il, in that the legal provisions regulating bail vary according
to the ty ie of procedure which the prosecutor decides bo follow at trial.
In summary rocedure the trial proceeds upon the charge stated in the
complaint which has been served upon the accused before the first diet.
> 2
Trial is conducted by a judge (or judges) sittin; without a jury. In
solemn proc dure the arrested perron is first brought before a sheriff
for judicial exaoination,though in practice the accused rarely amices
any statement in re;ard to the charge at this stage. It is usually
after the accused has been fully committed by the sheriff that the
indictment i3 served on the accused. After the service of the
indictment a pleading diet is held at least six days later either
in the sheriff court or in the High Court of Justiciary. At least nine
days later the trial diet is held at which the judge sits with a jury.
The coux'ts in the criminal court hierarchy do not all exercise
both summary and solemn jurisdiction. At the lowest level of the
hierarchy, the justice of the peace and burgh (or police) courts
which are presided over by lay judges, exercise sums ry jurisdiction
only. The sentencing power of those inferior courts of summary juris¬
diction is generally restricted to sixty days imprisonment. The
sheriff courts exercise both summary and solemn jurisdiction. In
summary procedure the sheriff courts may in some circurast: ncea impose
a sentence of up to six months imprisonment. The c urta of summary
jurisdiction may grant or refuse oral applications for bail made in
open court, at the first appearance of any accused who ig charged
with offences over which they have jurisdiction. If the accused is
not called upon to plead at his first appearance and the oase is contin¬
ued (C.W.P.) an application for bail may also he made at the pleading
diet.
Solemn jurisdiction, in addition to summary jurisdiction, is
exercised by the sheriff courts, and exercised exclusively "by the high
Court of Justiciary. When exercising solemn jurisdiction the sheriff
court may impose a sentence of up to two years imprisonment, but no
time limitation is imposed on the sentencing powers of the High Court
of Justiciary. In cases where the public prosecutor contemplates
procedure on indictment sifcher in the sheriff court or in the High
Court of Justiciary, the accused is charged on petition and brought
before the sheriff in private. A petition for bail roay be presented
to the sheriff at this first appearance unless the charge is murder or
treason. The sheriff may either grant or refuse the petition and may
either commit the accused for further inquiries (C.F.I<].) or !fully
commit" the accused, that is, commit the accused 'until liberated in
due course of law" (F.C.). If the accused has been committed for fur¬
ther inquiries he will be brought before the court again and has another
opportunity to apply for bail when he is committed until liberated in
due course of law.
The High Court of Justiciary has an overriding power to admit to
bail any person charged with any offence, and this includes charges of
murder and treason. In practice, however, the High Court of Justiciary,
when it considers bail petitions, generally sits as an appelate court.
64«
the hjikition of bail in xotb l.,,
Bail ie security which is given as a condition of liberation and
which is liable to forfeiture if an accused person does not fulfil his
promise to appear to answer to the charge on the day appointed. Depend¬
ing on the circumstances in which bail was granted, the security may
take the form of a bail bond, or a deposit of money or on article of
•j
value. Bail does not necessarily imply the creation of an obligation
in a third party, as bail may take the form of a pledge deposited by
the accused.^
A klgHT TO 3AIT, D.-FINED AND DI...CU3EJ3
In using the expression "a right to bail" we refer to a positive
legal right and not to a natural law or a moral right, When we identify
a right to bail we imply, therefore, that violation of the right can
be prevented or remedied by some legal procedure.
The use of the terra "right" in the law is not, however, free from
ambiguity. This ambiguity has been criticised by Hohfeld who drew
attention to the fact that although the terms "right", "privilege"
and "power" were often used synonomously in the law, the same legal
5
consequences were not always attached. Hohfeld argued that a right is
distinguishable from other legal relations, in that it always implies a
g
correlative duty. Explaining the difference between a right and a
privilege Hohfeld said, "the correlative of X*3 right that Y shall not
enter on the land is Y*s duty not to enter; but the correlative of X*s
privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's 1 no-rijht' that X shall
7
not enter".' Hi^it and power are distinguishable, he argued, because
a power implies the "ability" to effeot a change in legal relations.3
In considering whether a right to bail exists in -icots law it is
necessary, therefore, to look beyond the terms used in statutes or by the
judges, to find out what legal consequences are attached.
V>e detail below^ the circumstances in which an accused has an
opportunity to be admitted to bail. Bail may be granted by the Lord
Advocate, the police and the courts.
It is quite clear that the accused has no right to be admitted to
10 11
bail by the Lord Advocate or by the police who have never in any
circumstances had a duty to grant bail. There is no provision author¬
ising appeal or review of the exercise of the bail powers of these
officials. Indeed, in the case of the police, it is specifically
provided that refusal of bail shall not found any claim for damages,
12
wrongeous imprisonment, or any other claim whatsoever. The question
whether the accused has a right to bail by the courts has aroused some
controversy.
According to Hume the 1701 Act created a privilege of bail for
13
those accused of crimes not carrying a capital punishment. This
statut«»ho.vever, in addition to providing for appeals from the refusal
of bail laid a duty on the judge to grant bail in non-capital cases.
Other duties were placed on the judge, breach of which similarly made
him liable to a charge of wrongful imprisonment. The penalty
prescribed was a fine of up to 5000 pounds Scots and loss of office
and public trust.^ Hume's terminology led the Crown, in
Mackintosh v. iteGlinclyr. to advance the argument that bail had never
"been anything except a privilege obtainable only if the court thought
15
fit to grant it". The Crown's argument was rejected by the Lord
Justice-General who stated that for bailable offences, the 1701 Act
"provided certain hard and fast maximum measures of caution ... which
if tendered to the Court, entitled those persons as a matter of right
16
to bail". It is submitted, that much of the confusion surrounding
the question whether a right to bail exists, stems from a failure to
distinguish the two separate rights in relation to bail which were
created by the 1701 Act. Firstly the Act granted, under certain condit¬
ions, a statutory right to the accused to apply to a judge for bail and
laid duties on the judge to hear and decide such bail applications
17
within a specified time. The c se of Andrew v. turdoch in which the
sheriff-substitute was sued for failing to give deliverance on a bail
petition within the statutory tine limit of 24 hours, was an example
of a person suing for an alleged breach of this right. The second
right created by the Act, was the right to be admitted to bail. Thus
the judge was under a duty in non-capital cases to grant bail to an
amount within the maxima laid down. The 3heriff-3ubstituto v;a3 sued
1 s
in Arbuckle v. Taylor for an alleged failure to admit Arbuckle to
bail as was his right.
It is possible to explain the position of bail in modern law
in terms of the development of those separate rights. Thus, as we
19
describe belov?, the first right has gradually been extended by giving
the accused the statutory right to apply for bail at the stage of
committal for further examination,""C to apply pending an appeal against
sentenoe or conviction,^ to apply where sentence is delayed until a
22
report is prepared and most recently to apply for review of a court's
23
bail decision. The second right has not enjoyed a similar extension
and ha3 in fact been extinguished. The Bail (Scotland) Act 1388
abolished the non-capital criterion of bailable crimes and declared
?A
that "all crimes... except murder and treason, shall be bailable'.
J. Macdonald, in an article written immediately after the Act, declared
that the 1318 Act "estabiished the general preposition that all crimes
are bailable and that the amount of bail is in the discretion of the
25
Magistrate". This interpretation that the Act had extended the right
to be admitted to bail by extending the crimes which were bailable has
lingered. In 1$21 the discretion of the court to grant or refuse bail
was attacked in Mackintosh v. Mcdlinchv^ In the same year, in
H. Advocate v. '^uinn and otcdonald?Lord dalveson also rejected this
interpretation saying?
"... it is obvious that it would be exceedingly detrimental to the
public interest if it was supposed that every person who was accused of
any crime short of murder or treason was entitled to be sot at liberty
until the day of the trial upon finding a certain amount of bail. I
think this is not the law". 27
From the passing of the statute the courts have interpreted the
1838 Act as removing the duty to grant bail in bailable casas and
leaving the question of the grant or refhsal of bail in the discretion
28
of the court. Any attempts to place limitations on this discretion
29
have been rejected.
She extension of the first right helps counterbalance the effect
of the extinction of the seoond right as it gives to the accused
various opportunities to challenge hi3 custody. It would be possible
of course to extend this right further by, for example, allowing appeal
in solemn procedure by the accused from the judge's decision at the
3tage of committal for further examination. 3ut in the absence of any
right to be admitted to bail, the right to apply for bail can only give
limited protection to the accused.
Me have argued that the grant of bail is always discretionary,
fhe accused has no right to be admitted to bail, though in some
68*
circumstances ha has a right to apply for bail and to have his applic¬
ation considered.
• e consider in more detail belovr, the legal provisions which vest
discretion to grant bail in the Lord Advocate, the police and the courts
we describe the criteria which they have said they use in the exercise
of their discretion, Phe circumstances in which the accused has a right
to apply for bail are also fully described.
BAIL BY THij LQ;iD ADVOCATE
The Lord Advocate's discretion to grant bail before trial ante¬
dated the 1701 Act. As this Act imposed limitation?only on the
discretion of the courts, it was still competent for the Lord Advocate
to grant bail, even in non-bailable cases, and to demand bail money in
excess of the statutory maximum."^ Phis power of the Lord Advocate
was specifically retained by 3.8 of the Bail (Scotland) Act 1888. The
Lord Advocate, therefore, may grant bail to an unlimited amount to an
accused and accept responsibility for liberation, without the inter¬
vention of a court. The law does not place any limitations on this
discretion.
The criteria which the Lord Advocate considered influential have
not been published. For the reasons stated above we are persuaded
that the accused has no right to apply for bail to the Lord Advocate.
BAIL BY THS X)LICa
Although the law makes provision to ensure that an arrested person
is brought before a court as soon as possible, that is not later than
the first lawful day after arrest, a person may still spend up to 24
hours,or if local or public holidays intervene, up to 72 hours in
custody before his first appearance before a competent court. As such
delay was considered undesirable, especially in the case of minor
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offences, a statutory innovation gave the polioe power to grant bail.
The present law rest on 3.10 of the summary Jurisdiction
(Scotland) Act 1954 which vests discretion to grant bail in a chief
constable, or in his absence any other officer in charge of a police
station. The designated police officer, however, may only .grant bail
to accused charged with offences which may competently be tried before
a court of summary jurisdiction, other than a sheriff court (i.e., a
justice of the peace or a burgh court). A statutory maximum of 20
pounds limits the amount of bail which may be demanded.
In effect, the seriousness of the offence and the maximum bail
amount are limitations imposed on police discretion. The police have
not made public the criteria which they consider influential. We have
argued that there are no circumstances in which the accused has a right
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to as:-for bail.
BAIL BY TUB C0UAT3
Although discretion is vested in the Lord Advocate and the police,
the grant or refusal of liberty on bail is generally considered a
TO.
question of importance which the courts ought to decide.
The discretion of the courts to grant bail is unlimited with two
exceptions. The inferior courts of summary jurisdiction nay not
entertain a bail application if the accused is charged with an offence
over which they have no jurisdiction.^ The sheriff courts nay not
entertain a bail application if the offence charged is murder or
37
treason.
Unlike the lord Advocate and police, the courts have indicated in
the reported oases the criteria likely to influence the exercise of their
33
discretion. We argued above that the protection of the accused's
liberty is ultimately dependent on the way in which the courts exercise
their discretion. The criteria which the courts aclaaov,'lodge give an
important insight into the interests, including the liberty of the
accused, which the courts try to balance, and the weighting given to
theee interests. These criteria which the Courts say they adopt may
also bo compared with the criteria, which we argue in later chapters,
they adopt in practice.
(l) criteria described by the Courts as Influencing their discretion
(a; The attitude of the pablic prosecutor
The courts admit to placing great reliance on the Crown's attitude
to bail. This is understandable in view of the role played by the
public prosecutor and the independent discretion to admit to bail which
is vested in the Lord Advocate.
It appears that where the prosecutor consents to bail this is
considered sufficient to induce the courts to grant bail. According to
the Lord Justice-General in H.M. Advocate v. Saunders'
71.
"There nay be oa3oa, even v/hera the offence io a vary heinous
one, where the Crown consents to bail being allowed, and when the
Crovm does consent the application is always granted". 39
Tho extent of Crown power is not clear, however, if a situation arose
in which a court refused bail despite Crown consent. It io doubtful
whether the Crown would interfere with the court's rofuoal in such
circumstances. This view gains aome support from the decision in
Anderson. In this case a court not bail at a figure higher than
authorised by statute and higher than that desired by tho Crown. The
lord dustice-Clerk in lowerin - tho bail recognised, "that Crown counsel
did right in declining to interfere with the judgement of tho sheriff
fixing the amount of bail . ^
Tho reasons for the courts reliance on the Crown's attitude were
explained by the Lord Justic -General in Potteryand Ors v. H.M. Advocate:
'... in prosecutions conducted by the public rosocutor the
discretion is vested in the first instance at lea t, in the lord
Advocate» and unlets it can be alleged that the Lord Advocate has
refused bail, not for the purpose of securing the onus of justice
but f r some other and therefore illegitimate pur cteo, I think the
court ought not to interfere because such interference would be nothing
loos than relieving the ord Advocate of the responcibility attaching to
his high office, iie is subj ect to this responsibility and vested with
tho corresponding discretion because he has means and appliances for
obt ining information and forming a judgement which, airs not within
tho roach of any other official nnd are not possessed by this court". 42
A statement soon after tho 1303 Act indicated that tho courts might
endorse the Crown's view not only where tho -rown consented but also
in serious cases, unless there -.ore exceptional circumot ncos, where
tho Crown objected. In ilcon v. IcGuire the Lord Juntico-Clerk,
considering a charge of rape, said, that bail should not bo allowed:
"where the Lord Advocate objects to its being grr -ted and states
on his responsibility that his investigation of the c so does not
disclose any fact tending to show that it should be dealt with as
exceptional. If in any such case there were exceptional circumstances
the "ord Advocate could himself take these into c ns;'Aeration and
consent to bail . 43
This identification of the courts' and the 'ord Advocate's discretion
did not, however, prevail. Later judges emphasised the independent
discretion of the courts though recognising the Crown's attitude as
a very important factor influencing their discretion. Thus in
.Mackintosh v. McGlinchv the Lord Justice-General was of the opinion
that, "in considering any appeal to the court's discretion a statement
made to the court on the high responsibility of the Lord Advocate is
entitled to great weight".^ the most recent statement on this question
is by Lord Clyde in McLaren v. H.I.L Advocate where it was said that the
opposition of the Lord Advocate*
"... is a factor of very groat importance in any consideration
of the matter by this court, for he has means of obtaining information
and forrain; a judgement on the matter which are not possessed by us".
The courts place great weight, therefore, on the prosecutor's
attitude to bail. In addition the courts rely heavily on the
information advanced by the Crown about the circurast nces of the offence.
Great reliance must be placed on such information because of a
modern reluctance by the judges to inquire into the merits of a case
at this procedural stnge. It is likely that this reluct; nee stems from
the courts abandonment of the inquisitorial role which formerly they
adopted in relation to pre-trial procedure.^ In the eighteenth
century, the High Court of Justiciary would in some circumstances
inquire into the merits of a case by considering defence aid prosec-
A*7
ution precognitions. By the end of the nineteenth century however
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that court was refusing to undertake such inquiry7 although in the
lower courts an inquiry was still generally conducted at the stage
of judicial examination. The judge in the lower courts, therefore,
h ving t ken precognitions and inquired into the merits of the osse was
49
in a very informed position to oonsider any bail application.
As in modern procedure tho High Court of Justiciar does not
conduct ,'in inquiry into the merits of the case at the stage of applic¬
ation for bail, and as judicial examination is now a mere formality, the
courts have no alternative but to rely on information which the
prosecutor selects.
(b> dagard to the public interest and the ends of .justice
The judges have described themselves as exercising their
discretion with a single regard to the public interest and the ends of
justice. In older law this regard was limited to the consideration of
whether the accused would appear for trial. Hven evidence that the
accused had been convicted of subornation of perjury and interference
v7ith -witnesses and was likely to repeat such conduct, was held
50
in dorr v. Jrr and Fktlton to be an insufficient ground for refusing
51
bail. ..imilarly, according to oumett, consideration of the likeli¬
hood of tho accused committing further crimes was not a matter which
would influence the court's discretion, ^orae support for this narrow
interpretation was still voiced after the 1330 Act was passed. The
Lord Justice-General in -ie.-.nie v. Dickson, for example stated, "if
it is thought that (the prismor absconding) is not likely to happen
52
there is no reason why liberation should not be granted .
The demands of public interest and the ends of justice have,
hovfevor,been reinterpreted by the judges. In this reinterpretation a
number of factors, other than the likelihood of the accused's appear¬
ance at trial, have been described by the judges as likely to influence
their discretion.
(i) The nature of the o fence
'The seriousness of the offence charged has been described as a
relevant consideration when the judge is considering the amount of
risk to the public, which would be involved if the accused were to be
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rele sod on bail.
(ii/ Consideration for tho victim
Where the alleged victim of the accused may be at risk if the
accused is allowed to return homo, the judge may take this into consid-
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oration and refuse bail.
(iii) Ihe possibility that tho accused might tamper with evidence or
te, gjtaeasaa.
Although in older law the likelihood of the accused interfering
with the ends of justice ay attempting to falsify evidence 'was a
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relevant consideration only in relation to the amount of bail set,
the judges, after the 1338 Act, h we now included this consideration
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in factors affecting their decision to grant or refuse bail.
(ivi -rvions convictions of the •ccuaed. '
In H.iu. Advocate y- and . k.cdonald Lord -alveson 3aid that:
in the ordinary case b il ought to be allowed only where the
person accused has previously boon a law abiding citizen -with regard to
whom thex'e can be no reasonable doubt that, although he is released on
bail, he will attend his trial when it c.mes on. It does not, in my
opinion, apply to persons who have been law breakers in the past, and
still less to persons ... who have a record of many previous
convictions and have served sentences of penal servitude.'' 57
In a later case, the legality of the practice of presenting the
accused's record to the jud;e when the matter of bail was in issue was
questioned, in view of the statutory prohibition a ainst laying the
accused's record before the judge before the prosecutor has moved for
sentence. It was decided, however, that th.* statutory prohibition did
not a;ply to pre-trial bail decisions, and that tho accused's criminal
record might be a highly relevant and proper factor for consideration.
In -chood y« Iright criminal record was said to be not merely a highly
relevant consideration buts
75.
"in some cases, in itself sufficient to warrant the court
refusing bail. That would be particularly so where the list of
previous convictions is substantial or the latest conviction is of
relatively recent date". 59
Criminal record is considered relevant by the courts, at least
in the view of Lord dalveson, as an indication that the accused is
unlikely to appear for trial, and in the more popular vie\7, as an
indication that the accused ma,/ continue his criminal activities while
on bail.
(v/ To likelihood that the accused will reoeat the offence- or commit
oO
other ofiences while on bail.
criminal record is generally used to gauge the likelihood of the
commission of further offences but any ther information tending to
show this will be considered.
(viz -.-rest for an offence alleged to have been committed .-'die the
accused was on ball.
here an accused is admitted to bail and subsequently reappears
before the court charged with an offence alleged to have been
committed -while on bail, the judges have declared their reluctance
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to grant bail again.
(vii, criminal Association
Another interpretation of defeating the ends of justice v/hich
has been made, relates to circumstances.
"where the person accused is not acting alone, but in association
with others who may not themselves be the ob:ects of criminal proceedings
and where liberation w juld leave the accused free to continue .in
association and co-operation with these people for the very same
criminal objects participation in which has brought him to justice".62
6}
Apart from the su gestion in ..>..cLeod v. ..'right J that a subst¬
antial and recent criminal ricord may be a sufficient factor to induce
a refusal of bull, the judges have not Indicated -what weight they
attach, to the various factors, nor what combination of factors they
treat as fatal to the success of a bail application. It has, howevor,
been emphasised that the factors which the judges have described cannot
be treated as closed or exhaustive categories, feinting to the
uniqueness of particular cases, the judges have said that relevant
64
considerations must vary, from tine to time, with changing conditions.
(c.. information ,riven by the In,; agent for the accused
iJespite the number of judicial dicta emphasising the importance
of information laid before the court by the prosecutor, tho judges have
generally been silent about their attitude to another .jotontial source
of information, that is inf jr ation from the accused's lav agent.
Hie exception to this silence concerns information relating to the
innocence of the accused.
In dcottish procedure, an accused is presumed innocent until
pr von guilty .rvi this presumption affects the onus of proof at trial.
Tho presumption of innocence, however, has also provided a onlson
d'etre for bail. In older law, the inn cence of an accused was
certainly regarded by the judpen an a relevant consideration in the
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granting of bail. The jud;es, an described above, might consider
precognitions and any defences alleged, and if the accused's innoconce
was indicated mi^ht grant bail oven if the criiao woo orin facie not
bailable. This concern with tho iinocence of tho accused outlived the
passing of the 1833 Act. The point is well illustrated by the judge-
mant in . i. Advocate v. ocott where Lord itormonth harlin said?
''No doubt in one view it, seem® a little har t to use tho confession
of the prisoner against him, but st the same time his confession
displaces the presumption of innocence on which such an application
is largely founded'. 66
As the courts, however, attempted to extend the factors unfavourable
to bail to include previous convictions, it was argued that such an
extension was incompatible with the presumption of innocence. To avoid
what appeared to be an inevitable clash the judges denied that the
presumption had any application to bail. In MacLeod v. ri "ht
Lord Justice-General Clyde saidi
"The matter of granting bail is not a question which raises
issues regarding the presumption of innocence or any other presumption.
If it did so bail wou.d always have to be granted for in this country
everyone is presumed innocent till the contrary is proved'1. 67
The abandonment of innocence as a relevant consideration was deemed
inevitable in view of the judges' abandonment of their pro-trial
inquisitorial attitude^ in that a real assessment of evidence
tending to show guilt or innocence no longer takes place.
Modern law ha3 also extended bail provisions to situations where
the presumption of innocence cannot apply. Thus bail is now competent
pendin : an appeal against conviction or sentence.
The influence of older law in which innocence wa3 a relevant
consideration has not yet been totally harmonised with modern law.
Thi3 is seen, for example, in the incongruous procedure vfhoreby an
application for bail accompanied by a letter pleading guilty under
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1387 3.31 often includes an
averment of innocence.
(il; Tv >es of information advanced in favour of the accused
The law agent for the accused, apart from pointing out circum¬
stances whioh tend to show that the accused's case does not offend
against any of the factors considered inimical to bail, may also give
additional information to the court. The value placed by the judges
on such information has not, however, been reported.
It was recognised by Alison that factors, other than the
possibility of forfeiture of bail money, might induce an accused to
69
appear for trial. ?ha 3aae recognition perhaps prompted those law
agents who advanced "community root" type factors to porsuado the
curt to agree to grant bail. Information relating to stable family
70
life, employment and long residence in a community, has been advanced.
Other defenco information urged in reported cases related to hard¬
ships which would be a consequence of a refusal of bail, for example,
loss of employment resulting in deprivation of the accused and his
71 7?
family, impediment of the accused*3 legal defence' and youth of
73
the accused.
L.) ifoo accused's M±t to Anal / f r Ball
(-?,) Masa frrta3,
An arrested person ;.iuat b© brought before a court on the first
74
lawful day after arrest. If local or public holidays (including
Sundays) intervene, a delay of up to J2 hours may occur* fhe accused
has a right when brought before fcho magistrate or sheriff to apply
for bail.
(i, urxuarv n-ocedura
fha 'unary frocedura (Scotland) Act 1954 is the principal statute
regulating bail, in summary cases.
hen an accused is brought before a court of summary jurisdiction
the e, rt may adjourn the oasto a specified date without recording
the a cuoed's plea, duch an adjournment may be granted to allow time
for further inquiries or for any other nooassary caused a c .se may be
continued without plea in this way for a total period of 7* cr on
76
cuuso nhown 21 dsys from the date f apprehension. If the accused
is not liberated on bail he h .3 a second opportunity to a ply for bail
77
at the pleading diet.
In the absence of a successful motion for continuation without
plea, the accused's plea will be recorded at his first appearance. If
a plea of not g.ilty is recorded the trial may take place immediately.
In most cases, however, an adjournment before trial will be granted.
It is provided in the 1954 Act that the date of the trial shall be as
78
early "as is consistent with the just interests of both parties",
but no specific time limit is set.
(ii, iolemn procedure
The Bail (Scotland; Act 1038 and the Criminal irocodure
(Scotland) Act 1837 are the two principal statutes regulating bail in
solemn procedure.
If an arrested person is charged with an offence which is to be
tried by the sheriff or by the High Court of Justiciar:/ according to
solemn procedure, he is first brought before the sheriff on petition.
The sheriff may grant a motion for continuation and commit the accused
for further examination. There is no statutory maximum placod on
this period of committal but it must be concluded within a reasonable
79
time. ' The accused has a right to apply for bail when he is committed
30
for further examination.
In the absenoe of a successful motion for committal for further
examination, the accused will be committed until liber ted in due
c urse of law at his first appearance and has a right to apply for bail.
x^he time which the accused is liable to spend in custody after
committal until liberated in due course of law and bofore trial is
32
limited to 110 days. An extension may be granted if the prosecutor
can satisfy the court that he is not responsible for the delay, for
example, if the delay is caused by the illness of ih accused, the
absence or illness of a necessary witness, or the illness of a .iud.je
3 ■*
or juror. If the time linut is exceeded the accused must be set at
libart./ immediately. After such a liberation the accused is forever
free from all question or process in respect of the crime for which he
34
was committed.
In certain circumstances the accused has the right to appeal
against the refusal of bail or against the amount of bail set by the
magistrate or sheriff. Appeals may be disposed of in court or
chambers, by tho nigh Court of Justiciary or any one Lord commissioner.
(i> ..ui.uuary procedure
under the summary Jurisdiction (Scotland, Act 1934 the
accused may appeal a bail decision regardless of whether the decision
was made when the case was continued without plea or at tlie pleading
36
diet. -the prosecutor has a co-extensive right of appeal and may
87
appeal the grant of bail or the amount of bail set. -n the event of
an appeal by the prosecutor the accused is liable to be detained in
custody until the appeal is detox-mined, fhere is a time .'limit of ~J2
88
hours placed on the length of such custody but em order for a longer
99
period of detention may be granted by the High Court of Justiciary.
fhe accused, if he has raised the bail money, must be x*eleased if the
prosecutor's appeal has not been granted before the expiry of the
QO
time limit. If the appear is made by the accused, however, there
is no provision limiting the time lie may spend in custody before the
appeal is determined. If the prosecutor's appeal is refused, it is
competent for the court to award expenses tothe accused* similar
91
xpenses cannot, however, be award :d ajainst the accused."
LULi Bgasa&sa
The accused has no statutory right to appeal a bail decision
oo
made when he was committed for further examination. ~ In view, however,
of tlse inherent jurisdiction of the high Court of Justiciary to admit to
bail any person charged with any crime, it is arguable that a petition
93
to the high Court of Justiciary might be considered competent. Unlike
the ..caused, the prosecutor is given a statutory right to appeal a
°4
bail decision at this procedural stage."
The Bail (Bcotland) Act 1300 3.5 gives the accused a right to
appeal a bail decision made at the time he was committed until
liberated in due course of law. The prosecutor ha3 a co-oxtonsive
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right of appeal.
Provisions, similar to those described in summary procedure,
°6 97
regulate the time limit for appeals' and the award of expenses.'
( g), ,,-^Yiew
The Criminal Justice (dcotland) Act 19^3 3»37 gives the accused
a right to make applications to a court to review its refusal of
bail or review the amount of bail set.
The grant of the right to apply for review was not intended to
98
restrict the accused's right to appeal.'
The accused may apply for review of an unfavourable bail decision
on the fifth day after t e original decision and the eaftor on the
fifteenth day after any subsequent decision. The court may grant an
application for review 'on cause shown'. This has been interpreted
CO
by the courts as showing a material change of circumstances,
discretion to grant an application is vested in the court.
Application for review may be made when there is a bail decision at
any procedural stage, and the procedural 3tage aav be expected to
affect the criteria adopted by the court. For example, different
criteria raay be expected to influence the court in an applic tion for
T&vi®s before trial compared with an application made after conviction.^
Although there is no specific provision relating to the right f the
prosecutor to be heard by the court in any review applic tion, we are
of the opinion that a reasonable) interpretation is, th t the
prosecutor has the same locus otrndl as he had at the original bail
decision.
Clearly the Act gives power to a court to review its cwn bail
decision but a question has arisen concerning jurisdiction when an
appeal leas been taken from the original bail decision. In the case of
102
•luvoc.tu ,v. Jones a sheriff court refused bail and an appeal
was taken to the High Court of Justiciary where bail was gain refused.
An application for review, alleging a material change of circumstance
was brought in the sheriff court. The sheriff-substitute hold that the
application was incompetent in view of the appeal. He was of the
opinion that to allow such review by the sheriff court would be to
offend ogainst tho established oractice, whereby a judge in an inferior
court does not h vo the power to review the decision of tho dupreiae
Court.
103From i.erd, v. 11.11. Advocate it appears, however, that the
incompetence of the inferior court extends only to matters upon which the
appeal Court has mads a decision. In this case there was some L
confusion about the facts. The facts finally accepted aero, that
V/ard granted bail by the sheriff-substitute and an appeal against
this grant of bail, taken by the prosecutor to the High Court of
Justiciary, was refused. Ward, however, was unable to raise the bail
money and later appealed to tho High Court of Ju sticiary to reduce the
amount of bail. lord Cameron dismissed the appeal, hoidin; that the
review of the amount of bail was still within the competence of the
sheriff court which had origins"!ly allowed bail. The intervening
appeal to the High Court was held not to have affected the sheriff
court's power of review, as the High Court had not r.ado any determination
on the point in issue, that is the amount of bail, faking the view,
that -ord's application to the High Court of Justiciar/ was an applic¬
ation for review under the 1963 Act, such reasoning is sound. Ward's
application, however, appears rather to have been an appeal, as envis¬
aged nd authorised by the 1880 Act. Cn this view the decision is
questionable in its argument that the relevant statute nu3t be the
1Joj Act and that appeal taken to the High Court was "premature".
The provisions of the 1 63 Act were enacted without prejudice to the
accused's right of appeal. We would argue, therefore, that an appeal
taken by the accused under the 1308 Act against either the refusal or
the amount of bail is still competent, oven if the accused has not
utilised his right of application for review under the 1963 Act. In
Ward's case an appeal had been taken by the prosecutor to the High
Court of Justiciary against the grant of bail but there is nothing in
the 1888 Act to prevent the accused utilising his right to appeal a
different matter, that is to appeal the amount of bail.
(ii> -»olemn procedure
The provisions regulating application for review of bail in
summary procedure apply also to bail petitions decided by the sheriff
exorcising solemn jurisdiction.
-ieview of a brail decision of the High Court of Justiciary was,
however, competent before 19S3 end is still competent. Ouch review may
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be obtained by presenting a Note of Appeal, requesfcin ; renewal of
application for bail after refusal of bail by the sheriff and the High
Court of Justiciary on appeal. It is necessary to avor a material
change of circumstances.
It is important to appreciate the distinctions between review and
appeal and the two remedies ought not to be confused, fhe provisions
authorising review are designed to bring new information to the consid¬
eration of the court which made the original bail decision, Baview is
no substitute for appeal which gives the accused the opportunity to
allege that the court which made the original decision wrongly
exercised its discretion.
(4) Durlry* tyflftlr
It is provided in the bail bond that bail continues through all
adjournments or continuations of the diets of court until the final
disposal of the charge, or if sooner, until the expiry of £ months
after the finding of bail. A similar provision applies to bail in
, 107
summary procedure.
Once bail has been granted there is no prooedure by which bail
can be recalled even if there is evidence that the accused i3 likely
to abuse his freedom by, for example, absconding. In an unreported
case a petition for recall of bail -resented by the prosecutor was
held by the sheriff to be incompetent.
A cautioner is, however, entitled to withdraw his bond of
caution at any diet of the court at which the accused appears
personall
( p) A&ga ja&al frefpre gegt^o?
Ones an accused has presented himself for trial and the trial has
been completed, any question of liberation on bail is considered to be
subj ct to different policy considerations, than those attached to
pro-trial bail. Different rules relating to bail have been evolved,
therefore, to regulate the grant or refusal of bail at procedural stages
aftor trial.
(i; -here an accused pleads -ruHty at the first diet but sentence ia
delayed until a later date.
In solemn procedure where an accused pleads guilty he is liable to
be detained in custody under the original warrant of commitment until
the sentencing diet, a period which must not involve unreasonable delay.
It is provided, however, by the Criminal -Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887
3,34 that the prosecutor may consent to the release of the accused until
the sentencing diet. Where the prosecutor gives such consent it is
within his discretion to fix tho bail conditions.
(il) .here sentence is delayed to enable a resort to be prepared
A court may adjourn a case, in both summary and solemn procedure,
for a maximum of 3 weeks bo facilitate the preparation of a report
designed to help the judge determine the most suitable method of
110
deeding with an accused.
If a medical or psychiatric report is required the court,
in both summary and solemn procedure, may remand tho accused for a
111
maximum period of 3 weeks. Discretion to liberate the accused on
bail is vested in the court. Compulsory conditions are attached to
the bail bond. These conditions require that the a cusod undertakes
to undergo the required medical examination and undertakes to
attend or reside at a specified place tc enable tho examination to
bo made.
(f) After trial. pending ameal against conviction or sentence
The different criteria adopted by the courts in deciding bail
applications made on behalf of convicted rather than untried ,
prisoners, were explained by Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper in
.. Advocate v. Young. He saids
"... once the prisoner has been convicted the presumption of
innocence i3 displaced and tho onus demonstrandi is on the applicant
thereafter to show cause why, pending any appeal which he may take,
ho should be released from the prison confinement to which he has been
sentenced following upon the conviction". 112
The powers and duties of the Crown are also changed onco an
accused has been convicted. The Crown's position was clarified in
1932 by the Lord Advocate, when he replied in Parliament to criticisms
which had boen raised concerning a bail application pending appeal
after conviction. The Lord. Advocate, emphasising that at this stage
discretion was vested wholly in the court, pointed out that, "strictly
speaking the Cr wn has no locus standi at all in this matter, but out
of courtesy to the court a representative of the Crown attends...." 113
(i; Luminary procedure
The two most comrao-i methods of obtaining a review of a convi¬
ction or sentence in summary cases are suspension and a; peal to the
High Court of Justiciary by stated case.
Suspension is a common low remedy. After the final determin¬
ation of a case an a cased in custody may present a bill of suspen- ■
sion and liberation to the High Court of Justiciary, If the accused
finds caution and is liberated he must, under paid of .abandonment of
Ms appeal, attend personally in court on the day appointed for the
hearing of the appeal. 114
An appeal by stated case is competent und :v tho ternary
Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1954 S.62.
If an appeal is taken the summary court may require the appellant
to consign a sum or find caution to cover any fine or expenses which
115
my be incu red. where an appellant is in custody ho is entitled
to mike application to the sumary court for caution fox- interim
116
liberation pending the determination of the appeal. respite the
terminology* caution for interim liberation is essentially the sane as
117
bail. The court, in its discretion, may refuse such application or
if it decides to grant interim liberation may dispense with further
consignation or caution, or may impose additional conditions as to
113
caution or other conditions. Any such application must be defcerra-
119
ined by the court within twenty-four hours. If tho court refuses
interim liberation or asks for caution to an amount which the accused
cannot raise, the accused may within twenty-four hours appeal to the
High Court of Justiciary or any judge ther-of* fhat court may refuse
the appeal or grant interim liberation on such conditions as it thinks
120
fit. No right of appeal, from a summary court's grant of interim
liberation or the amount of caution,is given to the prosecutor.
If the appellant is liber ted but fails to appear in court
when required a sanction, additional to the forfeiture of caution
121
exists, in that the court may hold the appeal to bo abandoned.
On the abandonment of an appeal the court may grant warrant to
apprehend the appellant and time spent at liberty is not counted in
1 ? •'
computing any unexpired period of imprisonment. If the appeal is
dismissed warrant to apprehend may be granted by the High Court of
Justiciary and again any time spent at liberty is excluded from the
computation of the period of imprisonment. In dismissing an appeal,
however, the High Court of Justiciary does not have the power to impose
38.
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a term of imprisonment longer than the unexpired torn.
(A3,/ Cougar} yo<?efoy<?
Chere a person convicted on indictment lodges an appeal against
conviction or sentence, under the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act 1926,
he may petition the IIig} Court of Justiciary to -jrant bail until the
12A
appeal is determined. Such a petition may competently be determ¬
ined by a single .judge of the High Court of Justiciary who may in his
discretion grant or refuse bail. If bail is refused, however, tho
appellant has a right to have his petition considered again by a quorum
of the High Court of Justiciary. Consistent with the Crown's lack of
locus standi in this matter the Act gives no similar right to the Crown.
If the Court grants bail and the appellant is liberated but fails
to appear in court when required, a sanction additional to the
forfeiture of bail, exists in thai; the Court may summarily dismiss the
•, 125appeal.
If the appeal is dismissed or if the sentence of imprisonment is
increased by the High Court the appellant must serve the unexpired
period of imosironment. In computing this unexpired period, any period
'f
after the date of admission to bail is not counted.
SAIL* APPLICATION. FQ-d.1, ?0 CuiirUJC, ICCALL
ill
(a) -k>de of application for bail
The law does not lay down specific requirements relating to the
node of application for bail and methods appear to bo dictated by the
practice and convenience of the courts. Under the 1701 Act, both
verbal and written applications wore considered, and despite dicta
127
in Arb. elde v. .Taylor that a plications must be in writing, verbal
applications continued to b .* ho *rd by the courts.
Application for bail in summary cases is, in modem practice,
usually verbal, defusal of ouch application is recorded on the
minute: end record of successful application is made on the warrant
of committal.
In solemn procedure the favoured mode of application is by
written petition, because this method is considered to have procedural
advantages especially in the event of an appeal. Verbal applications,
nevertheless, were still considered by some sheriff cou.rts until 1972.
1 -*8
In a recent practice direction ~ from tho High Court of Justiciary it
was pointed out that the judges of that Court were reluctant to consider
verbal applications and the udvantag s of written applications were
commended, fhis will possibly ensure that only -written petitions
are presented.
U.- apej and aopUcatiop ^
In certain circumstances an accused may be granted legal aid. If
legal aid is made available, the accused may receive legal advice and
129
legal representation free. '
(4, - IT-1 proco.^gp
In summary proceedings prosecuted .in a justice of the eace court
110
or a burgh court, the accused is eligible only for legal advice,
w'horo a summaiy prosecution is to bo t ken before tho sheriff and the
accused is in custody, the accused is entitled to legal aid until the
conclusion of the pleading diet and this includes legal aid in conne¬
ction with any application for bail up to and including this time.^
Legal aid is also available to cover any application for review or
appeal of a ball decision.^ 'where a plea of .guilty is tendered legal
aid continues until the last diet fixed for disposal of the casel^3
The accused,while legal aid continues, is entitled to legal advice
ab ut bail and to have any application for bail made by a legal repre¬
sentative.
Apart from these circumstances, to obtain legal aid the accused
must satisfy the court that the grant of legal aid is in the interests
of justice and that he is financially incapable, without hardship, of
paying for his own defence.''34
(ili Legal aid in solemn procedure
In solemn procedure the accused is entitled to legal aid until he
is admitted to bail or committed until liberated in due course of law.135
Tho -mcused, therefore^ always has acces to legal advice about bail anl
may if he wishes be represented by a solicitor, who if necessary will
petition the court for liberation on bail. Legal aid is also available
to cover any application for review or appeal of a bail decision.136
Apart from these circumstances, to obtain legal aid the accused must
satisfy not the conditions relating to the inte -ests of justice bat" only
financial eligibility. Once the accused appears before the high Court
of Justiciary he is always entitled to legal aid if he satisfies the
financial conditionsJ 37
(ili) ".■ego.l aid in appeals after mviction or sentence
Legal aid is not available to an accused appealing against conv¬
iction or sentence, either in summar or solemn procedure, unless it
appears to the Oupreme Court Cormittee that the accused has substantial
grounds for taking the appeal and that in the particular circumstances
of the case it is reasonable that he should receive legal aid."'38 If
legal aid has been granted in earlier proceedings, the finanPial
condition is considered satisfied. If legal aid has not previously
91.
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been granted, the financial conditions must also be satisfied.
U/, ism
Lm .-"qms la wWa Mil mc
U , bU<?<? baM
3ail granted by the police raay be found by the deposit of money
or an article of value to cover the fuuount of bail, '-lie deposit may
1An
be made by a surety or by tho arrested person. It is arguable
that bail may also be found, by tho creation of an obligation to pay
over the amount of bail f the accused fails to appear on the appointed
4 4 4
day. fhe form of bail to be .accepted in a particular case lies in
142
the discretion of the police.
iul ija, aaaaaaa
It is provided that in sui nary pr cedure bail is to be inter-
crated as including any pledge lodged by or on behalf of the accused
143
as security for his attendance in court.
3ail may be found by consignation, of money, equal to the amount
of bail, with the clerk of the court, fhis money ay bo consigned by
tho accused or by a third 'arty.^^
Alternatively bail may be found by a third carty signing a bail
145
bond as cautioner and surety. A bail bond 'is not a mere private
A if
Instrument, it is a bond of judicial description". The at?mdard
form of a bail bond is re reduced in Appendix I. The only
roa.on for which a person jgay be rejected as cautioner and surety is
if the clerk of the court is not satisfied that the hereon has
147
sufficient financial means to cover the sum specified in the bond.
(ill) 3ail In solemn procedure
The only way in which bail may bo found in solemn procedure is
by a third party signing a bail bond as cautioner and surety*
(bJ conditions which may be attached to ball
In general the only condition which i3 attached to bail is a
condition requiring the accused's appearance in court. -Despite the old
148
precedent of -Jvcrnon. in which bail was granted in con amotion with a
residential condition and a condition relating to the provision of a
guard for the accused, the courts have not used their discreti n to
impose additional conditions to bail* iven where legislation appears
149
to grant a limited power to impose c nditions the courts have not
taken advantage of such power. Compulsory conditions are, however,
attached to bail by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 3,27*
Under this section,where a person remanded for an inquiry into his
physical or mental condition is granted bail, conditions relating to
willingness to undergo examination, and attendance for examination are
150
imposed in the bail bond. ^
(i) .gssSg&feasa
The penalty attached to breach of a bail condition or failure to
151
appear in court is forfeiture of bail. The court may in addition,
152
however, grant a warrant to apprehend the accused.
V.'hen bail becomes liable to forfeiture, the usual practice is for
the court, on application of the Crown, to forfeit the bail. In
153
-loorison v. ionro it was held competent for a sheriff to forfeit
bail after the prosecutor had deserted the diet uro loco ob tempore
and it was remarked that this was a common procedure in the High Court.
The High Court of Justiciary may also forfeit bail at a diet fixed for
154
a hearing on the relevancy.
In forfeiting the bail the court, if necessary, nay also grant
155
a warrant of recovery of bail from the cautioner. 'The cautioner may
apply to the court for time to pay but may become liable to imprisonment
if he fails to pay within the time granted. The court, however, instead
of ordering imprisonment for failure to pay may allow recovery by civil
diligence.
Objections to forfeiture may bo made, but the only ground of
objection entertained by the courtc, is the improper citation of the
, 157accused.
A sanction, additional to forfeiture and rearrest, exitts in
relation to bail granted pending appeal against conviction or sentence.
153
As wo described above, the court may dismiss the appeal f the
accused fails to appear.
The question whether ail accused who fails to appear nay also be
159
held liable for contempt of court was raised in ~'lrie v. -- .wthorn.
In this case the accused, a youth of seventeen, was charged on a
summary complaint and was cited to appear in the sheriff court. He
failed to appear but appeared after notific tion at the adjourned diet.
He explained that h ■ had failed to appear because he had not read the
citation and his father had forgotten to remind him of the date.
Although it was held that the conduct of the ccused did not disclose
a wilful defiance of the court and did not amount to contempt of court,
Lord Justice-Ianeral Clyde was of the opinion that in other circum¬
stances the accused's failure to appear might amount to contempt. It
was argued before the court th.it although the bummar/ Jurisdiction
(Scotland) Act S.33 provided that the failure of a witness to appear
could be treated as contempt, no similar provision was made in regard
to the accused. In the case of tho accused it was provided that a
warrant for his apprehension could he issued. The Lord Justice-General
took the view that the failure of the court to issue a warrant did not
prevent the court from considering the charge of contempt. He stated,
hovrover, that the issue of a warrant of apprehension was an extreme
l60
measure which was not always appropriate. It is arguable, therefore,
that if a court has t•ken the stop of issuing a warrant, a prosecution
for contempt might be considered incompetent.
Some countries have created a separate offence of failure to
appear on the appointed day. This has the advantage of clearly
proscribing the conduct which the law wishes to deter. The use of
contempt 01 court as a deterrent against the accused's failure to
appear ha3 other disadvantages, not le -.st the technicalities surrounding
the law of contempt. Another difficulty is that the essence of contempt
is not the failure to appear but the failure to obey an order pf the
162
court, that is the citation. Citation of the accused for trial,
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however, may not occur until after the release of tho accused on bail.
Presumably, therefore, if the accused absconded before lawful citation
ho could not be held liable for contempt.
(a) ccall of Forfeiture
Prior to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949» the courts
had no power to refund bail which had been forfeited, though it was
possible for the accused to apply for a suspension of the sentence of
forfeiture.
It was provided, however, by the 1949 Act 3.44 that any court,
if satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances, might
recall its own order of forfeiture and direct that bail money be
refunded. This decision of the court is final and is not subject to
review.
ij/X. : CUdX.;/ C'0,1-'ill.jATIOH
JLtL Caa2§aaay^a x'vr £U£g&I Juybo3y.
Under tho statute of 17C1 a right to be admitted to bail
existed in certain circumstances and it was comsotout under this
statute for an accused to 3ue a magistrate for damages in respect of
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an alleged breach of this right. Under the 1303 <ct, however,
admission to bail is discretionary and such an action is no longer
competent.
Under the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 8, 2(5), no liability
attaches to the Crown in respect of judicial acts and this includes
any .vrongful detention. A judge is also protected from personal liab¬
ility for acts done in exercise of his judicial duty.
In summary procedure a judge, other than a sheriff, might be
found liable in damages in some circumstances. Jo be successful the
person suing must prove that he has suffered imprisonment as a result
of some proceeding, act, judgement, decree or sentence and that the
proceeding etc., has been quashed. He must also prove that the
proceeding etc., was taken maliciously and without probable cause,
dome defences are specified.^0
-Cefusal of bail by the police does not ground any action for
damages for wrongful imprisonment or any other claim arising from a
refusal to liberate.
(2) soooensation for Legal Custody.
(a), coi.pqnqg^ion
Some legal systems have thought it equitable to provide monetary
compensation, in some circumstances, for loss suffered by a person who
was imprisoned before trial but acquitted of the charge,^ ® No such
provision exists in Scotland,
§?A<?Q"pe
For those accused who are convicted, time spent in custody before
trial, may be token into account by the court when considering
sentence, fhe Criminal Justice Act 1967» 3,63 of which applies to
Scotland, obliges a court in passing sentence of imprisonment 6r
detention in a Young Offender13 Institution, to hove regard to any
tine spent in custody by the accused awaiting trial or sentence.
Unlike the equivalent Ilnglish provision, however, bine spent in
custody is not automatically subtracted from a sentence but may be
subtracted at the discretion of the court.
LUMUJIwU ..IfIIJUT BAfL
Release on bail is not the only way in which an accused may be
released pending disposal of his case.
1It is provided by statute that where the police have power
to bail an arrested person they also have the power to liberate that
person without requiring bail in any form.
170with possibly a few statutory exceptions# the courts have the
power to release an accused without bail and merely cite him to
appear on the appointed day.
heler.se without bail, however, presents some procedural diffi¬
culties in solemn procedure which do not complicate release in summary
procedure, fhe complexities referred to arise because of the potential
difficulty of serving the indictment on an accused. The preparation
of the indictment generally takes some time and it is not usually
prepared before the accused i3 committed until liberated in due
course of law which is the procedural stage at which many accused are
liberated. To facilitate the service of the indictment, which is
vital to the success of the prosecution, the accused is required to
elect a domicile of citation before he is released on bail. Service of
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the indictment is competent at the domicile of citation, and this
avoios the difficulties of 3ervin,;; the indictment when the accused has
changed his address or has absconded. In suiamary procedure, if the
accused is in custody, the coaplainy naist be served on him before he
172is asked to plead. In most cases, therefore, the complaint will
havj been served before the court considers bail and ossibly liberates
the accused.
Another alternative to bail is liberation under a fixed penalty
173
but this method of release is competent only in summary procedure.
Under this form of liberation there is no requirement bo find a
cautioner or to consign any sum of money. In addition the court's
discretion is restricted in that the max.mum penalty is limited to
the sum of 10 pounds.
98.
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Since the implementation in 1970 of part III of the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1963, children who commit offences aro not generally
brought before a criminal court. 'She 1963 Act inti'oducod new
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raacliinery for dealing with children in need of compulsory measures
of care. According to the philosophy behind this Act, the commission
of an offence by a child is merely one indication that the child is
experiencing difficulties and is in need of help, The Act provided
that each local authority oust recruit lay persons to form a
children's panel. The new system of children's hearings which was
set up is staffed by three persons drawn from the panel. Provision
was also made for the appointment by each local authority of an
officer to be known as the reporter. This officer has very wide
powers including the power to decide whether a child should be referred
to a children's hearing. Hie children's hearing is intended to
consider all the problems of the child and to recommend a disposal
in the best interests of the child.
ill pfrUforeq 3szJ&a Mlsa
When a child is arrested, with or without warrant, a report must
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be made by the police to both the appropriate prosecutor and reporter.
An authorised police officer has the power to release uch a child
unless the charge is Jiomicide or other grave crime} or it is in the
child's interest to remove him from association with any reputed
criminal or prostitute; or the officer has reason to believe that
liberation would defeat the ends of justice. Liberation may be granted
on tho child, or his parent or guardian, entering into an obligation
promising the child.43 attendance at the hearing of the charge.
Alternatively liberation may bo granted on the child, or his parent
or guardian, finding bail to on amount that the officer believes will
secure the child's attendance at thhearing. Oolice powers to
liberate children are wider, therefore, than their powers to liberate
adult offenders conferred by b.10 of the summary Jurisdiction
(Scotland/ Act 1954*
In cases, however, where a decision is taken not to proceed with
a ch<'irje, the child is not automatically entitled to Ms liberation.
The detention of the child may be continued to enable the reporter to
decide whether the ©aild should be referred to a hearing on soma other
ground. If the reporter believes custody to be necessary, the cMld'B
detention will continue until the hearing, ho provision is made for
consideration of an application for release but a limitation of 7 days
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is placed on the period of detention.
CO. htolfogft deforp •• doqrfaft
..'hen a reporter considers that a cMld who is in custody is in
need of compulsory measures of care, he must whenever practicable,
arrange a hearing to sit on the first lawful da/' after custody. If,
however, the hearing is unable to dispose of the case detention may be
continued for a period not excooding 21 days if the hearing is satis¬
fied that detention is necessary in the interests of the child, or if
the hearin; has reason to believe that the ©hiId will abscond during
173
investigation of the case. On cause shown a further period not




If a child, not in custody fails to appear before a hearing,the
hearing may issue a warrant of detention for a maximum of 7 days and
this is authority for bringing the child before the hearing.^ If the
hearing is unable to dispose of the case and has reason to believe that
the child will not appear when required, detention may be authorised for
131
a period not exceeding 21 days. " On cause shown, this period may be
132
extended for a further period not exceeding 21 days. The hearing,
in order to obtain further information,may require a c ild to attend or
reside at a clinic, hospital or other establishment for a period not
exceeding 21 days and a warrant of detention may be issued for this
183
;juroose.
An appeal against any of these detention decisions may be taken to
134
the sheriff. In limited circumstances, an appeal by stated case to
135
tho Court of Session is also possible. No further appeal is
competent.
(?) ijhjLldran drought befpre 5 Sheriff
.'here a child and his parents do not accept the grounds of
referral to the hearing, the case must be brought before a sheriff for
1 36
a finding as to whether any ground of referral is established. This
is a civil not a criminal procedure. If the child fails to attend he
may bo arrested and detained until the case is determined. No provision
is made for consideration of any application for role oe but the case
187
must be determined within 7 days.
An appeal may also be taken to a sheriff against any decision of a
188
hearing. If the appeal is taken against a warrant of detention there
is no provision for interim liberation of the oh:ild. fhe appeal,
however, must be determined within 3 days or the warrant ceases to have
.t4)„ Chilton ?ro?ecuted Ip Cpmfca
101.
It is still competent) on the instructions or at the instance of
190
tho Lord Advocate, to rosacute a child criminally but such
prosecution is comparatively rare. In the event of a criminal pros¬
ecution the general provisions which ware described above, regulate
bail. One difference in procedure, however, is thut a child not
liberated on bail cannot be committed to prison but must be committed
191 192
to a place of 3afety chosen by the local authority.
Oroyjpiopp uq^r frfrp ,19^ M
There is no provision for legal aid or representation at the
hearing.^
Legal aid may be grant -d in respect of any proceedings before the
sheriff, if the sheriff is satisfied that the grant of legal aid is
in the interests of the child and if financial conditions are satis¬
fied,^^ here an appeal is taken to a sheriff against a child's deten¬
tion bofore disposition by the hearing, legal aid is available without
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inquiry into financial resoux-cos.
W.;th the additional condition that substantial grounds for appeal
must exist, legal aid is available in respeet of any appeal to the
Court of Cession.
Although the amount of work involved forced us to exclude from
our research the operation of the provisions which regularo the release
of children, we consider this a subject worthy of research, be have
included a description of the release provisions,not only to give a
com irehonsive account of this rea of boots lav/, but also because thay
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represent an unheralded ox&,.ple of the &boliti.>n of ball. It is true
that bail ;ua$r atiil competently bo yiven by the police if the child
is rested,but bell has in efroct jeoa abolished Tor children who
aro uofc.inod but who are not to be prosecuted in tho criminal courts.
In pi ca of bail the -ocial dork (Scotland; Act attempts to safeguard
tho c ild against pro-uiaoosition custody by imposing strict time
11 its on the length of custody and by providing machinery to facil¬
itate a speedy appeal to the sheriff against detention. As the
availability of legal aid is liraite , however, there is no guarantee
that fclso child or his parents will be aware of or un&arcinnd tho
appeal revisions.
"Thus the problem of official forml tiona of rulea -sad rights
become; complex. First, as to formulations already present, already
existent» the accepted doctrine, ihora, I repeat* one lifts an eye
canny nd skeptical as to whether judicial behaviour is in f ct
what the paper rule purports (implicitly) to state. Jno seeks the
real practice on the subject, by study of hoe the cases do in f ct
eventuate. One uooka to datermine how far the paper rule is real,
ho;? fax* merely paper. One geeks an understandin; of actual judicial
behaviour* in that comparison of pap r rule with practice; one
follows also the use mad© of the paper rule in argument py judges
and by counsel, and the apparent influence of ita official presence
on decisions# One seeks to determine when it i» stated, but
ignored; when it is stated and followed; when and why it ia
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The legal provisions regulating bail were described in the previous
chapter where we pointed out that the law does not give a person in
custody any right to be released on bail pending court a poaranoe. The
only riidit conferred is the right to ask for ball and to have thia
request considered. Statutes define in detail tha eireussst ncea in
which t! ia latter ri ;ht applied but gives unfettered discretion to the
police and the courts to grant or refuse bail in any oaao where they
are authorised to consider this request.
mmmm. wmmm
• very year the exercise of the legal discration of the police
and tlws courts results in tha detention in custody of thousands of
persons until the date est for their appearance in court, it is
possible to ascertain tha number of parsons detained in prison
before trial from published criminal statistics" but the figure
for police custody is not publicly available. Nothin wac known
about the exercise of this legal discretion except that in certain
reported eases'* the judg -a had indie ted various cireusast ncos which
they o id might persuade than to grant or refuse bail. So remedy
10$
this we resolved to study the bail decision-making of the police and
tho courts.
Decision-making may bo studied at several different levels, it is
important to draw a claar distinction between prescriptive and
descriptive studies. In tho former the aim of the researcher is to
create an optimal cheoxy or model of some aspect of decision-tasking,
for example, how decisions ought to be made in an organisation given
certain defined goals. In the latter the researcher attempts to
describe come aspect of decision-making, for example, how decisions
are reached in an organisation. These different approaches are,
however, apparently confused by some theorists. Thus we would categorise
the philisophical models of judicial decision-making called by
Dchubert^ the legal-norm^ the legal-fact^ and the legal-discretion^
models as prescriptive models despite the fact that the theorists
might consider that they have described how judicial decisions are
made. The models are properly categorised as prescriptive if as
-Schubert saidi
"hhen the observed decision fails to correspond to the predicted
decision (the researcher)8 usually castigates the court for having
(in this particular case) failed to follow the rules of logic in
reaching its decision. No attempt is made to discover whether
judges actually do make decisions in the manner prescribed by the
model." 9
It is our impression that although organisational decision-making
theorists have tended to concentrate on the development of prescriptive
theories or models,^ the emphasis has been different among those
concerned v?ith decision-making by lew officials. Theorists interested
in this rea have been more concerned with producing descriptive




There has been a great volume of research work related to the
general area of organisational dociaion-making. After surveying the
12
studies -ubenstein identified three main foci, the decision, the
decision-maker and the decision process. «e believe that this
classification say also be applied to rosearch studies concerned with
13
decision-making by law officials.
•iuch of the bail research has been concerned with aspects of
deciaion-aakinj and because of this we think the studies can
profitably be considered in the wider context of organisational or mora
specifically legal decision-making.
There have been few attempts in tho bail studios at developing
prescriptive theories or models. The Vera "community roots" scale may,
however, be considered as the first step towards a prescriptive model
which attempts to identify the good risks when securing the appearance
of the accused is the sole aim of the bail system. The only other
attempt, of which we are aware, to produce a prescriptive model was
14
made by Landea. Landes using mathematical logic has attoiapted to
evolve an economio model of an optimal bail system.
The great bulk of bail research has been descriptive in character.
The revelations of these studies havo generated many reforms and have
possibly inspired the development of prescriptive models.
In reviewing the bail studies in Chapter II we noted that a great
deal of research was concerned with asc staining tho factors v?hich
influenced the bail decision an the success and conn :quoncos of that
decision. Thi3 appears to have been the main focus of the research.
We aro not familiar with any research which concentr ates on the bail
decision-maker but attention has been drawn to the fact that the person
who controls the bail decision may not b9 the judge but may be the
icy.
bondsman or the prosecutor. Studies of the decision process have
been undertaken though perhaps incidentally to consideration of the bail
decision. Suffet has certainly criticised the neglect of this asoect
and emphasised its importance ahen ho studied bail decision-making as
17
a product of courtroom interaction. '
Like rssearchera concerned with other legal systems, wo thought
a descriptive study was essential as in Scotland the only information
about bail was restricted to the content of the legal, norma.
In choosing the focus of the study we were influen ed by bchur
who h 3 argued that!
"So examination of substance and procedure in the field of
criminal law can be completely satisfactory, unless it takes into
account the emergence (largely through the informal Interaction between
individuals occupying the related roles that constitute tho system of
criminal justice/ of working patterns of aceo modation to situational
imperatives and of routiniaad modes of everyds, operation. -Juch
developing patterns reflect or even generate a significant amount of
strain between ideal and actual legal norus." 13
fhia induced us to devote c nsidarable attention to the decision
process. e considered bail not as the isolated decision of one type
of official in one type of court but tried to describe bail decision¬
making at all the different stages in the legal system at which this
matter was considered. ho hoped that this ?v>prO#ch would give some
insights into decision-making in general and bail tiedsior>-making in
particular, which other bail studies had not a&terapted. Areas of
interest opened, up were, for exam le, the attention given to legal
norms at different levels of decision-making, the extent of agreement
about the importance of variables between different officials, the
similarity of decision-making situations end the relative importance
of officials involved in the decision-making situation, fhe different
decision-making situations arc described separately arid in considering
these rto were, like buffet, interested in the patterns of intemtion
between the various officials,who were involved in the decision-asking
situation. We ./ere interested, for example, not only it: what inform¬
ation was available to the deci3ion-maker but in who supplied the informa¬
tion and on whose information the decision-maker relied.
Following the general trend in bail research, we decided that the
bail decision itself vould bo another important subject for investig¬
ation. This involved a consideration of what variables were likely
to produce a bail granted or refused decision. In this assessment we
made the assumption,that the decision could be explained by reference
to what occurred in the decision-making situation particularly the
information made available to the decision-maker. In examining some
of the consequences of the bail decisions,attention w;s paid to such
issues as whether accused were able to raise the money for bail, how
long persons spent in custody, whether released persons n peared in
court when requested, and the final disposal of the case.
Although we accepted that the bail decision must to some extent
be influenced by the personal attitudes and beliefs of the individual
decision-maker, «o made no attempt to explore this in the present study.
We considered the decision-makers and other persons involved in the
decision-making situation, therefore, not as individuals but as role
actors.
109.
ms mji i izmm
"hen we designed the research we thought that it a gfat be more
revealing to cut across the main demarcation lines dr>',sm by the law
namely, bail in summary orocedure, bail in sol©an procedure and bail
af or conviction, to study separately the different bodies vested with
discretion. These bodies we identiflad as the court prosecute ru, the
police, the burgh and justice of tho -once courts, th • chordff courts
and tho High Court of Justiciary.
• o were able to stud,,* only one example of each body exorcising
discretion as the amount of work involved raid the rime available
prohibited a comparative study of rimilar bodies in different districts.
It was possible to study 9«ch bod;- in Edinburgh which ?as a convenient
res 3arch base and we, thoroforo, sought -or,emission to carxj out the
res.arch in that city.
.Ct frho Jfe»e.arci; ,1^9.1Qfrt
University colleagues introduced us to various officials who were
in a osition to consent to the race rch. The research could not have
been un ertaken without official consent as bail petitions in the
sheriff court and in the High Court of Justiciary are hoard in private
with members of the >ress and tho public excluded. In addition we
required access to a wide variety of c nfidential papers end records,
dermisclou was readily granted to allow us access to all papers and
records that we desired, and to attend the bail petition hearings in
tho - ©riff court. Wd were, however, refuse*:! entry to the hearings
of tho High Court of Justiciary on the ground "that oo Ion.'; aa the
HO*
matter of ball is dealt with in Chambers, it appears essential to
exclude third parties who have an academic or statistical interest
21
in the matter". Despite this refusal, we decided to continue with
the project though we considered the exclusion from the iligji Court
of Justiciary as a considerable loss to the research. In 1972 on the
appointment of a now Lord Justice-Joneral, permission was again
sought. On this occasion the request was granted and fortunately it
was not too late to include bail appeals to the High Court of
Justiciary in the research.
LLLJm itez&m&JX <*wor^
Little orientation was required before boginnin : floldwork
because of our legal training, "-o found that our familiarity with
legal procedure and jargon was helpful not only in understanding the
practice but also in facilitating our acceptance by various officials.
Initially wa spent a number of weeks observing decisions in the
burgh and sheriff courts and examining all the records and official
papers ;hich were relevant to bail.
Because of our interest in the decision-making situation,
observation was the obvious method of collecting the data vre wanted.
Indeed, as the decision-maker wag to a great extent dependent on the
presentation of verbal information and as no record was made of this,
observation was the only way of finding out much relevant infarction.
Although ouch of our data vaa collected by observation we were able to
avoid or minimise the most common sources of distortion caused by this
method. Firstly, we had no difficulty in observing the decision¬
making because, unlike many decisions, judicial bail decisions
111.
arc mnde in a formal setting. decondly, it is extremely unlikely
that the decisions were affected in any way by our presence as
observers, Hot only were wo silent and uninvolvod in tho decision¬
making, but in many cages the dacisioiv-maker was una rare of our
research interest. A third possible source of distortion was
minimised because we did not attempt to select information from the
total amount of information available. Our intention was to record
all information made available to tho decision-maker,though we found
it Impossible to record systematically the subtleties conveyed by
22
tone of voice or gesture.
It became apparent during this preliminary work that we could
not observe the prosecutor or police making bail decisions in the
sama way that we could observe the judge. W© decided to exclude the
exercise of the prosecutor!s discretion to grant bail from the
research because of the difficulties of monitoring his decision in the
absence of any formal decision-making situation. V.'e wore porounded
tor rac this exclusion,when it app#.'ired from the records,that the
oroaecutor by-passod the police and the courts in only a very few
cases# Noting, however, the apparent influence of the prosecutor*s
representations on the decision of the judge, we paid particular
attention to this in the research. Although it was possible to
observe the bail decisions made by tlie police, certain difficulties
lead us to the conclusion that there were advantages in relying on
record research rather than observation. As we explain in Chapter V,
there wvs no forum for the consideration of police bail because the
decision was made informally after consideration of a written report.
In t'ne absence of any forum, there was a real possibility thai we might
influence the decision or practice if we attempted to attach ourselves
112.
23
to the police decision-maker. In vie.7 of this danger and the fact that
we had -ccens to the written report on hich the decision was based ,?e
did not attempt to observe the decisions in the sample,though :e did
observe other bail decisions which were made while we were examining
the police records.
To ensure consistency in the recording of data we prepared
information sheets. These sheets, reproduced in Appendix II, were
designed to enable us to record wh t happened in the decision-making
situation and included oral ;snd written information given to the
deedsion-mukar.
Although we placed emphasis on observation a gr at deal of
information, for example, the time spent in custody md the delay in
raising bail could be obtained only from official records or papers.
A considerable amount of time, therefore, was also devoted to
collecting this data.
As observers we had the advantage of being able to mix with
court end police personnel. Although most of our questioning was
informal we did request a number of interviews which /ere granted. This
unstructured observation and discussion was a source of much
valuable information and many ideas. To allow us to moke comparisons
and to use statistical techniques, however, the observation of the
decision-making situation and the collection of d t from the
available records was appropriately structured.
In the follo/ing chapters we describe in more detail the way in
which bhe research was structured to examine the difforsnt decision-
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"Some of the harmful
consequences of an arrest
can be mitigated if the
accused has the opportunity




The recent upsurge of research in various countries concerning
bail and other pre-trial release procedures has focuoscd on court
practices. An arrested person, however, may be liable to 3pend a
subotuntial >eriod in police custody before his case is considered by
a co^rt* in Scotland an arrested person must be brought before a
court within 24 hours but at the weekend this period increases to 48
hours or, if a court holiday intervenes, j2 hours*
In this chapter we exrunj.no the partial solution to the problem
of police custody which hus been adopted in cotland, that is, police
2
ball* Ihe legal provisions regulating bail were described aoove*
It may be recalled that the police have the power to grant bail only
to persona who ar© to be tried before the inferior courts of summary
3
jurisdiction* -Ithough the police may not ask for bail in excess of
20 pounds, their discretion is otherwise unlimited by statute or
Common las*
Before describing the results of the study of polios bail
decision-making we attempt to place the subject of the research in its
procedural context by describing the practice adopted by the police
after thay have arrested an accused up to the time they consider bail.
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The usual procedur. followed by the polica after asking an
arrest was to take tha parson to the appropriate divisional station.
Persons arrested within a defined area around the central police
st tion ana women arrested alone were, however, taken direct to the
central police station. At the divisional station tha report of the
arresting officer was heard by the divisional sergeant who docided
whether to proceed with a charge, ho trills of identity raid property
were then recorded, -ny address given by the arrested person was
verified, usually by a polioo officer asking confirmation from the
occupants of the house at the address given. A charge sheet was
prepared by the divisional sergeant on the basis of the facts given
by the arresting officer. As soon as possible after the relevant
information had been recorded the arrested person w.-:a transferred to the
control police station.
As a matter of police practice the question of bail or other
form of liberation was determined only by the officer in charge of the
central police station. Bail w. s generally determined at that
station by the duty sergeant "with the cognisance" of the inspector.
On arrival at the central polica station the prisoner's property
was chocked and identification d tails were entered in the book
recording arrests. Thereafter the prisoner as locked up in one of the
ceils. There was a possibility of delay before the divisional
sergeant was appraised of the facts surrounding the offence because
verification of address and completion of the charge shoot by th©
divisional force could take some time, especially when there were a
number of arrests. Until the duty sergeant know tho o facts he was
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not of cour30 able to make any determination about bail. Very occas¬
ionally to avoid delay, a cer-geunt would telephone for details and
might arrange for bail before the reports arrived.
-hen an arrested •erson was taken directly to the central police
station the procedure was the s:.me as followed at the divisional
station, belay, however, wan avoided and when veriflying an address a
police officer might, if so instructed, inform the occupants that bail
of a specified amount would be acceptable, The police said that
considerably effort was also made,on behalf of divisional oris nera
with insu ficient money,by telephoning and house visits to contact
reiativ 8 or friends who might provide money for bail.
rag jrajgcT OF ira rac-gicn
The research covered all arrests made in the year 197-2 by
5
.Idihburgh City Police. The nuabar of arrests in which a charge was
made totalled 7328. This figure included cases destined for tho
sheriff and burgh courts, children*s hearings and warrant arrests
destined for courts in £*17.end and other parts of nsotland. Of these
cooes,3726 persons appeared in custody in the -diriburgh burgh Court
6
and those case3 were prima, feci0 eligible for police bail. 3uil was
granted by the police in 824, that is 22 per cent,of the eligible
orsee.
The research was designed to examine the way in which the police
exorcised their statutory discretion by constructing a model of the
operative v triables in bull decision-making and to consider the results
of the police decisions.
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In the course of preliminary fialdwork we found that the sources
of information available to the police differed from those available to
the courts, fho courts, in addition to some basic recorded information,
relied essentially on verbal information presented by the prosecutor,
the accused's law agent and the accused. Most of the information
available to the police, however, was contained in the charge sheet.
This reoord drawn up by the police was, as far as tho police were
concerned, a correct representation of the facts and it was on the
basis of these facts that the police made the decision about bail.
Information which could be obtained from the charge sheet was as
followsi- date end time of arrest; name of arresting officer; date and
time of appearance in central charge office; name and address of
arrested person; police verification of name and address; sex, date of
birth and occupation of arrested person; nerae of officer accepting
charge; brief account of tho circumstances of the offence;
names and addresses of witnesses.
One obvious source of information, that is, the criminal record
has not been mentioned, fhis is because the criminal record files
were not kept in the charge room and were not as a matter of practice
consulted by the authorised police officer when he was considering bail#
Although the charge sheet was the basic source of information,
two other sources of information were available to the police.
Information from these sources, however, was not readily revealed in
the records#
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She firat source was information advanced by the police themselves.
aIio chief constable had given certain directions relating to the amount
of bail required and the circumstances in which bail ought to be
refused. Those directions were made available to us and were taken
into account in the research. It was more difficult, however, to
determine when an objection to bail by an individual officer had been
made, -iuch an objection w. a recorded in only 2 cases, but Athough
the police admitted that this information was not fully recorded, it
was still ref rded as a rarity. The objection, when it occured,
generally related to some special circumstance surrounding the offence
which was considered to make bail undesirable. Je decided that us
those special circumstances were in any event taken into consideration
by the officer deciding bail, the orais3ion from the records of a few
specific police objections to ball would not have any appreciable
effect on the research results. Additional infor ation. might alao
be requested by the officer making the bail decision from the arrest¬
ing officer, but this occurred generally only where the information
on the charge sheet was consider :d to be obscure. Lastly, it was
possible that the officer making the bail decision might have additio¬
nal information from hio wri personal knowledge of the arrested person
or circumstances of the offence, although we were aware that personal
knowledge, like the prejudices of the individual docision-raake^ might
be important factors in a particular decision it was not feasible in
the context of our study to attempt to collect and assees this
information.
The second source of information concealed by the records was
information from the arrested person. here infamr.ti n from the
arrested person differed from the information on the charge sheet the
police information, as one might expect, was accepted by the officer
considering bail. But if information given by the accused, for example,
about his address was later verified then the charge shoot information
was changed. For our purposes, however, come problems v.ere raised by the
common situation ./here the accused who lacked sufficient money for
bail was asked whether relatives or friends would provide the money.
As no record was kept of this, failure to have bail money raised was
open to more than one interpretation. The correct interpretation
might be that the person named by the arrested person was asked but
failed to provide the money, or that the arrested person did not name
anyone or that the police did not consider granting bail. In interp¬
reting the data which related to persons granted bail this ambiguity did
not arise because it was possible to obtain the information about the
provision of money from the bail receipts.
•e have described some of the difficulties involved in basing
the study of police bail on record research. We had reservations
about observation also, partly because we doubted whether observation
would significantly increase our iaaovrledgo of the information
available, and partly because of practical difficulties,not least the
problem of ensuring that our presence did not influence the bail pro-
7
cedure and decision. Unlike the bail decision in court, there was no
public forum where information ?as exchanged when the police considered
bail. From mere observation, therefore, we could not have obtained
information conveyed by telephone or from conversations outwith our
presence. In addition the bail decisions might bo made at any time,
day or night, fhis and the problem of ensuring th t our attempts, to
witness any police questioning and information g thering,did not influence
police practice, persuaded us not to rely on observation, o favoured
record research which seemed to give an almost equivalent information
yield and involved the fewest practical difficulties.
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The relevant records were located in tho charge office of the
central police station and because of tills we spent a considerable
period of time working there. This helped familiarise ub with police
procodure as prisoners were locked up and bailed while we were in the
charge office, dome time was spent discussing bail in general terns
with the different police officers and this influenced our ideas
about which variables to include in the model of police bail. It was
also possible, as the study was retrospective, to ask specific
questions about individual cases without affecting the result of
these cases.
(2) The of ft fodQl, PX. the Copygtiyq
in P9U<?<? 3;?aa
A clustering of bail granted decisions occurred in those cases
destined for Monday and Saturday sittings of the burgh court. In
8
order to reflect the annual percentage of bail granted to bail
refused decisions,-we collected a sample from all the arrested ooraons
destined to appear before -dinburgh burgh court on two Mondays, two
Saturdays and three other weekdays. The sample Included 92 cases in
23 of which bail was granted. The sample represented 2.5 per cent of
the cases eligible for police bail in 1972.
For the ijurpose of the research the assumption was made that the
police did not make arbitrary bail decisions but granted or roftioed
bail utilising in some way tho available information. The first step
taken, therefore, was to break down the information available to the
police into a number of information items. Fourteen information items
were categorised as follows!- number of hours after arrest before the
next court (CTHI£S)j information relating to the circumstances of tho
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arrested person, th t is sobri&ty (SOBRIETY), 3ex ( SEX), age (AGS),
address (ADDRESS), employed (..DIP), occupation (0CC)| the offence
charged (OFFENCE) and special circumstances surrounding the offence
(SPCIRCS);chief constable's bail decision (CCQ3J)j police objections
to bail (P0IDBJ)> information about the availability of bail money,
that is, the arrested person had sufficient money to cover the
standard bail amount (MOHAV ,), had sufficient money to cover the bail
amount asked (liGHAVA), contacted someone who provided boil money
(ISDHVAV?) .
Our aim wrt3 to construct a model to illustrate the way in which
all or any of the variables, that ia, the information items were
utilised. Drawing on our experience of polico practice we conceived
a model of police deoision-ranking as a certain flow of variables which
must be satisfied before bail would be granted.
v.© considered, and rejected as inappropriate, various methods of
constructing our model, for example, multiple regression and factor
analysis. A methodology which suggested to us sore attractive posaib-
9
ilities was Guttaan's scalegra© analysis.
The l-uttman technique has been developed and applied mainly in
the construction and development of attitude scales. The distinguishing
char' cteri3tics of a Guttman scale are that tho scale must satiety the
tests of curaulativonees and unidimensionality. A simple example may
illustrate the logic behind tha Guttman technique. An example of a
uniuimensional cumulative scale is a ruler, A ruler mo:,surea length,
a single dimension,and grades the units of length cumulatively that
is,six inchos is greater than four inches and both oro greater than
one irjsk*
An attempt to measure the attitude of a group of persons towards
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convicted parsons provides a mm sophisticated oxmplo. In attempting
to construct » Outtana sonic the first task f the researcher is to
generate, on thy basis of experience and intuition, a number of
statoconia which he thinks reflect different positions on the altitude
continuum. buch statements Bight range for ©xaapls through (l) I
w uid work byaide a person with a criminal record (d) I would employ
a person with a criminal record In an unskilled job (j) I would employ
a person with u criminal record in a responsible position (4) 1 would
invito a person as a frieau to my house even if thy person had &
criminal record (5; I would mane/ a person even if the person had a
criminal record. If the researcher las suocessf.il in constructing a
Qutstcuaa scale with the properties of unidimenoiemailt;• and cuaulativenese
then the pattern of responses £son the group tented .till fall into a
certain characteristic pattern. This pattern is such that' all
respondents (or a sufficient number to satisfy the teats specified
by Guttaaa) if they agree,fur example, with st&t mcnt (3; will also
answer that they agree with atatassents (1/, (2), ( J) and (4).
Similarly rejpjtondeats answering that they agree with statement ( 2)
will agree with statement (t) and if they disagree with statement (.3)
the will disagree with statements (4) and (5). Translating this into
the tores of -ur first example this means that if s piece f string
passes the 2 inch mark on a ruler but does not pa- 3 the 3 inch mark
then wo can predict that it passes the 1 inch mark but fails to
pans the 4 end 5 inch marks. .5ns important difference, however, ought
to bo noted, Ihe ruler Is aim an ordinal scale ,;hick means that 4
inches is twice as long as 2 inches. This does not apply to the
duttaen scale, th&s the conclusion cannot be drawn that a person who
a ;n.toj only with stntemnts (1; and (i) is twice an 'rejudicod as a
who wrvmn with statements (1) to (4).
Although we ware not attempting to measure the police attitude
to bail, Guttmon scalojran analysis utilises two procedures which we
thau;ht might be adapted to construct a model of police decision¬
making. Firstly, Guttraan scalo gram analysis arranges variables in an
order of importance according to the number of cases which fail or pass
such individual variable, -secondly, it fits in different variables to
arrive at the pattern of variables which forms the host scalo. This
seemed basically what we vers attempting to illustrate in the model,
that is, we .vere attempting to identify the variables which influenced
the bail decision and shew thoir respective importance. We decided,
therefore, to use the Guttmaa technique to find the boot fit pattern
when bail decision Wr-s the most important or highest ordered variable.
Sata cards were prepared for each case in the cample. hotails
of identification, the fourteen information items and the bail
decision .vers ceded and punched on each card, The Guttaian scalogram
anniyals used,v?a3 the subprogram Guttman -.cale, taken from the system
of computer programs culled -ftat i-stioal "'acka;?9 for; tip? -ocial
10
■'donees (IPGS). The program curds directed the creation of a
number of different scales each with the bail decision as the highest
ordered variable. Cutting points ware chosen for the different
variables to test various theories about the relationship of the
variables. For example, theorising that to achieve a bail granted
decision the arrested person had to be sober, hud to have a fixed
address and have regular employment, cutting points for the variables
sobriety (GOB&IM'Y), address (iPUSisSG) and employed (G 'were
choaan to construct such a scale.
desalts with the different scales tested were unimpressive and
all fell below the minimum O.d coefficient of scalability from which
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we concluded that no valid Guttman scale had been produced. To take
into account a possible interactive effect in sane variables wo
11
recoded sobriety to take into account tho affect of passage of tine*
12
A new variable, money available for bail (MON.V) was also created#
A number of now acales were then programmed but the coefficients of
scalability were still below 0.6.
On reflection we decided that our preoccupation with the
coefficient of scalability was misconceived because the variables
based on the information items were not essentially cumulative in
character. V/hat confirmation, therefore, was required ? It may bs
recalled that the model we conceived was a certain flow of variables
all of which must be satisfied to realise a positive bail decision.
We were of the opinion that to confirm tho model,it vras necessary to
create a scale which showed all tho cases passing the bail granted
variable as also passing all the other variables in the scale, and
no case failing to pass ono or more variables passing the bail granted
variable. Bearing this in mind we re-examined the scales which had
been generated. In one scale consisting of the following variables;-
bail decision (BAILBiSC), money available for bail (JQNAV), sobriety
(recodedj (SGBRI2TY), address (ADBildSS), special circumstances
surrounding the offence (SPCI8CS), chief constable's bail direction
(CC03J) and police objections to bail (?0L0BJ),all the cases passing
the bail granted variable also passed all the other variables, and no
case which failed to pass one or more variables passed the bail
granted variable. In view,howover, of the possibly unreliable
coding of (B0L0SJ) we decided that it was not justifiable to include
this as a separate variable. The reason for this was that the police
ob action to ball in individual cases wa3 almost never recorded, f-nd
to overcome this we had coded thi.. vi'Viable on our estimation of whan
uuch ohjoction was likely to have occurred* A3 our estimation refl¬
ected the variable special circunat ncea ae considered that the oases
aero more aptly coded under that v.iriabla. This roc -din.; did not
c;aisa my significant change in the ordering of tha dot «
The final scale, called ..c,.le A, froa which (.Of,OBJ) was
omitted ia reproduced and explained in Appendix III. e have
extracted thi crucial pass/fail pattern from JeSle 1 aa t in in
illustrated in fable I. -*o submit that cale confirms cur model
of police bail decialcH^zaakin:. It identifiaa the information items
which worn utilisod by the police in deciding bail a d illustrates the
we-- in which the information itesse .ere utilised.
If this confirmation is accepted,it follows that tfi® police in
deciding bail did not consciously or subconsciously add or isubtract
metaphorical or even real points,but rather regarded the presence of
cart in variables as a prerequisite for, and justification of, the
griuuing of bail. Failure to find one or more of the variables resulted
in a refusal of bail, -qual ieportanca was apparently occurdad to each
vari bio. extraneous variables sere diaregarded, though it was always
possible for a new variable to bo incorporated to form a now decision
pattern.
»e are of the opinion that this form of decision pattern aunt
be found in many other decision-making contexts m it ic-.ds t. uniformity
and ick decisions, relying as it does on almost taoc aacal application
of settled criteria,father than the balancing and weighting of eircuo-
st • -.ic :s for each individual case*^ VI© suggest that the Guttmaa
tscr.'fque can usefully bo adapted in the manner which v», have doucribod
to verify such docioiorwiokin patterns* The Guttoaa technique can
TABLEI
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also be used to identify the operative variables in this particular
form of decision-making pat torn. It may be seen in Scale A and Table I,
th t all and only those cas .8 which passed the bail granted decision
passed the other variables# The variables in that scale 2a1st be
accented as the operative variables because, when other variables were
added or removod, tho cases which passed the bail gr nted variable no
Ionper passed all the other variables. This is illustrated in Scales
15S and G which are reproduced and explained in Appendix III.
To summarise J on© type of decision-making patternmiy be repre¬
sented by a flow of variables Leading to a positive decision. A
nooitivo decision is dependent on the presence of all of these variables
and a negative decision is tho result of the absence of any one or
more of these variables. The GuLtman technique may bo adapted to
identify the existence of such a pattern and the operative variables.
Police bail decision-making was examined and we found that it fell into
the pattern described. The operative variables were identified. A hail
granted decision was found to occur only when money was available, the
prisoner was sober, the prisoner had a fixed address, there were no
special circumstances surrounding the offence, and there was no
16
objection by the chief constable to bail. All these variables must
be considered of equal importance.
Because of the subjectivity of the original selection process and
our consequent inability to characterise tho casos on which the model was
built as representative of tho whole population, wa decided that the model
127.
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must be subjected to testing by a random sample of cases.
The cases in the random sample were examined to see if they
conformed to the model, that is, to see if in all cases in which bail
was not granted at least one of the variables in the model was not
satisfied and in all cases in which bail was granted all the variables
were satisfied.
The results of this examination are set out in fable II. fable
II includes all the cases in which bail was not granted and illustrates
the variable or variables which the case failed to satisfy to obtain
bail.
The cases in which bail was granted were also examined. It was
found that 11 cases satisfied all the variables in the model but in 2
cases bail urns granted contrary to the model. Both cases failed to
pass on the receded sobriety variable. A new coding of sobriety was
evolved to take account of these cases. The new coding s >ecifiod that
where the sobriety (3'BHIbTY) variable was coded drunk and the money
available (MOS'-V) variable waa positive and the hours before the
next court (CTILiS) variable was coded twelve or more, then the sobriety
coding equalled sober. The effect of this second revised coding was
to reduce the time span of more than twenty-four hours to more than
twelve hours where a person was drunk but had the ra-.ney available
for bail. The results in Table II were not affected by the
1B
introduction of this now coding.'
The final model in the form of a diagram is represented in
Figure I.
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BailDecision-MakingttheP l ceLevel LIBERTY
A
Contacts someone whopro¬ vides monfiy. Contacts someone butno moneyprovided
C.C. orders permit bail
Accused has bail money Accused doesnot haveb il money
Burgh Court Offence
Fixed Address
C.C. orders donot permit ba.il









AH .XAMINATIOM OF JOttd COiiViiO^ ;^JAL AJ-/XTS OF ^OLIC , BAIL
In this section four aspects of police bail ars xauinod. Firstly*
w$ oonsidar the time spent by bailed and non-bailod persons in custody
and the conditions of that custody secondly, bai1 money thirdly, the
success of bail and lastly, the practice of withdrawing bell#
(l) %UW cwita4Y
(a) Time aoeat in police custody before first court, ..apaoagqaoe
This description of time spent in custody was based on the
second, that ia, the random sample because the original sample wa3
weighted in favour of weekend arrests and accordingly could be
expected to give an unrepresentat ivs picture*
Figure II illustrates the real time 3pent in custody, from the
time of arrest to the first court appearance, by accused who were not
released on bail* Also represented in this figure is the potential
time which the bailed accused would have spent in custody if bail had
not been grant d. The average real time spent in custody by the
non-bailed cases was 14*6 hours and the average potential time spent
in custody by bailed cases was 33*7 hours* The average rml time
spent in custody by the bailed c sea was 10.7 hours. This compar¬
atively long time may be explained by the fact that a large number of
accused had been drinking or were drunk when arrested. The police
wore reluctant to release on bail someone who was still under the
influence of drink* In addition delay sometimes occurred while the
police contacted relatives or friends of the arrested person to inform
them that money was required. omo time may also have elapsed before
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relatives or friends, who were willing to supply the iaoney, were able
to bring it to the police station.
FIGURE II
Time Spent in Police Custody Before First Court Appearance
Number of hours before first court appearance
*
0 Hours spent in custody 19 Potential hoursby non bailed cases 11 spent in custody«■ by bailed cases
From this it appears that a bailed person did not on average
enjoy any great advantage over a non-bailed person in relation to the
real time spent in custody, as the bailed person spent only 4 hours
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1qs3 in custody than the non-bailed person. But as the potential timo
to bo spent in custody by tho bailod group groatly exceeded the
potential time to be spent in custody by tho non-bailod group, the
grant of bail saved the bailed person from a period of custody much
longer than 4 hours.
iW d of poi^t fp thq opU^e bbUfl19
Before being locked up in a police cell an arrested person was
required to hand over all his property to the police. Hie police also
removed belts, ties and any other article which they considered sight
b© used for self injury or aa a weapon.
The three-storey cell block was adjacent to the charge office
and consisted of .'4 cells which were able to contain up to 60 prisoners,
dome attempt was made to segregate the prisoners. Although children
ought to be detained in a place other than a cell, lock of alternative
accomodation usually moant that children, though separated from the
root of tho prisoners, were looked up in one of the smaller cells. For
fcranio prisoners there existed a special cell which could bo opened
by one key only and this key was always held by a woman, This cell
was small with a slightly raiaod wooden floor and, apart from toilet
f cilitie3, was completely bare. On tho some level there were two
comnunal cells. These cells had fitted benches round the walls,
hooters which wero supplemented by hot air vents and a toilet ooen to
public view. One coll was used to contain burgh court; prisoners and
the other C.I.I), prisoners, destined for tho sheriff court. 'The base¬
ment colls had coneret3 floors, no heatin; and felt damp and vary cold.
The police admitted that obstreperous prisoners soa?times had their
jackets, jumpers and shoos removed and were locked up thoro, liter®**?
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to "cool off "* The cells on the top storey -wore provided with beds and
bedding. Those cells were generally used for overnight prisoners but
were sometimes used during the day. Inly sober and non-verminous
prisoners were allocated these cells. The drunk and vagrant prisoners
were given instead a rubber pallise on the floor of the appropriate
communal cell. A cell was reserved for persons arrested for driving
offences involving drink or drugs and these prisoners were allowed to
sleep there until they regained their sobriety. Another cell known as
the "hospital" cell was larger than the other cells to allow, whore
20
necessary, the presence of two escorts to guard the prisoner.
The police showed us a printed notice which described the rights
of the prisoner. The notice stated that writing paper must be supplied
to the prisoner on request and that he was entitled to send a message by
letter or telephone to a relative or friend, or in appropriate circ¬
umstances, to a foreign consul. It also stated that the prisoner,
subject to police consent, might be allowed a supervised visit by a
relative or friend. Information about bail was also given and the
notice stated that:
"If you wish to be released on bail you should notify the officer
on duty. If your ocse is one in which bail can be granted, he will, if
necessary, send a message to your friends for the amount of bail. hen
bail is lodged you will be liberated and will be advised of tho time and
place fixed for your appearance in court."
Tte were informed by the police that this notice was displayed in
the cells. V/hile inspect!n; the cells, however, we commented on the
absence of the notice. The police then stated that the prisoners
usually tore down or defaced the notices.
To encourage good order the police allowed smoking and were
usually willing to purchase cigarettes or news apers for the prisoner
out of money from his property. The prisoner did not, however, have to
buy his own food, as meals from a commercial caterer were brought in
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three times a day.
Photographs ana fingerprints were taken of those prisoners who
wore to appear in th? sheriff court but not usually of prisoners
destined to appear in the burgh court.
On the mornings when the courts were sitting,the prisoners
awaiting appearance in the burgh court were brought directly from the
police cells into the burgh court, The prisoners who were to aopear
in the sheriff court were taken under escort to the cells below the
sheriff court.
C4 Pfrg. qf cur^t AMm
Until about ten years ago it was not uncommon for tlie police to
grunt liberation on the deposit of some article* for example, a watch or
a ring equivalent in value to tbe amount of bail set. Although still
legally competent, in practice such articles are no longer accepted.
Liberation on bail is now grunted only on the deposit of a sum of money,
The amount of money re<ue tod is in the discretion of the officer
granting bail but his discretion is bounded by a statutory maximum of
30 pounds. In examining all the coses in 1972 in which bail was granted
only one case was found which violated the statutory ma.iraum. In this
case 3 pounds was deposited as bail for an accused charged with four
offences of breach of the pe ce« There was some suggestion that each
offence had been assessed separately although it is not within the stat¬
utory regulations to exc.ed the maximum in this way. Foreign currency
raoy sometimes be acceptable to the police and in ono case French francs
to the value of 15 pounds were accepted. Cheques, however, were not
accepted. In addition to the statutory maximum, the chief constable had
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fixed tho amounts of deposit which he considered appropriate for the
various offences. Although these amounts weca not absolutely binding,
few cages were found where bail was fixed outwith tho suggested amount.
The scale laid down by the chief constable i3 shown in Table III.
TABLE III
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Considering the cases in both samples, we found that in all but 2
c sos in which bail was granted tho deposit fell within the recommended
scale. The average amount deposited was 5 pounds and 70 pence. Despite
the low amounts requested for release on bail, only 25 P<s? cent of those
cases released on bail were able to pay the money out of their property.
In 75 por cent of the cases the money was provided by relatives or
friends. Fi ure III illustrates that of those arrested, 13 per cent had
no money at all and another 40 por cent had under one pound. A mere
13 ?er cent had the money to pay boil at the recommended amount.
Three main questions are raised by these figures, Firstly,
whether the requirement that money be pledged prevented the release of
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FIGURES III
Amount of Money in Possession of Arrested Persons
Ho. of cases'' :-i_i
:: '■ — : ::ir r:*t~~
with money above
with money below"c«c."scale
Released on bail O Custody
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impecunious persons. Secondly, whether the sums of money required
were too high or too low and thirdly, whether the money requirement was
an effective inducement to prompt released persons to appear in court.
(a, of -Aether i^.p apppy prevented, rqlqaaq,.
It is apparent from the decision-making model constructed with the
help of Guttman oculogram analysis that the non-avai 1abiiifcy01" money
prevented a considerable number of persons from obtninin: bail. Scale C
shows that when the availability of money variable w s removed from the
scale an additional 11 (12 per cant) of the c 3as passed all the
21
remaining variables. -hen tho new coding of sobriety was incorporated
into the model the number of additional cases passing, as -cole D showo,
22
incro sed to 15 (16 per cant). In the second sample no oases failed
on the availability of money variable alone. But using the new sobriety
coclin: 6 (7 par cont) of tho oases ffoiled because of the non-avai lability
of money. Prom this we est!mata that by abolishing the requirement that
money be pledged, the number of cases r leased would be increased by
about 50 per cent which would increase the release rate from 22 P©r cent
to about 40 per cent. She number of cases detained in custody would be
decreased by about 16 per cont.
In addition,the abolition of the money requirement would reduce
police work by relieving the police of duties connected with b- il
receipts and more importantly by rendering unnecessary the police
efforts to obtain money from the relatives and friendc of the arrested
person.
(b) A Consideration of the amount of bail required
The police, in following the amounts of bail suggested by the chief
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constable, appoarod to base the amount on the seriousness of the offence
rattier than the financial means of the individual accused. The police
estimation of seriousness, however, in 31 per cent of the cases in the
two earn les exceeded the penalty imposed by the burgh court. In 27
per cent of the cases the money required by the police and the court
penalty were identical.- In only 23 per cent of the cases was the sum
requested by the police lass than the court penalty, (The remaining
19 per cent of the cases were not included becauao final disposal did
not occur at tho first court appearance.)
The amounts of deposit requested by the police seemed very low
in comparison with bail amounts in other couatriec. Nevertheless in
many cases the amounts exceeded or equalled the disposition of the
burgh court, The amounts appeared even more incongruous when they ware
compared with the bail amount a set in tho sheriff court. »'e found that
the amounts of bail requested by the sheriff were linked to a rough
tariff of seriousness of offence but were also linked to the individual
aeana of the accused. The police tariff, however, did not reflect the
sheriff court practice. This lead to .some 31 range results, for example,
the sheriff in one case asked f r bail of 20 pound- from on accused
charged with attempted murder, tmd 5 pounds or less was asked in many
ca ob -where theft by housebreaking was charged. In the police tariff
recommended by the chief constable, however, 20 pounds was the .sum
laid down for a second charge of prostitution and a refusal of bail
was r commanded if tho offence charged involved dishonesty.
.Ccj. A consideration of the .effectiveness of the money requirement aa
ar> jte&aaafflBfe &a smsm
In view of the poverty of many of the arrested persons a .peering
in the burgh court,it is arguable that the threat of f rfeiture of
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evon very small amounts of money may be an Inducement to soma accused
to appear* Such an argument also gains some support from our finding
that in a great number of cases the forfeiture of bail was likely to be
more severe a penalty than the court disposition. We do not, however,
even at the police level, support tho view that money bail is an
inducement to appear. W© are of the opinion that for those ->arsons
who have no intention of appearing in court, the fear of forfeiture
of m snail sum of money will not deter '.hem, if they ..re not deterred
by the fear of rearrest and unishrnont for the original offence. Any
objection based on the fact that tho disposition of the court say be
less severe than the forfaituro of bail may be countered by tho a,guaent
that although this was a finding of our research it is unlikely that
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trie ccused could be aware of this possibility.
There was also some evidence to suggest that booms® the amounts
of police bail were high in comparison to the court dispositions, this
acted as a disincentive to officials to folio# up cases in which the
accused did not appear in court. Indeed the police admitted that
occasionally in circumstances where the offence of being drunk and
incapable was charged,they infor ed the arrested oerson that If he
)aid the money for bail but did not appear in court, the money would
bo forfeited and that would probably be the end of the matter. We
f mnd that of the 4° bailed accused failing to appear in court in 1972,
a warrant of arrest was issued in only 14 castes. In the remaining
cases no ention was taken other than forfeiting the money deposited as
police bail.
The money requirement in police bail is in no vr y comparable to
the form of compulsion built into the English surety system. Dae
money for the deposit was accepted from any person including a co~
accused,without regard to the reliability of the person dvaacing the
money or hie relationship to $s® arrested .-iersoa. Indeed the money
advanced by relatives or friends was in eotaa oases % . ken by the
a -rested person who signed the boil receipt in his own atmet* liven in
cos >s where th© receipt was signed in the nsras of a person other than
feho arrested person, that person hss no legal duties or ;k.wbsb to
compel the arrested person* a attendance in court.
-liere in very little evidence to indicate whether a M^h appear¬
ance rate would be maintained oven in the abaanee of a sonsy requirement*
Although police have the statutory power to release persons without a
sonsy deposit, this power was vary rarely exorcised. In only 9 (less than
0*003* P©r cent) of the cases where bail was competent was a parson
role .a@d on his own word. The number is too small to b&ee any pred¬
iction about the success of an extension of this forts of release but
in all cases the individuals did appear whan repuirod in court*
Successful release without money in other cas 3, for example, those
appe-riii?: before the sheriff court cannot easily be used to gauge
polico success, because so awry of the burgh court cases were petty
offenders charged with offences committedwhile under the influence of
alcohol*
( u ^99-939 ^ M
The criteria of success of bail is not limited in cotland to the
appearance of tho bailed person in court* Success also depends on the
rela sod person not coram!feting another offence while on bail*
■hen measured by the nuc&or of bailed persons a peering as
directed ia court, police ball was successful in that only 40 (4*3 par
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cent) of those released failed to appear. Table IV illustrates the
types of offence for which bailed persons failed to appear and the
amount of bail forfeited.
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TABLE IV
Bail Forfeiture « Types of iffence and Amount of Bail
Total forfeited Avor-ige forfeited
Offence No. of cases (in pounds) (in pounds)
Bruni: and incapable 22 36 j
Broach of the peace 14 70 5
Theft 2 10 5
Licensing (3) Act 15 5
Assault 1 15 15
TABLE V
Bail Forfeiture t Signatories of the Bail deceipts
ilumbcr of cases
Bail receipt signed by arrested person 22
Bail receipt signed by relative 9
Bail receipt signed by other person 6
Bai.l receipt signed by co-accused or relative of
co-accused 3
Table V shows that over 50 per cent of tlsj individuals who failed to
appear were bailed in their own name, and yet individuals paying their
own deposit money formed only 24 per cent of the samples. It would be
misleading, however, to conclude that those cases, in which bail was
made possible by relatives or friends advancing money for the deposit,
wore a better risk. The fact that a person has relatives or friends
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in the community may well be an indicator of a good bail risk but m
individual able to pay his own bail may also have relatives or friends
in the community and it would bo wrong to conclude from the fact that
they do not pay his bail that he was a greater bail risk.
It is difficult to evaluate success based on the second criteria
of failure to commit another offence while on bail. It was not possible
to £Hther information about whether a charge for an offence committed
while on bail arose after the first offence had been dealt with. But
no cases of individuals rearrested for another offence while still on
bail were found in the samples. In view of this, the shortness of
the period of liberty and the fact that the police refused release
where they thought mother offence might be committed, it seems safe to
conclude that the second criteria of success 'was also fulfilled.
Considerin; success from a different angle, however, the question
may be asked, whether the police refused release in oases whore the
individuals would have appeared in •ourt and would not have committed
another offence if released. In our submission the answer is in the
affirmative.
Firstly, we are of the opinion that the availability of money is
not a variable which is relevant in the assescnaent of a good bail risk.
The arr sted arson's ability or lack of ability to raise a very small
sura of money gives no indication about whether he will fail to appear
in court or commit offences or in other ways abuse hia release on bail.
It does not even give a reliable indication about whether the accused is
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a vagrant or passing through the city. We argued above that fear of
forfeiture of small amounts of money was not a successful inducement to
appear. In view of this we favour the abandonment of availability of
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money as a criterion of release. .'hen wo interpreted Scale 2 we
argued there would he a 50 per cent increase in the number of
persons released if the availability of money was not considered
'6
relevant by the police. The police with justification refused to
release* except in to the care of a fit person, persons who were not
sober. It appears, however, from the data in the second sample that
a person with money was considered to sober up more quickly than a
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person without money in his property. W© estimate, therefore, that
the removal of the money criterion would also lend to an increase in the
number of sobered drunks released.
The chief con -table's directions prohibited release in cases ..here
theft or some other offence involving dishonesty wa3 charged. The
sheriff court, however, taking a much greater risk in view of the
longer period of freedom and the more serious offence charged,
successfully released many accused charged with offences of dishonesty.
There is no good reason for automatically excluding persons charged -with
such offences from police bail.
The criteria on which the police granted and refused bail must be
considered justified, in as much as the police obtained a very hi^h rate of
appearance in court which was not marred by the commission of offences
by the accused in the period of liberty. We are of the opinion,
however, that it is not sufficient for the criteria to ensure only
that the persons bailed are successful releases, the criteria must also
ensure that all potential successful releases are bailed. We found that
the criteria failed in this second objective by failing to maximise the
number of probable successful releases. We believe that the abandonment
of the money requirement and an extension of the types of offence, in
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Oae police practice which is without statutory authority and
coatx-ary to the practice of tba courts is the caacailatijn of a grant
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of bail. In cbsc*cln; the icauod bail receipts for tho year 1972 we
found that in 5 cases bail had boon granted, than cam .Hod. In 2 of
the cases tha cancellation was unobjectionable in fch t the bail for
procedural reasons had been ro-ontared in the bail book kept by the
police for accused, who were to a poor in tha sheriff court. In the
othor 3 cases a bail receipt had boen issued and signed by the approp¬
riate third party, who had supplied the money for the deposit, The grant
of bail was also noted in the usual manner in the bob; kept for this
purpose. Despite this, bail was cancelled* So res-ion was recorded,
ami the arrested person was brought as a custody prisoner to the burgh
court. The police explainod that auch cancellation miJit occur if
tho arrested person turned obstreperous in the police atat ion, perhaps
because the effect of drink h- ; not completely worn off.
m,d 2;?is BAIT, ar ....... . .-m».j F.,:;.; cuif.g s„ JHPaisuD
lil Msmsl ski -jto M
As an alternative to bail, the police have the power to liberate
a person on his 00m word that he will appear when requested in court,
fho police claimed to regard tho use of this power as appropriate only
whan, extenuating circumst nc jQ existed* fixtenuating circunstunces,
however, do not seem to have occurred often because in 1972 only 9
such cases were recorded.
fixes of the caseu concerned women arrested on char job of breach of
the peace* in each case the woman was the only person available to look
aft >r children at home. In another case a mail on a similar charge was
released on the recommendation of a doctor. Medical attention was also
required for three persons, two of whom were over 3event,/, who were
charged with being drunk and incapable. A respectable civil aorvmat
aid a woman of almost fifty who were arrested on similar charges were
also released. None of these persons had sufficient money to give bail
at the rate recommended by tho chief constable.
(>, ag&ftaga lprd of faront
In the case of children the law provides that unless the offence
charged is homicide or other grave crime, or the child is in a.,sociation
ith a criminal or prostitute, or his liberation is likely to defeat the
K)ends of justice, the police must liberate the child with or without bail*
Although bail is competent it vraa not used by the police in these
circurastancea.^ The usual practice was to liberate the cldld on his
parent or guordiaa entering into a verbal obligation to present the
child at the hearing of the charge* The parent was di.ectod to telephone
on the morning of the next court to find out whether the child was to be
presented at tho sheriff court or mora usually at a children'3 hearing*
So separate statistics wore kept of the number of children talcon
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into police custody. data ab ut t:ie release of children into the
custody of a social worker or transfer to an assessment centre wa3
recorded, but not systematic vlly. Although we consider that the criteria
and results of police release in this urea are worthy of research the
amount of work involved prohibited its inclusion in the present research.
(xi la&aaa aa sL Ska S&te rpgpcutey
'•hen the police considered that release was outwith their
competence they sometimes consulted the city prosecutor about whether
a particular persons ought to be released. Only 7 oases ./ere recorded
in 197— as bein - released on the authority of the city roaecutor. fhe
police admitted, however, that such consultation was not fully recorded.
Of the oases recorded, b 11 was granted in 2 cases. In one case
the charge was theft of good from a shop. Hie other case was a
warrant arrest for a parking offence. In the remaining cases release
was authorised in one case where theft was charged and another case in
which a warrant arrest had been made* deleuse was also rented to an
accused who was charged with bein , drunk and incapable aid required
hos dtaL tre/itment. Proceedings were dropped and the release author¬
ised of one accused charged with being drink and incapable and another
charged with breach of the peace end wife assault.
consultation with the city prosecutor was not automatic but it
appears from the cases that to prompt consultation it >.'ub helpful to be
a foreign national or to b© in need of medical attention or to be very
old.
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U; —;1Pi,jc jn bho ...ufchority ,f the rocurator-fj c:l
A consult tion which nan considerably standardised took place
between the police ,nd the procurator-fiscal in relation to certain
traffic offences which fell within the jurisdiction of the sheriff
court.
fhe sost usual ex mplo of this concerns vehicle drivers who were
arrested and taken to the central police station after providing a
>2
positive breath test. Under the relevant legislation ~ the driver is
required to provide a sample of blood or urine for analysis. If the
driver provided the requisite sample and it was possible to get hin
home safely, he <ra3 usually liberated by the police on the authority
of the procur tor-fiscal.
fhe police said, however, that as a matter of general practice
they would not, oven if requested, contact the procurator-fiscal to
authorise release for arrested persons who were not eligible for
police bail.
For those persons not role sod by the police, the court
appearonce was their next, or for those appearing in the sheriff




OF A LAY MAGI TaS. COD fig
There exists "widespread criticism
of the lay magistrates system in
Scotland, with bailies sitting as
magistrates in their own locality,




"The lay judge brings to the court
a practical everyday knowledge of
the way of life and social
conditions in the local community
to which those who appear before
him belong, and such knowledge is
not less valuable ••• than the
foundations of legal training




The hierarchy of the Scottish criminal court structure was
outlined aboveand we described at the base of this hierarchy, the
burgh or police courts and the justice of the peace courts.
Four main ftea tures differentiate these courts from other Scottish
courts exercising criminal jurisdiction. Firstly, their administration
is not the responsibility of the central government and the court
prosecutors are not answerable to the Lord Advocate, Secondly, the
judges are not legally qualified and are given little or no training.
The clerk appointed to the court nay be legally qualified but whether
legally qualified or not h© is an officio legal assessor to the
court and has a duty to advise the magistrates about law and procedure.
thirdly, the jurisdiction and sentencing powers of those courts are
vory restricted, '*-ith a few exceptions the power of sentence is
limited to the imposition of a fine not axe .edin; 50 pounds and/or the
imposition of a sentence of iaprisomenfc not exceeding 60 days. The
fourth distinguishing feature results beoause the legal aid and advise
scheme has not been fully extended to these courts. As legal aid is
not available for representation, the vast majority of accused are
unrepresented by a lav? agent.
z:., :>,:zm£ o -' rtu i ^ -ruica
Although burgh and justice of the peace courts deal with very
minor o fences, thoir procedure was of considerable interest to ua
a
boc u -e we estimated that these courts dealt with 40 to 30 ner cent
of all arrested persons who wero brought before a court in 1372. fhls
interest was increas d w'.an wo discovered the low status given to
those courts by the lawyers to .Thorn we talked and hoard criticisms of
alleged breaches of legal procedure and disregard of the precepts of
5
natural justice.
As we described sbove^ the general aim of the r search was to
describe the decision-ranking situation uad to consider what infor¬
mation influonc id the dacision-maker to grant or refaoo bail. In
investigating some of the consequences of the bail decisions »ve hoped
to highli ;ht ?,ny .0 roblane specific to the burgh court.
In our study of the Edinburgh burgh court we looked at the
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information made available to the bailie and attemoted to assess what
information influenced ilia boil decision. In addition wo considered
the availability of legal advice and representation in relation to
bail. In considering the consequences of the bail decisions we
concentrated on the following issues*- the time >pont in prison because
bail was refused or while attempting to raise bail, the disparity
between bail and sentence, the effect of the bail decision on the outcome
of the case, the review process and forfeiture of bail due to the
non-appearance of the accused.
flf- 413 ■ RCH M£fH03)QL0GY
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In the course of our preliminary study in the burgh court various
officials to whom we talked voiced some surprise that vr© were studying
bail. We were assured by them that there was nothing problematic about
ball in the burgh court, as bail decisions were few and completed in a
few seconds. Our own observation confirmed their description but we
considered that both this scarcity and haste of decision warranted
some investigation.
On the basis of information gained durin ; this period, we drew up
information sheets which we used during W** Period of observation to
ensure that we did not omit any information about a particular case.
7
These information sheets are reproduced in Appendix H*
It was not feasible to observe the cc.-jer chosen at random or
151.
oven observe cases over a period chosen at random# .he observation
period was dictated by the availability of time and an estimate of time
which would bo sufficient to .give an accurate and hopefully represent¬
ative sample of bail decisions in the burgh court# ",'e decided to study
the cases in a four w -ek period in -«ay 1972 and arranged to have access
for this period to the prosecutor* s papers and the criminal records.
( 2, .hQ -'erjpd of QkgaazaUaa
Applications for bail in the burgh court were always heard in
8
open court. The court convened aver/ day except >undayo .<ind each day
wo sat in court, in a seat generally reserved for social workers, to
observe all the custody oases brought before the court. These custody
canes included all the persons a rested by the police >n the morning
of the court or during the previous afternoon or weekend, and perrons
who hod been in custody since a prior court aopo ranco,at which time
their c e© had been continued without plea. For all poreons pie -ding
not guilty or not pi ading because their case was continu>d without
plea, we comoleted a court information sheet adding any extra information
made available to the court. Later we noted from the prosecutor1s
papers i nd police records, the information available to the prosecutor
which included the criminal record of the accused.
When we came to look at tie consequences of the bail decision we
found fch t the number in the s mple was insufficient to allow ub to
draw any conclusions about many of the questions in which we were
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interested, we decided,therefore,to base this record research on the
year 1972#
Unfortunately due to the organisation of the records we found
much of the information we ./anted, difficult and soma tines impossible,
to obtain. Where it was impossible to obtain the information from the
records we made estimates based on the sample cases, although we were
unable to demonstrate that all the proportions of the sample were
noooasarily numerically representative of the proportions of the
annual population.
The main records analysed were the bail receipts of the burgh
oourt, the court lists, the police charge files and arrest book.
m jmrnm Mmm
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During our period of observation in May 1972, 233 abrested
persons were brou ,ht before the burgh court. Of those cases,257 pled
guilty and were sentenced immediately. So casos were continued to
allow a report to be prepared before sentence. Bail was a relevant
q
consideration in only 27 eases. Of these eases -5 plod not guilty
and 2 were continued without plea# Table VI shows the bail
deoision which was made in these cases.
TABLE VI10
The Bail Decisions (Sample)
Bail Bail Ordained
granted not granted to appear Total
Police bail continued by court 30 03
3urgh court bail 13 6 2 21
Change of plea to guilty 21 03
Bail granted tfter review 2 0 0 2
(2; Infognatioq and Bail Diapretjpq
iflL The magistrate
The basic information available to the magistrate,who was
generally called the bailie, wns the information on the complaint which
covered the ntme, age and address of the accused and tho name of the
offence charged. The bailie was also in a position to know whether the
accused had been released on police bail, because in these cases the
accused was not brought before the court from the cells.
In ?1 of the cases the bailie made his decision without any
additional information except the request of the prosecutor.
In 1 case one additional item of information was given by the
prosecutor. This infomation was that the accused was of no fixed
address*
In 5 cases the accused attempted to advance some information. In
one of these coses the bailie, immediately after the prosecutor's
request for bail at a certain amount, had confirmed the bail. The
accused said he could not raise the money as he had commitments to meet.
'■Che clerk silenced this accu ;ed, however, and told hin that bail had
been set and could not be reduced. Thus the accused was precluded
from ma',in,? out a case for bail at an amount ho could afford. It
ought to be noted that there was no legal justification for the clerk's
statement, the mere pronouncement of an amount of bail Joes not
preclude a judge from taking into a* count represent tiona of the
accused for a lower amount. The second accused protesting against the
asBOtmt of bail informed the bailie that ha had been unemployed for
sovon weeks. In this cuso also the bailie confirmed the bail requested
by the prosecutor without any further inquiry.
Twotother accused protested when the prosecutor alleged they had
no fixed address. The first> accused gave an office address to the
court but this was rejected by the clerk. Ihe rejection or acceptance
of an address is, however, a matter for the judge and in other courts
we have seen an office address accepted. A second address was then
given by the accused and he said that he had lived there for twenty
years. The other accused said she had four sons and caughtere who
would give her a home. In neither of these oases did the bailie
attempt to make further enquiries or to have this information chocked.
The fifth accused who attempted to give information was no mora
successful, dhe tried to obj ct to custody when the prosecutor asked
for custody to enable him to take out a warrant of an una ;eoified
nature. The bailie refused to listen to the accused and told her that
she vrould be allowed to speak at her trial. e discovered later from
the prosecutor's papers that thi woman was once professionally
employed and was now married and residing with her husband who was
regularly employed, dhe had no previous convictions. lie had a
fixed address,though the police alleged that shg and hor husband were
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due to laave that address in a few days. The charge tragi committing a
fraud by presenting a cheque for three pounds with insufficient funds
to cover the aisount. )n the b-ais of the bo facto the wow®, had she
been allowed to spaak, might bare made out a good c no for retaining her
liberty, The charge was later deserted by the orescent©*.
To summarise! we found that in 21 (78 per cent; of the eases the
bailie had no information on which to make a deeird >n except the
11
information on the complaint and the bare request of the prosecutor.
The accused attempted to give additional information in 5 (19 per cent)
of the eases but the giving of such inform :tion was not encouraged and
no aiteapt was made by the bailie to clarify or increase this inform¬
ation. In no case was any attempt made by the bailie to obtain addit¬
ional information from the accused or the prosecutor.
Having ascertained what information was availab e, we attempted
to assess what information influenced the ecision of the bailie. e
found that in all but two cases he granted the prosecutor*a request
for custody or liberty and sl o assented to the anoont of b»i! asked
by the orosocutor. Having regard to this assent to the prosecutor's
request and the fact that th i bailie had little or no information to
found his own decision, we h-d no hesitation in concluding that only
one operative variable, namely the request of the orosocutor Influ¬
enced the bail decision of the bailie, h'e represent hall decision -
ranking in the burgh court in igure XV.
The findings relating t • the bail decision-staking of the bailie
are disquieting. In a court /here there is no lawyer to protect the
intoreote of the accused, an inquiry by th n -I t • to int - the merits




often been said by the High Court of Justiciary, that the attitude of
the prosecutor Is a relevant consideration for the court. The view
that the court should exercise its bail discreti ;n merely by rubber
stamping the request of the prosecutor has, however, never been
adopted.
To improve the bail decision-making of the magistr tes, the
quantity and quality of the information made available to them must
obviously be Improved. give further consideration to this question
12 ,
below. Any improvement, however, would also be contingent on the
extent to which the lay magistrates free themselves from their complete
dependence on the prosecutor.
Cbj The city .prosecutor
The city prosecutor by virtue of his office has discretion to
consent to the release of a person on bail pending court appearance.
In the previous chapter we sew the prosecutor exercise this discretion
by consenting on a few occasions to the release of pe sons for v/hon the
police wore unwilling to accept the responsibility of liberating on
13
police bail.
hen an accused is brought before a court the prosecutor may
1 A
mike representations to tho court about bail. 4 It is the court,
however, which is vested rith the discretion to grant or -©fuse
bail.
when we examined the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion in
o posing bail or asking bail of a certain amount, e found that the
prosecutor, in contra t to the magistrate, did h va before him a
rjro'-t deal of information on which to base his decision. This inform¬
ation consisted firstly, of information from the police charge sheet,
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and in th© last ch ptsr we b .oka down this information into the
following cataeries J- d-.to and fciaa of arraatj name of arresting
offico | date and tins of appearance in central charge office} nama and
address of arrested person; aona.' in possession of a rested -person;
so * d te of birth and occupation of arrested person} name of officer
acceptin charge; charge; brief account of circumst nces of the
offence} names and addronaes of wifcno sos. deeondly, the prosecutor
had access to the full criminal record of the accused and from this ho
libelled the offences which ha mi -ht want to bring to tho attention of
the court. Thirdly the irosecutor knew whether the accua d was
released on police bail and how uuch m-ner was oaid. Lastly the
prosecutor had the opportunity to obtain additional information if
the .accused ;ave information in court*
in examining the sample c -.ses we discovered that, although the
basic information available to the prosscut r was the information
obtained by an available to the police, the prosecutor in opposing
or askin for bil did not use the same criteria as the ;x>lico. The
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police, :s we described* required sobriety as a pre-requisite of
reletse. Assessment of the sobriety of the accused was not* however,
a problem for the prosecutor because nrobably without exception, if the
accused was sober enough to bo broupht'before a court ha would be
sober enough to be released. e found that the p-oaocutor did not
follow the chief constable's directions about ball. In a number of
c sos we witnessed the prosecut r ask for bail which did not corres¬
pond to the recommended scale and ask for bail when a property offence
was charged. The s ecial circumstances which we denci'ibod as
influencing' the police decision were not conside ed f tal to bail by
the prosecutor. I'or exampl >, we found that the prosecutor in some
oases asked for bail oven when the address of the accused was the
locus of the offence charged or where the accused livod with the
victim of the offonce.
Because only a small number of bail decisions were made in the
sample cases,it was impossible to attempt any sophisticated analysis
to discover what variables did influence the prosecutor. were
able, however, to make some distinctions betwem the cases, ha found
that a clear cut division existed between those c.aos in which bail
wan requested and those in which custody was requested. In the latter
oases, unlike the former, the prosecutor had information that the
accused had no fixed address, or that the police wanted custody to
allow them to make further inquiries, ^'e examined all the other
information items available to the prosecutor but we did not find any
which produced such a clear distinction.
'•-'hen we examined the amount of ball asked by t;xj prosecutor we
did not find any clear cub distinctions. It is possible, however,
as may be seen in Table VII,to distinguish a rough tariff based on the
seriousness of the offence as perceived by the prosecutor. We found
that for drunk and incapable offences the prosecutor tended to ask
bail between 3 to 5 pounds, for assault between 5 fuxl 15 pounds
depending on criminal record and for breach of the po co between
5 to 10 pounds depending on criminal record. The highest bail of
between 15 to S3 pounds -was usually asked if the char.70 specified that
the accused was a known thief loitering with intent, or in possession
of goods or tools without a satisfactory explanation.
Although the prosocut r always asked for a specific amount of
bail, wo discovered that he was not in a position to know whether the
accused could afford the bail asked. In 7 cases in tlto sample, the
160,
3?ABLE VII
A Comparison of the Means of the Accused, Bail Amount and Lentonce
fpendents Saployed Money available Bail ant. sentence Offence itecord
(pounds)
Yes Yes Yes 3 3/3 Ad Ass/3 of p S
u:i No No 5 £5 TTP B of ? None
mt Yes Yes 5 £5 TTP 3 of P S
m Yes Yes 5 £5 TTP/Ad Ass/B of P S
No No No 3 Ad PP L/C
us No No 0 Ad PP None
Yes Yes Yes 0 £2/53 TT? Ass/3 of P S
Yes Yes Yes 10 £5 TTP Indecent s
Exposure
3/Cm No No 10 £10 TTP B of P
us, No No 10 £10 TTP B of P L/C
Yes Yes Yes 10 Ad /Ad. B of P/A3S 3
No No No 10 £8 TTP B of ? None
Yes No No 12 £8 TTP Known Ihlef L/C
Yes Yes No 12 £8 TTP Known Thief L/C
Yes No No 15 £15 NT? Known Thief L/C
Yes Yes Yes 15 Ad, /£5 Mai Ban/ S
TTP B of ?
Yes No No 15 Ad /Ad B of P/Ass L
NS No No 20 £15 NT? Known Thief L/C
NH = Hot recorded
D/S a Besert sirapliclter i,e. charges dropped
Ad » Admonished
TTP => Time allowed to pay fine
NT? = No time allowed to pay fine, accused goes to prison for a
fixed number of days. The prisoner may be released if the fine
is paid, or released from part of the sentence if part of the
fine is paid.
Ass = Assault
B of ? = 3reach of the peace
PP = Pound in area for unlawful purpose
S => Short record, no custody sentence
L a Long record, no custody sentence
C = Custody sentences in previous record
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prosecutor knew that the money asked was available, either because the
accused had sufficient money in his possession, o.- because the accused
had paid police bail. Information about dependents, however, was
often not recorded nor wc.3 there any information about the financial
commitmenta of the accused. fho orosecutor did have information about
the ©noloyment st tus of the accused but in only 5 cases was trio
incom of the accused recorded, fhie may be seen in fable VII raid
it ouyht to bo noted that bail money of 10, 15 and 23 pounds was
asked, although the accused did not have the money available and was
recorded as being unemployed with dependenta. »'e reached the conclufa
oion that the money asked by the prosecutor depended on a rough tariff
of seriousness of offence us perceived by the prosecutor, r ther than
the financial ability of the accused to raise the money. 3© do not
know if financial hardship was caused to families who raised the bail
but in 4 per cent) of the cases in which bail was granted,the
amount set caused the accused to plead guilty or spend the whole time
in prison unable to r&iee the money, fhe amount of bail asked also
exceeded in 11 (60 per cent) of the cases in which ball was granted
the centonce lap jsad,and equalled the sentence in j (23 per cent) of
the caaco.
LI ,L,y3ftX , ^qre^rflgtion .ffld Td Afd
Of the 288 arrested persons appearin , in the burgh court during
our period of observation only one accused was represented by a lawyer
in court. The accused who was charged with breach of the peace was
rale s d on police bail but did not appear in court and his solicitor
lodged a plea of not guilty on his behalf. Althou fi on accused on
bail avoid his obiij tion to appear in court by instructing a
solicitor to represent him, the absence of this accu ad avoked no
comment from the court. Indeed without any request fron the solicitor
nd without any information bsiog given, tho b dlie, on the question of
the clerk, ordained the accused to appear. A co-aceu sod who pled not
guilty was also ordained, ffcesse two accused wore the inly custody
cases ordained to appear in our ^>erlod of observation.
All the provisions of the legal aid scheme have not been
extended to burgh or justice of the peace court » ccuaed appearing
in these courts cannot obtain legal representation under the legal
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aid scheme,though thoy are eligible under the scheme for logal advice.
Uo provision is made for solicitors to attend regularly at the burgh
court or police station for the purpose of giving ouch advice, The
moused can expoet no help froa the clerk of court who nay bo legally
qualified, as it has boon decided that tho clerk has no duty ^r
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authority to protect the interests of the accused. fhe accused must,
therefore,defend himself as boat ha can again t a legally qualified
pro ocutor before a lay -aagi. tr to.
In Edinburgh, however, an attempt has been ro .de to fill this gap
in the legal aid scheme by th. provision and payment of a part-time
public defender. This provision was instigated and financed by
-dihburgh Corporation who annua: ly fc&vs given a honarium "for the
services of a solicitor being available in the burgh court on behalf
of poor persons .18 In January 1g*74 the Corporation- a®psed to extend
this scheme by voting to appoint a full time solicitor to give legal
19advice and assistance to persona appearing in the burgh court. ' fhia
proposal did not unfortunate.y aeet with approval from the -.cofctish
home and Health department, who objected on the grounds that some
legal aid facilities existed end that the current Government proposed
20
to ab lish the burgh and justice of the peace courts."
respite the provision of a ,/ublic defender we found that none
of the accused in the sample had benefitted from this scheme. «e
accordingly requested aa interview with the solicitor, ./ho was appointed
to act as public defender, to diacuss the practical extent of tho schema
The solicitor explained that hi3 appointment obliged him to attend at
the burgh court to give legal aid and advice when he was notified by
burgh court officials of a request by an accused for trie aid. de did
not consider that his duties © tended to visiting the accused after
arrest and before his first court appearance to advise him about hia
plan and, if necessary, about bail, -hen asked ho/ often he gave
legal advice and aid unuer this scheme he estimated between six and
twolva occasions in a year. Ho ?ilso expressed the opinion that he
would not be able to continue as public defender if there was any
appreciable incrsa e in the deiasnd for his time and scrvf es.
•e doubt, however, uh ;thor the "'unmet need : for legal aid in the
burgh court was represented by leaa than a dozen cases a year. It
appe «rs that in practice the effectiveness of the public defender
schema was severely limited. Die scheme helped only a very small
number of accused. It was not readily avtiilabxo, since it was probably
unknown and certainly unpub Licised, and depended on court officials to
give notification of a request.
•e are convinced that all tho provisions of the criminal legal
aid scheme ought to be extended to lay magistrates c -urts. Apart
f X3U general benefits, wo thxah that such an extension would have two
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isipor&nnt consequences in relation to bail. Firstly, icceos to legal
advice before first court appearance would laid to an increase in the
numb r of not guilty pleas and therefore the number of cases in which
bail would be a relevant consideration. Secondly, fcho attendance of a
duty solicitor /ould ensure that a request f r bail was made on behalf
of tho accused. In addition, on the basis of our experience in the
sheriff court, we believe that the duty solicitor would also ensure
that if necessary a case would bo made out for the r lease of the
l
accused on bail,and the financial ability of the accused to rai ■;©
bail would be made known to the court. «hen faced with possible
o -position, the prosecutor would be likely to give noro details about
his grounds of opposition or hi3 grounds for requ stin; a comparatively
high amount of bail, The provision of legal advice nd representation
21
ic, as we argue below, one method of overcorain; the Is ck of inform¬
ation available to the court.
Qi ,-9m £saadflagagga M. SssJLaiaas
( 6 ..nnual number of oe.-sonx wanted bail and ram bled in custody
Using the bail receipts issued by the burgh c urt in 1972 we
o2
counted that bail was granted and raised in 17-1 oasoe."'" In addition,
0"J
we estimated that the court continued police bail in 3> cases. In
16 cti..e3 bail was granted by the court but not raised. This figure
doos not include a number of accused,who were granted bail,but who
changed their plea to guilty because they could not raise the amount
sot, -e estimated that if theso cases were included the number of
cases in which bail was granted bat not raised would rise to 41 eases.^
Tho total number of cases in which bail was ~x atect equalled 178 plus
165.
39 (estimated) plua 42 (estimated), that is, -59 cases. The number of
accused who appeared in eusfco ./ for trial wo counted an 24• A'hi.s
figure also is misleading, because the records concealed oases in which
hail was rofuaud but 1 tor jr. ntod after review, caoos in which the
charge waa dropped, cases in which a plea of guilty w is made at a
later diet and cases in which a pica of not gui it./ was changed to
guilty when bail was refused# "ur estimate of the number of
accused refused bail was 99*
To suciaariso: durin; the /ear 1972, 9 cons of the 3726
oaotody esses appearing in the burgh court pled not guilty# Of these,
30 par coat raised bail, 12 per cant were unable to rai a bail and
1
3 _>or cent were refused boil#
l,Vu, ,1^,,.9^,9,47 ■jflana.;-! MU^aaa-&a£aM£ as 8Q& satok
TABhS VIII
Average ?iaa 1 *®nt in Custody bee:-use Bail was Hot Brsuitad or Hot Raised






Bf.il raised at prison















In fable VIII we illustrate thut persons ivbo were granted bail
but who were unable to raise the money spent on aver-go a Ion ;er
period in custo y than persons refused bail. Inability to raise the
money resulted in 4- per cent of tho parsons granted bail being admitted
to prison. Of these 26 per cant war© released from prison the same day
when a relative or friend brought the bail money to tho prison. About
56 >er cent of the persons admittod to prison spent an average of 7
dcyo in rioon before their bail money was raised cold 20 per cent remain¬
ed in prison until their trial, These figures illustrate that people
were admitted to prison and spent a conaiuerable time in custody for
the sole reason that they lacked money* Apart from the distress to
the accused and his relatives, it must also be borne in mind that these
admissions and short term custody coses were expensive end no doubt
caused considerable strain on the overburdened facilities and manpower
of the prison system.
■<hen we examined the sentences given to persona refused bail and
persons unable to raise the bail money, we found that in every oase the
pre-trial custody was more severe than the eventual sentence imposed,
Jhsxm fables IX and X it may be seen that in all but one case a fine was
imposed by way of sentence. In the one oase where a sentence of _>Q
days imprisonment was given, tlie pre-trial custody still exceeded the
sentence.
It may be recalled that the burgh court with few exceptions does
not have the pow.-r to impose a sentence of imprisonment in excess of
60 days, -.pacific provision is made to prevent the court from imposing
a combination of fine and imprisoment which would exceed this maximum."
fables IX and X illustrate, however, that in many cases the c urt
imposed a fine without flowing any tine to pa . 'V i :■ • nt that if the
167.
fABLS IX^
Coxa arisen of Tims Spent in Custody Due to dofusel off 3<dl and Sentence
'fine (days) spent Sentence Aims (days) spent Sentence
in custody due to in custody due to
rollisal of bail refusal of bail
4 £5/7 dys ».f. '. 22 £5/7 dys K.'f.?.
26 £10/7 dys N.T. ». 23 £10/30 dys NT?
13 £10/14 dys »•?. 45 £5/7 dys N.T.P.
26 Admonished 3 idi'oni shed
3 £2/3 dys H.T« . 8 Admonished
41 30 Admonished
32 £30/50 dys 2.2?. . 25 £20/30 dys NTP
12 Admonished 32 m/."Q 479
37 Deserted Si&plicitar 3,2 £10/10 dva NT?
15 Not guilty 31 Not proven
17 5/30 dya li»3?»?» 20 £5/7 dys N.T.P.
.n.. ,. £15/. ,5(7. dr§ ?I:A, • 7 £5/7 dys R.I. P.
22 Admonished 7 £5- 7 dys S. T. ?.
W X28
Comparison of Time Spent in Custody Because Bail S'as Sot i>a£.?ed and Sentence
Time (days; spent -enterica The Amount of Bail Set
in custody because (pounds)
bail was not raised
35 Hot guilty 15
35 £5/7 dys B.T. 15
21 Admonished 3
22 £5/7 dys M.1V. 15
11 £10/30 dye T.T.P. 12
£$/■>& y15
23 Deserted Sjjaplielter 10
Jul— 15




convictod person could not immediately raise the money for the fine ha
2q
was imprisoned for the period fixed as an alternative to the fine. J
We found that in some cases the combination of pre-trial custody and
sentence exceeded 60 days imprisonment. These cases a-e underlined in
tho Tab as. Conceptually pro-trial custody is different from sentence
but the subtleties of this distinction are unlikely to he appreciated
by the man deprived of hi3 liberty. Because of thi~ we were disturbed
by the fact that a person refused or unable to raise bail granted by
the burgh court might be liable to spend a total period in custody which
exceeded the sentencing powers of the court.
Table X also illustrates tfc?t in most of the cases in which bail
money was sot but not raised the amount of bail asked exceeded the fine
30
imposed as sentence.
To summarise* we found that the majority of persons refused or
unable to raise bail in the burg^h court spent a period in custody
awaiting trial greater than any period of imprisonment imposed as
sentence. The combination of pre-trial custody and sentence in some
cases w:>s greater than th • maximum sentence within the competence of
the court.
Icn, The effect of the bail doci.J-on on the outcome of b'.o case.
In many bail research projects it has been suggested that release
on bail and pre-trial detention have some relationship with the
outcome of the case. It has boon argued that the bail decision may
affect firstly, the determination of guilt or innooonc„ .and secondly, the
sentence imposed.^
ke looked at the outcome of the bail ro fused and bail granted but
169.
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not raised oases s©t out in Tables IX and X, We were unable to look
at the results of all the C ir.es released on bail for tlx? year and
inotend we used the results of the c^sea released on bail in the sample#
•o did not find that release on bail increased the likelihood of & not
guilty finding. No cases relo. rsed on bail in th sasaplo wore found not
guilty. Of the oases appearing in custody 3 were found not guilty or
not proven. In relation to sentence, we found that no cr~ee released on
bail was given a custodial sentence but only 1 oeee appearing in
custody was given audi a sentence.
We aid find, however, a marked difference between the bail and
custody oases in relation to the imposition of fines. In21 oui;
23 custody cases in which a fine was imposed, a prison alternative was
fixed and the court did not allow the convicted person any time to pay
the fins. In contract in all (10) the bailed cases in which a fins
was imposed after conviction, thegfiMgitit were allowed time to pay the
fine.
In some cases, therefore, a double penalty was imposed on those
persons who lacked money. They were kept in custody because they could
not raise the money for bail, and as they had no opportunity to raise
money to pay a fine,their detention was likely to continue after
sentence. Accused released on bail not only had the opportunity of
raiding money for a possible fin© while on bail 'out wore given addit¬
ional time by the court to pay the fine.
U, -fort?,*, 9iff tfr? ball
Our attempt to invest! ;~to reviews of bail by the burgh court was
unsuccessful. We were informed that no records were kept of applic¬
ations for re«l«w or their -mtoomo. Officials iv..„\-.xSB©d uc that very
few such applications sere made.
fhe procedure was described as informal, the clerk bringing the
written application to the notice of the bailie before court and the
prosecutor attending to give his views.
-ggfoifrwre ?f
In the year persons (5 por cont of those released on bail by
the burgh court) failed to appear and had thoir bail forfeited. I^o of
these cases related to the aanse man who was charged on t.<o separate
occasions with being drunk and incapable. Although tlii3 accused was
described as having no fixed address, he had on the first occasion
seven pounds and on the second occasion twenty-two pounds in his
possession, bail was set at throe and five pounds respectively and
when the accused failed to appear,the bail was forfaited but no warrant
for arrest was issued, as wo au gusted in Chapter V^he forfeiture of
bail appears sometimes to bo considered a sufficient penalty. In
another two eases bail was forfeited but the warrants for arrest were
withdrawn, presumably because tho accused did appear for trial though
after their case had been called. Of the remaining cases, four involved
youths charged with breach of the pease, one a housewife aged forty
charged with a similar offence, one a man who wag charged with being
drunk in charge of a child arid one known, thief, fhe last case is
interesting as it typified tire modem prototype of a good bail risk.
r]«3 accused in this case was a professional man employed and supporting
his family with whom he liyed. He had no previous c nvictions. Iron¬
ically this was the only case in which the warrant of arrest was still
outstanding four months aft u? tho end of 1971.
As the accused's non-appearance for trlau re® :.1 in the issue of
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a warrant of arre3t in only D oases in the year, and as the accused was
rearrested in ail but 1 case* failure of accused to appear when on bail
cannot be consider d a problem in the burgh court.
IXTJC.-IIQBS OF Tild ■>dO?Q.,.^ ItJaiC-AHlSATIOH OF LAY .IJS CPU ;T3
The reorganisation of local government in Scotland is due to come
into ei'fect in 1973* <<ith this in mind the Conservatives published a
■hito daper which advocated the roplacement of tho burgh ond justice of
34
the peace courts by a system of justices courts, .'.iujor changes proposed
in tho 'hits Paper were that tho control governrnon. should adopt the
responsibility for the adiainict ation of the now courts and that the
prosecutors should be answerable to the Lord Advocate. Although it as
envisaged that many of the new courts should be staffed by legally
qualified stipendiary magistrates, the present system of lay persons
sitting as magistrates was specifically retained, fo overcome defic¬
iencies in the present system due to the lack of legal expertise and
prejudices of lay persons, it was proposed to introduce a training
scheme for magistrates and to require three magistrates to sit together.
Under the scheme the new courtc are to be given wider jurisdiction in
summary offences and their sentencing power is to be increased to allow
the imposition of a fins not exceeding 100 pounds, 'fheir power of
imprisonment, however, is to remain at the present ma omnia of oO days.
This proposed reorganisation will a feet tho court in may ways
but below we consider only the implications for tho system of bail.
Firstly, we anticipate th b the proposed ei tanoion of jurisdiction
172.
would load to an increase in the number of arrested nor ona brought
bof>re the lay magistrates courts, This would particularly affect
person-: chor ed with theft or housobreakin up to the value of 1C0
pounds, regardless of previous convictions, These perrons ere nt
pro ant always brought before tho sheriff court but in future might be
broughfc before a justices court. Secondly, the view was ex iressed
in the hito .'aper that decisions are best taken by at least three
magistr tes but projX)se that a bail decision may be t >':sn by one
raagistr to. if the view about the quality of majority decisions ie
correct we must assume that some bail decisions would be inferior.
The proposed reorganisation does present an opportunity of
educ ting magistrates to make their bail decisions on the basis of some
adequate information,but we doubt whether a short course of lectures
and a suggested 24 appearances the bench in one year will have the
far reaching improvement3 claimed in the v.hite Taper. The possibility
of extending legal aid to the ner courts was not conoido cd in the
■Vhite Taper but we believe th.it if a new and wider role is envisaged
for the e courts, such an extension is vital. The extension of the
duty solicitor scheme would not only safeguard the into re ts-of
the inoroused numbers of arre ted arsons brought bef re the court but
would also onsure the publication of information to the court. If the
scheme is not extended,persons who would previously have benefitted
from legal representation in a sheriff court will bo denied thi3
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IM A HL^tlPF COURT
Considerable attention ought to be d >votod to the sheriff courts
in a study of bail because of the large number of bail decisions made
and t>je gravity of the cases considered by these courts. <«o estimated
that the sheriff courts were responsible for over 00 Por cent of the
1
bail decisions made by a court in 1972. These courts were responsible
for the vast majority of bail decisions because although the lay
courts of sumra.ary jurisdiction dor It with approximately tho sane
2
number of custody cases, a much smaller percentage of accused pled
3
not guilty thus reducing the number of cases in which brill was a
relevant consideration. The High Court of Justiciary dealt mainly with
bail appeals. W<j found, however, that appeals were comparatively rare
4
and accounted for an estimated 2 per cent of the annual decisions.
The sheriff court has jurisdiction to consider and grant bail in any
case unless murder or treason is charged, fhus a decision about bail
may be made in the sheriff court oven if the crime charged may or must
5
be tried in the High Court of Justiciary.
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THA duaiBCf OF ma .tic. uiCH
Our study of the Edinburgh sheriff court opened up some areas of
interest which /ere different from those considered in the burgh court.
One differentiating feature was that for the overwhelming majority
of accused appearing in custody befcfro the sheriff court, the court
6
appearance was their first opportunity of obtaining release on bail.
In contrast, arrested persons appearing before the bur h court were
eligible for police bail and might be released prior to court
appearance. Accused appearing in custody before the sheriff court
did, however, have the opportunity of obt lining- free legal advice
about their plea and about bail. In addition, free legal reprosentation
in court was available to then and if they accepted this, responsibility
for making representations about bail fell on their solicitor. As
legal representation at this stagoawas virtually unknown in the burgh
court, we were intorested to see what effect this had on thb conduct
and result of bail applications. In the sheriff court not all bail
applications wore heard in open court and we were given an opportunity
to consider bail applications which vrere held in private and from
which the public and press were excluded. Other applications which
we considered were applications for release after a plea of guilty and
pending the completion of a report before sentence. We intended
considering these applications in the burgh court but found that in
no case did the bailie ask for a report. Conceptually this question
of liberation pending a report before sentence differs from the
question of pre-trial liberty, presumption of innocence, however,
7
has been accorded little substantive relationship to the issue of bail
and,as many similar considerations affect both forms of roleaoe,we
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thought it important to include Liberation before sentence within the
ambit of tho study.
In accordance with the general aims of the study, wo considered
what Information was made available to the decision-maker and attempted
to assess the effect of this information on the decision to release or
detain in custody. We identified the decision-maker as the sheriff
and the procurator'-fiscal. It may bo remembered, from the discussion
8
in Chapter III, that in Scotland the procurator-fiscal has,by virtue
of his office, certain powers to authorise or refuse release.
In the context of the information study, we attempted to assess
the possible effects and implications of a bail experiment in Scotland,
similar to experiments in America inspired by the Vera Institute.
These experiments have received some attention in England and the
suggestion has been made that Vera type information sh -ets should be
9
introduced into -nglish courts. In ^cotland also the experiments
have received some favourable attention from the organisers of a
government bail studyj^ Other aspects with which we dealt were the
use made by the procurator-fiscal of the information available to him,
the attitude of the sheriff towards receiving information and the
contribution made by tho accused's solicitor.
In considering the consequences of the decisions, we concentrated
on the following issues! bail money, time spent in prison, a
comparison of bail decisions and the final dispositions, the suocess




Before starting to collect data we spent a period of two wooks
in the sheriff court and in the court offices familiarising ourselves
with procedure, finding out what records were available and what
information could bo obtained frota them. On the baois of information
gained during this period we compiled information sheets for use in
the recording of data relating to the sample cases, fhose Information
sheets are reproduced in Appendix II.
It was not feasible to observe cases chooen at random. The
observation period was dictated by th availability of time aid with
this limitation we estimated that a four week period would be suffic¬
ient to produce a useful and hopefully representative san >lo. The
study in the sheriff court cover 5d a four week period in M rch 1972
and v;o were given access to all the papers relating to the cases
observed during this period,
U/, r^a ^iod, q£
In the sheriff court bail applications in summary procedure
were hoard in open court, as were deliberations about custody or
liberty "when an accused pled guilty and sentence was delayed pending
the completion of a report. As a matter of court practice, however,
bail applications in solemn procedure 'were made by petition and
these were he? rd in private. It was the practice to clear the court
of the public and press an., hear the petitions in court in the
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presence of court officials and tho accused's solicitor* fhe
accused was also present except in review cases when he was not
usual1;/ brought from prison to court.
w'o sought and obtained permission to attend theao private
hearings through the offices of the clerk of court raid tbo procurator-
fiscal. In a few oocasions court officials challenged our presence
but the objection was withdrawn when we referred to th© peaaaiesion
obtained and this was confirmed by the clerk of the court.
-dinburgh sheriff court sat daily except 1unlays and heard
cases arising within the sheriffdom which encompassed, in audition to
the city of Edinburgh, an area in -Midlothian and Peebles.
Our research was mainly conc erned with the custody cases, that
is, persons arrested within the sheriffdom and brought before the
11
sheriff court at the earliest opportunity after arrest • Other
perrons included in the custody lists vrore persons who had previously
appearedin court at which time they had been remanded in custody.
Ourinj the period of observation we sat at a table in the well
of tho court with the clerk of court, the procurator-fiscal and the
accused's solicitor. Prom this position we were able to hear
submissions made to the sheriff which in many cases must havo been
inaudible to the public. W© were also able to witness any bargaining
made by tho solicitor and the prosecutor at the table before the c.se
was called.
As the custody cas s were not heard at my specific time v?e
were forcod to spend man hours listoning to a volume of road traffic
offences, livened occasionally by offences of failure to possess a
television or dog licence.
While sitting in court, we completed an information sheet for the
folio inj types of cases*- oases in which & plea of not guilty was
made, oases which were continued until a later date, caoeo in which
sentence was delayed after a plea of guilty to allow a report to be
prepared and applications for realm of a previous bail decision.
Later we examined the papers of the procurator-fiscal and canplated
12
a secand information sheet.
UX, &B3S& iSaaaasgfr
In the sheriff court study, unlike the bur h court study, we
did not attempt to compile the annual statistics from the records.
This was partly because the sheriff court yielded a greater number of
cases and partly because sheriff courta were included in a government
stud,/ which we believed would produce this information. »e did use
some records compiled by the procurator-fiscal' s office to ascertain
the final disposition of the cases in the sample. Wo alao spent
some fciiae gathering information from bail bonds and the records of
bail receipts in view of our special intex-eot in the financial aspect
of bail.
(4), ,-fte3ftrfttj|,oq fp? Pffft o&
Variables were constructed to cover the information on tlse
information sheets* All the information obtained by observation and
record research about the sample casao was then coded on computer
1 ^
cards. In Appendix v we include a list of the variables created.
Considerable use was made of the pro yearns to provide descriptive
statistics, to test some relationships between the variables end to
carry out a Vara type experiment.
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(li Eeocri »tlon of the Jamole
During our period of observation. 238 custody cases were brought
before the sheriff oourt for a first court appearance or for
appearance after a continuation had beon granted at an earlier date.
A description of the >lea made and procedural stage of these eases
is given in fable XI.
TABLE XI
Custody Cases » flea -lade nd .b?ocodural Steg®
Plea made and procedural stag®
No. of
Cases
% of obu- % in which
erved c-:ses pro-disposition
release possible
Continuation without plea (a?) 20 7 11
Continuation for further examination (CPE) 15 5 7
Not guilty plea (SGS) 85 29 46
Pull committal (PC) 25 9 13
Continuation (report) C(it) 10 4 5
Guilty plea (report) G(d) 30 10 16
deview (a) 4 1 2
189 65 100
Guilty plea sentence passed 96 33 m
Aliasing c ises 7 2 m
Total number of cases observed 292 100
Fran, fable XI it can be seen that bail, or release without bail
with the accused ordained to appear* was a relevant consideration in
139 (65 por cent) of the observed cases. The dispositions of release
or custody for the sample cases, that i3» the cases in which
predisposition release was possible are set out in Tables XII and XIII.
TABT.J XII
Casos Granted Liberty at the different 'rocedural Stages
C>V? NG(S) FC G(R) ..oviow Total
Bail granted 0 47 15 0 3 65
Ordained 1 16 0 0 0 17
0 0 0 9 0
0 0 0 1 0
Ordained (social enquiry report) 0 $ $
Ordained (medical report) 1
Total number of cases released $2
Humbor of cases with missing values 7
TABLS XIII
Cases Hot Granted liberty at the different Procedural Stages
CWP CFG SG(S) FC C(li) G(R) Review Total
Bail refused 0 0 15 10 0 0 1 26
Continuation 19 15 0 0 0 0 0 34
Continuation (social
enquiry report)0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
Continuation (raeclicul report)© 0 0 0 9 2 0 11
Continuation ( other report) 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 3
Total number of cases continued in custody 90
(?) -^c^et^.fl ,t9 i^e oy oet^ Xn
-VW 0% $ 0flgg
L&Lj&e aamsgSasdELasal
Our examination begins with the procurator-fiscal becnuso he has
discretion to agree to liberty before the accused is brought before the
sheriff#
While examining the police records we noted that in eomo canes
the procurator*fiscal was recorded as having consented to the release
of a person before a first court a jpoarnnce. This method of release
was usually applied to persons arrested on suspicion of contravention
of the doad Traffio Act 1972 S.5 to whoa a blood or urine test was
administered. The procurator*-fiscal had also delegated to tli© police
his authority to release accused charged with breach of the peace
within a sports ground, hue to a direction from the Lord Advocate
this offence must be heard before a sheriff court and the police
have no pov/or, ther fore, to consent to release on police bail. In
the vast majority of cases, however, tltcre was no practice of police
consultation with the procurator-fiscal and the police said that, even
if roqu-atcd, they would not contact tho procurator-fiscal about bail.
It was su^Epsted that an unusually persistent solicitor or the
existence of special mitigating circumstances, for example, illness
might prompt such consultation, fhese circumstances,however, must be
uncommon as wo found only 2 recorded examples of such release in the
annual figures.
The procurator-fiscal has a legal right to make reprocentations
to the sheriff about the question of liberty or custody of the accused.
Below we consider what use the procurator-fiscal made of this right
and tho apparent effect of his representations on the decision of the
sheriff. At this point, however, we consider tho extent of the
information available to the procurator-fiseal and whether ho node
this infc&tation available to the sheriff.
U) t9 $he ro^rqtoy-fiscal
We described in Chapter III the traditional criteria used to
assess a bail risk. Theae criteria concentrate on considerations
which derive mainly from the circuasi'nees end seriousness of the
offence and various aspecto of the criminal record of the accused*
We found that in every case the procurator-fiscal had the
information on which to base a judgement utilising any of these
criteria* Hiis information was mado vallable in the police report
and a copy of the criminal record of the accused. She information
was of a similar nature to the information available to tlte prosecutor
15
in the burgh court /hich was described more fully above.
In discussing the Vera Institute bail experiments,we pointed
out^ that bail piedict ions have had. aone success based on non-
traditional criteria which are concerned with "community roots '•
Considerable interest has been shown in these experiments ,ond in the
context of the doglish bail system,criticisms have been voiced because
in many cases "community roots ' information was not available to the
17
court. In view of this we ware interested to discover to what
extent this type of information was available to the -coltish decision¬
makers*
In the case of the accused for whom a report was prepared
"community roots' information was included in the detailed description
of the social background of the accused* In other cases, although
additional information about the family and background of the ac.cused
was often added to the general information in the police report, this
information -/as not always available. V«e considered whether inform¬
ation was available to the procur tor-fiscal about eight variables.
These variubleG were fixed address, persons with whom accused lives,
time spent at the address given, employed, type of job, marital status,
dependents, nd Souxte of income, fable XIV illustrates the extent and
type of information which was pot available to the procurator-fiscal*
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the procurator-fiseal always had information about tho address
of the accused aai lacked Information about the employment status of
the accuoed» in only 3 cases. Information was available about all
eight variables in only 19 cases but in ovor 76 per cent of the
cases the procurator-fi steal had information about at least six
variables, kissing information moot frequently concerned the identity
of the co-resident3 at the accused's address and the time tho accused
had lived at the given address. Lack of information was novor total
though in 3 cases information was lacking about as many as five
variables#
TABJ.J XIV
CoraEunity .toots" Information Not Available to tho P*F«
1 as person with whom accused lives
2 B time spent at address given
3 S3 employed
4 S3 type of job
5 S marital status
6 » dependents
7 S3 source of income
8 S3 address
Information not available
Sol of c ises
Information not available







1 2 4 7
3 69 4 12
1/2 2/4 '2/5
■*
»• />p/o 2/7 4/7
17 3 1 5 10 1
2/5/6 1/2/7 2/4/7 5/6/7
i 3 2 4
'
1/2/5/6 2/4/5/6 2/3/5/7 2/5/6/7 4/5/6/7




(11) A com o rison of the information ovdlable to the orocurator-.flsoal
aa4 $M. Maaaafelaa stem to £M stoLIX
><G f ucui that although the procurator-fiscal had fU 11 information
relatin to traditionally acoeptod bail criteria and considerable
information about the "community roots" of the accused# he gave very
little of this information to the sheriff, Ihe procuratorsfiscal
generally indicated whether he a ;reed to or opposed bail but in
64 per cent of the cases no information was given to support this
attitude, In 19 per cent of the cases information about one variable#
for example, the number of previous convictions or the oirctctotanoea
of the offence was given. Information about two variables and about
throe variables was given in 10 per cent and 5 per cent of the cases
respectively, fhe most information given extended to five variables.
Hie type of information given merits some attention because it
must represent oifeher information which the procurator-fiscal himself
considered important or information which he thought tho sheriff would
consider important, 'fable aV illustrates the type and frequency of
the information given by the procurator-fiscal. From this it may be
seen that the procurator-fiscal was preoccupied with criminal rocord
and, with the exception of information about the address of the
accused, displayed little interest in information relating to
"community roots".
ve noted with interest that even in those cases whore the
procurator-fiscal gave information he did not use all the information
which might have advanced his cases. Further consideration and a
-JO
possible explanation of this is given below.
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TABLE XV
Type and frequency of Information liven by F.F. to tho heriff
Tvdq of information ftiven Suaber of cases
Seriousness of offence 5
Circumstances of offence 11
Length of criminal record 25
ilecent convictions 13
Seriousness of past sentences 13
Son appearance warrant 5
On bail for another offence 16
Further inquiries necessary 1 1%
Unsatisfactory address 14 25-
Unemployed 2
Medical hi tory 9
Other iafonantion 0
S.V Sri ftSUf
The ahari.fr has a duty to consider any application for bail
naade by a accu ed when he appears in court for the first time in
connection with the offence chafed. A trial d to is not always
fixed at first appearance end if a case is continued the accused may
sake further applications for bail when he is brought a& in before the
court. In cot land, unlike nglani, the judge's decision to oomsait
for trial is now merely a formal aterap to the procurator-fiwcaL's
request, Fhe bail decision of the sheriff, therefore, dooo nujt take
place in the context of axaainin.; whether there is a case to answer.
ih nynjljft Le tb t.ho dieyj.CC
The basic information available to the sheriff in cases where no
plea of guilty was registered »as the information on the conplaint or
petition which amounted to the name, age end address of the accused
and the offence charged. For additi nal information the sheriff had
to roly on information put forward by the irocurator-flocal, the
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solicitor or the accused. In cases whore a guilt/ plea was undo and
a report ordered* the sheriff also had available the criminal record
of the accused.
In considering what information the : horiff had on which to base
his decision,we found that in 47 per cent (86) of the oases the only
additional type of information made available to the sheriff was the
attitude of the procurator-fiscal or solicitor to the liberty of the
accused .
fide percentage included almost all (3d) of the cases which were
continued for further enquiries. ?ho prosecutor asked for a contin¬
uation ia custody in 60 per cent of those c sea, but it appears that a
request for custody was implicit in tho continuation motion in the
reciainin cooes, as this was granted by tb© sheriff. In tho majority
19
of cases " the solicitor was silent ,nd did not increase the inform¬
ation available to the sheriff* On a Cm occasions the solicitor
agreed to the irocurator-fiscal*s motion for continuation in custody
perhaps unuer the misaoprehension that he could not oppose custody at
this stage. fbia reluctance of tho solicitor to argue for the liberty
of tho accused stems* we think, from the fact that the procurator-
fiscal, but not the accused, haa the right to a .peal a bail decision
at this stage. It may have been overlooked by the solicitor that
this limitation does not apply to summary cases. Fhia interpretation
19
gains come confirmation from the f ct that in 3 oases the solicitor
did not oppose custody and rgue for liberation,but instead tried to
circumvent the at ge of continuati n by making a motion for full
committal and bail.
Although it may be to the advantage of the prosocutor to have an
accused in cuetody -if he wishes to pursue further inquiries,the
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accused does have the right to ask for liberation at this stag&* The
solicitor by his silence is, therefore, failing in his duty to the
accused* The solicitor may find it difficult to persuade tho sheriff
to grant liberation if the prosecutor wishes custody but, by his
objections, ho could at least force the prosecutor to show cause why
the accused should be kept in custody* It is noteworthy that 44 per
cent of tho accused going to trial were at a later stag© released
with or without a bail requirement. The solicitor, therefore, cannot
be considered to be dealing in this context with a lost cause.
Very limited information was also available to the sheriff in
45 cases in which a not guilty plea was made and in ^ petition cases
which were committed for trial. In tho majority (44) of these cases,
however, agreement was reached by the procurator-fiscal and solicitor
and the sheriff merely endorsed this agreement. In this situation we
do not beiiove that the paucity of information need cause concern if the
public interest and the interest of the accused are both protected by
persons who are fUily informed about their respective interests. In
the remainin; minority of the c-.ses (10) there is cause for concern, as
the sheriff reached his decision on what must be considered inadequate
information, in view of the disagreement between the procurator-fiscal
and the solicitor*
To summarise1 we found lack of information to be a causo for
concern in cases continued before the trial diet was set., representing
18 per cent of the aample cases and in 5 P©£ cent of the sample cases
in which the sheriff made his decision when he was inadequately
informed about the merits of the disagreement between the procurator-
fiscal and the accused's solicitor.
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In the remaining 54 per cent of the sample oases some additional
information was given to the sheriff. We now consider the type and
extent of the information which was given.
W© described in fable XV the type and froquency of the inform¬
ation given to the sheriff by the procurator-fiscal. In Table XVI
we give a similar description of the information given by the solicitor
to the sheriff.
From a comparison of fables XV and XVI it may be seen that the
procurator-fiscal, unlike the solicitor, concentrated on information
about aspects of the accused's criminal record and the offence charged
r ther than details of the accused's background or "community roots".
TA8L3 XFI
Type and Frequency of Information Oiven by Solicitor to Sheriff
Tree of Information Number of cases
Seriousness of offence 6
Circumstances of offence 2
Length of criminal record 13
decent convictions 2
Seriousness of past sentences 7
Hon-appe:iTEOice warrant 2
On bail for another offence 4
Further inquiries necessary 4 28*
Address 18 ^
Time spent at address 2
Co-residents 7
ilarital st tus 9
Dependents 9
Heeded at home by family 10
i&aploynent status 15
Type of job 3
Income 7
Youth 3




The solicitor gave more information than the procurator-fiscal
covering a greater number of cases. Information was given in 52 per
cent of the cases. One type of information was given in 15 per cent
of the caaos, two ty >es in 10 per cent, three typos in 2 per cent and
four typos in 6 per cent. The most information given was nine types.
•.'hen the information from the procurator-f.: seal and the solicitor
was combined it became apparent that in many casos the increase in the
sheriff s information was limited to only one or two information items.
In assessing whether the information made available to the choriff as
sufficient we considered that the participation of the legal aid
solicitor w s of great importance.
The participation of the legal aid solicitor completed the
accusatorial contest. In an accusatorial system the judge is not given
all the information bearing on the solution of a case but only that
information which opposing counsel select in support of their c see.
The underlying assumption of such a system is that in the contest
between the arties all tho relevant information necessary for a
decision will be brought before the court.
We examined the information made available to the sheriff to see
if the disagreements between the procurator-fiscal and the solicitor
did in fact x'osult in an increase in the information made available.
Tho results of this examination are shown in Table XVII.
Tab"© XVII shows that more information was given whon the
procurator-fiscal and the solicitor disagreed, .here there was agreement
more than one item of information w a given in only 7 per cent (4)
of the cases. here there was disagreement, however, such information
was given in 75 por cent (53) of the cases. Ho information was given
in 74 per cent (42/ of the cases in which there was agreement,
compared with 13 cant nhere there was di agreement#
TA3LS XVII20
Ast# of Information Uad* Available -hen #F# .-snd Solicitor Agreed az^tl disagreed
Number of information items 01 23456739 10
2<uabor of eases when •*,!?» and
solicitor agr ed. 42 11 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
lumber of eases when -\P. and
solicitor di :. agreed# 10 8 14 15 13 6 4 3 1 0 1
■■e also found some evidence which indicated that the amount of
information increased with the extent of the di»;: agreement between the
proeur-tor-ficeul and the solicitor# <her« the di:^agreement concerned
the question of the custody or liberty of the accused wo found that an
average of 4 information items was given, -here, however# the disag»*
eonent concerned the terns of liberty of the Recused, tha. is, whether
the accused should be bailed or ordained, or the amount of boil required,
an average of 2.5 information, items was given#
The sufficiency of the information produced by the clash of
interests hot .eon the procurafeor-fiseal and the solicitor depends on
two further factors# It la necessary firstly that both parties «ero
21
fully informed. © found that the procu..: tor-fiscal was fully
informed about traditional factors considered influential in a bail
decision but leap well informed about "coESSunifcy roots ' factors, e
22
discuss the briefing of the solicitor below# The second essential
is that both parties appreciated what ercuccivo vnlu© was attached
by the sheriff to the information which they presented and witha - d#
23
Consideration is given balow to this where we describe our
reservations about the solicitor's interpretat ion of the important factors#
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(11) Additional Information requested by the sheriff
..'0 found that the sheriff was not only more receptive than his
counters rt in the burjh court to information bearing on tho question
of pre-di. position custody or liberty, but also took an active part in
seeking additional information.
In 27 per cent (50) of the sample cases the sheriff requested
additional information before making his decision. These requests
were in 42 cases addressed to the procurator-fiscal. Table aTIII
shows the information for which the sheriff asked.
TABLE mil
Additional Information Requested 3y the sheriff from tho P.F.
Tvoe of information Number of oases
Does ?*F. agree to terms of liberty su^jested
by solicitor 25
Severity of accused'a criminal record 6
Any recent convictions 3
Acceptability of accused's address 3
Circurastances of offence 2
Is accused on bail for another offence 2
Does record show issue of a non-appearance warrant 1
In 7 Oases the sheriff aought additional information from the
aroused* a solicitor and in 1 case directly from the accused. Four of
these requests were concerned to clarify the motion of the solicitor,
three questioned the acceptability of the accused's address nd the
last was a plea of despair for anything that could be said in favour
of tho accused.
The content of the requests are interesting because they
illustrate the sheriff's interest in the traditional bail indicators
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pf attitude of the procurator-fiscal, criminal record and acceptable
address of the accused.
(Ill) .ho i.rf luenoe of the information varlab1.ee on the decision ..of
25a© information requested by the decision-maker is one indication
of the f ctors which he considers influential but perhaps even mors
revealing arc the reasons given by the docisi or>»;aaker. Although it
cannot be assumed that the reasons given represent the crucial
factors in the decision, they do at least indicate what factors the
decision-msker regards as acceptable to the public or that section of
the public with whom he is concerned, -a found, however, that the
sheriff grrvQ reasons for his decision in only 3 cases and, therefore,
abandoned this line of inquiry.
Ae then attempted by using statistical correlations to ascertain
24
what information variables were related to the sheriff's decision.
In d )ing this we made the assumption that the sheriff s decision was
not irrational but was based on the information raa^e available to
him in the decision-making situation. >e tested soma null hypotheses
thut different variables ware not related to the sheriffs decision,
25
in other words, that the two variables ware independent.
We found that using Yates' corrected chi square we could reject
the hypothesis of independence with four information variables, we
concluded that the sheriff's decision to grant or refuse liberty was
26
dependent on the attitude of the procurator-fiscal, and information
27
given by tin procurator-fiscal about recant convictions, non-
23 29
appearance on a previous occasion end on bail for another offence.
It was not possible to reject the null hypothesis using any of the
information variables advanced by the solicitor. '»e were also un¬
able to reject the null hypothesis with any of the variables
based on the information which was given in
available to the sheriff.
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the papers mad®
(c; An evaluation, of the information uado available to the sheriff
30
>/e havo described above in scxae detail what may be termed the
information input of bail decisi ns, a process which is of funda¬
mental importance in all deeision-md:irr;« To be satisfactory we
believe that the information made available must satisfy the tests of
■?1
accuracy, relevance and sufficiency*
The accuracy of the information pi'.en in the bail decision¬
making situation was to some extent guaranteed by the fact that an
important part of the information was baaed on the criminal record
files. 3"nformation from this source may be considered accurate
barring clerical error or deliberate falsifie tion, and the cuned
might be expected to object in the face of these. We argued that
the solicitor was hampered because he did not have access to this
source of information and instead had to rely on the memory of the
accused. To acme extent the accuracy of information not based on
criminal record was also protected in that there were t -ro possible
sources of suoh information, the police r nd the accused. Agreemnt
about information may be considered a good guarantee of accuracy.
A disagreoment about infoiSnation considered important by the decision¬
maker could be resolved by the decision-maker seeking further
information.
The information given may be considered relevant in as far as it
related to the critorion adopted by the decision-maker. >»e found
that the sheriff placod the greatest emphasis on factors relatin - to
criminal record and fixod address and those were the factors
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emphasised by the procurator-f13Cal but not the solicitor, The
solicitor concentrated on giving information about the background
of tho accused and about his address although there is little
evidence to suggest that the former type of information was
considered important by the sheriff# It is interesting to note in
this context that unlike 'community roots" information, the back¬
ground information advanced by the solicitor could not in the majority
of cases have boon given with the aim of showing that the accused had
roots in the oorcanuttity and was therefore likely to appear, as this was
not disputed by the prosecutor# The information given by the solicitor
appears rather to have been given like a plea in mitigation of
sentence to persuade the sheriff not to order custody because of the
family clroumutaneas of the accused.
In considering the sufficiency of the information given to the
decision-maker,it is quite clear that In the .greet majority of cases
the sheriff did not have tho information to enable him to assess by
reference to the accepted criteria whether the accused ought to be
released# Indeed,as we pointed out, in 47 per cent of the sample
cas :q the sheriff had available a minimum of written information and
was given no information by the prosecutor or solicitor except that
they wanted liberty or custody»
devorthelass the underlying assumptions of the accusatorial
system on which legal deoision-making in cot land is grounded must be
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borne in raind. As we argued above in an accusatorial system the
lack of information need not in itself "do objactionable, -e did
point out, however, that the contest between the prosecutor and
solicitor was not always joined particularly in continuation oases#
-omo concern is necessary also because the solicitor did not a:>poar
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to appreciate that, in view of the importance attoohed by the sheriff
to the crimin 1 record of the accused, it vr.s not adequate to ovoid
a contest with the prosecutor about the interpretation to be
attach.d to the accused's criminal record and to concentrate instead
on describing background circumstances.
(d, Comments on the decision-making models
In Figure V we show four main patterns of decision-making
identified at the sheriff court level. The first model describes
the situation in which the procurator-fiscal took the initiative in
seeking the custody of the accused and tho solicitor made no
attempt to obtain liberty. This ra.^del closely resembles a model
which we said represented the pattern of decision-making in tho burgh
\ 1
court. In tho second model neither the procuretor-fiscal nor the
solicitor individually controlled the decisis® but the terms of their
agreement wore automatically accepted by the sheriff. The model shows
that in the -Teat majority of these c ises the sheriff was given no
information end was not, therefore, able to make an independent assess¬
ment of the merits of liberty or custody. The third model represents
the situation where tho procurator-fiscal and solicitor disagreed
about liberty or about the tanas of liberty. The model shows that a
much greater amount of information was made available to the sheriff
who had to choose between the competing sup estions. The sheriff's
reliance on the information given by the procurator-fiscal is also
illustrated. Perhaps surprisingly the review cases did not always
follow this pattern. '«© found that in 2 of the 4 cases the solicitor
and procurator-fiscal had reached an agreement and,as in the second







model repreaants the situation where the sheriff was given information
but neither the procurator-fiscal nor the solicitor made representations
for liberty or custody. In this situation the suggestion about
liberty or custody came initially from the sheriff. We found that this
applied only to some - of- „ those decisions made about liberty or
custody pending a report after a guilty plea. One explanation for the
sheriff's initiative in those cases is that the sentence which the
judge was considering to some extent determined whether the report
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would be compiled while the accusod was in custody or at liberty.
It is interesting to note that the major decision-making patterns
which wa identified differed considerably from those described by
Ouffet in his study of 1,473 bail settings in New York.
Suffet found that the modal pattern of bail decision-making, which
represented 49 ?or cent of the oases, was one in which the judge
fixed bail vrithout discussing the matter with either the prosecution
or defence attorney, duffefc's suggestion - decision pattern, repres¬
enting 30 per cent of the cases, resembled the attern which we found
occurred most frequently* hyen in this pattern, however, Juffet found
that the judge departed from the suggestion agreed by the attorneys
in about 33 per cent of the coses* It is bvious from thi3 that tl>e
judge in ->uffet's study played a much more active role in decision
making than his equivalent in the sheriff court. This difference may
perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the procurator-fiscal,
unlike his American counterpart, is vested with discretion to grant
bail* It is not surprising, therefore, that if the procurator-fiscal
and solicitor have reached agreement that this agreement should be
endorsed by the sheriff. 3u**fet suggested that the greater success of
the prosecution attorney may be because he has mors prestige in the
n7
court room# •'•e would explain this success, however, by arguing
that the prosecutor appreciated,more than the solicitor,the factors
likely to influence the decision-maker and was more fully briefed
about these factors.
( i) Legal Re >rcsentation and L jgal Aid
In the sheriff court a duty solicitor attended before court to
advise and represent all arrested persons who were in custody# This
service .fas made available under, the legal aid scheme without any
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charge to the accused.
All tho accused in the sample, except 2, were represented in
court. On© of the accused who refused representation pled his c:.so
for bail more passionately than any lawyer but with the unfortunate
result that he insulted the judge ynd assaulted the police when they
tried to remove him from the dock. Bail was refused. The other
accused had a history of mental illness and was kept in custody to
allow the preparation of a medical report.
ilxoludin; the continuation cases, tho solicitor sought liberty
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<?or the accusod in almost all cases. In 3 cases the solicitor
acquiesced in custody. These eases mainly conoerned accused for whom
a medical report was sought. One case concerned an accused charged with
assault >nd ravishment of a young girl. It was not clear whether the
solicitor thought an application would be hopeless in this cuse or
deliberately refrained from seeking bail for tactical reasons.
There \sras evidence that in some casea the solicitor and the
procurator-fiscal had negotiated the tones of release before tho court
hearing, deference was made to such agreement in 3 cases and we also
199.
witnessed discussion in 5 cases. The solicitor and the procurator-
fiscal agreed the tena3 of liberty in 51 cases.
In \ddiiion to safeguarding the interests of the accused and
agreeing favourable terr.s of liberty with the procurator-fiscal
we argued that the solicitor played an important role by regulating
the amount of information which was made available to the court, .e
described^ a model in which the solicitor's acceptance of the
procurator-fiscal'a motion for bail or custody resulted in little
additional information, ■'hare the solicitor opposed and advanced
favourable information, however, the procurator-fiscal was forcod,
if he wanted a result in his favour, to produce information suffic¬
ient to induce the sheriff to accept his motion. If the solicitor
was tenacious the procurator-fiscal was forced to produce all the
unfavourable information available to him.
fhe continuation cases illustrate the consequences when the
solicitor failed to actively pursue the liberty of the accused, wtmely
automatic custody without any information being made available to the
sheriff*
fhe success of the system requires that the solicitor, like the
procurator-fiscal, has full information, The solicitor rau3t, therefore,
have the time and the opportunity to ascertain the relevant information
from the accused.
from the criticisms of delay voiced by the court staff and the
flexible court time table which allowed the custody cases to be heard
when the solicitor had finished intervi ewlng, it did appear that the
solicitor took tlje time he required.
fhe question whether the solicitor obtained all the relevant
information is difficult to answer. Proa the information given to the
200.
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court by the solicitor* it may be soon that the solicitor in many-
cases had elicited,and appeared to regard as relevant, information
about the home and background of the accused. e are unable to say*
however* to what extent the solicitor failed to elioit such inform¬
ation. It was obvious that the solicitor also regarded the criminal
record of tha accused as relevant. W© noted* however, that in a
number of cases tha solicitor was either misinformed or lacked full
information. In these cases the solicitor either admitted his lack
of information* or hie account of the accused's record differed from
the account given by the procurator-fiscal who had available a copy
of the police record. For details of criminal record the solicitor had
to rely on the memory of the accused and the list of previous convic¬
tions libelled, but the offences libelled by the procurator-fiscal
did not necessarily represent the Axil criminal recocd of the accused^
nor did they show* for example* whether the accused was on bail for
another offence or had failed to appear on a previous occasion. we
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have illustrated above that various aspects of the criminal record of
the accused arc considered relevant by both the procurator-fiscal and
the sheriff. Because of this it la important that the solicitor has
full and accurate information about previous convictions.
V«o suggest that a simple and effective way to ensure that the
solicitor io fully informed would be to make available to him a copy of
the accused* s criminal record. There can be no sustainable objection
to this on tho basis of privacy of police records because it concerns
only information which the accused could ralato given the time and an
45
exceptional memory. A copy of the police record is at present made
for the use of the procurator-fiscal and tho provision of a duplicate to
the solicitor oould be unlikely to overburden the court adminiotration.
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U) dome Implications and Consequences or the 3aj.l Dgg£g&aa
(a) The money lor boil
In Chapter III we outlined the different methods by which bail
maj be found. Briefly, the legislation provides that in summary cases
bail may be found by a deposit of money, equal to the amount of bail,
by the accused or a third party. As on alternative, bail nay be found
by the subscription of a bail bond by a cautioner. This lattor
method is the only method competent in solemn procedure. The terms
of the bull bond provide that the cautioner is bound to pay the am,unt
of bail if the accused does not appe;.\r on the appointed date. Provision
is made for the issue of a warrant to recover the ra^ney if this is
necessary and also to imprison the cautioner if he fails to pay the
A&
money within a specified time. It is obvious from this thut the legal
provisions do not always require that money be deposited. Juperficially
it appears, therefore, that the Scottish boil bond system resembles
the English system of recognisance which has been characterised
'as an ae'eno.'lodgement of an unsecured debt to the State payable upon
AT
the non appearance of the accused.w
In our examination of the methods used to find bail wo discovered
some divergence between legal theory and practice, do found thut in
summary caso3 tho invariable method of finding bail was by the deposit
of money rathor than the subscription of a bond. In sole;on procedure
where bonds were subscribed, the money payable by the cautioner in the
event of tho non-appearance of the accused was in fact deposited at
the time the bond was signed. Indoed in some case3, despite the bond's
cautionary fossa, no third party undertook: the cautionary obligation and
the bond was signed by the accused who deposited the money.
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Our research into the explanation of this, revealed an interesting
example of official practice distorting and overriding legal norms.
She widespread practice of requiring the deposit of money
appears to be due to the practice and insistence of the clerks of the
court. Dating hack to the seventeenth century, responsibility for
accepting cautioners with sufficient means has been placed on the
appropriate clerks. Failure has in soma cases resulted in an action
of damages against the clerk.^ To avoid such action the clerk wes
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advised to require the production of some evidence of sufficiency,
for example, a certificate of sufficiency signed by a .justice of the
peace. Toda/ the only evidence of sufficiency which the clerks of
court generally accept is the deposit of a sum of money, equal to the
50
ariount guaranteed in the bond. Although it is debatable whether
the clerks of court could be hold liable if they accepted a person
of insufficient means as a cautioner of a bail bond, they justify
their practice by referring to the necessity to protect themselves.
In seme unpublished records of the Scottish Home and Health
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Jep rtnent we found that the legality of this practice of the
sheriff clerks had been attacked in 1931. At that time it was accepted
that bail could legally be found either by deposit or by bond without
deposit. 'The ^ocrutary of State, however, declared himself unable
and the Convenor of the Sheriffs proved unwilling to take steps to
have the practice altered. The practice still flourishes.
•hether the clerks are to be held responsible or not, it is
obviously in the public inter >st that cautioners who are unable to
meet the sum specified in the bond, are not accepted. After examining
the amount of basl, however, we re ched the conclusion that the
sufficiency of potential cautioners cannot in most cases be a question
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in issue. We found that the bail money was in 67 per cent of the
cases 5 pound;.; or loss and in 16 per cent of the cases between 6 and 10
pounds* In only 11 per cent of the cases wan bail set at 20 pounds or
more and the highest bail was 50 pounds, -occluding a few persons who
are habitually of no fixed address, there can be few persons today from
whose income or assets the court could not, if necessary, raise
20 pounds or less to cover a forfeited bail. For persons raising
comparatively high amounts of bail, evidence of a bank account,
ownership of a house or car, or similar evidence could be used as
evidence of sufficiency. The current practice is sore likely flue to
bureaucratic convenience than the problem of insufficient cautioners.
Ilia con3equoncoo attributable to this jtactios tire open to
serious criticism. e found that this practice caused 47 pe*r
cent of the earn pie to whom bail had been granted, to spend some time in
prison because they or their families were unable to provide the
cash immediately, fable XIX sets out the time taken to raise the bail
these persons. In addition we found that for 8 per cent of the
bail cases, this period of imprisonment after a .grant of bail,
represented a first custodial experience and for 16 per cent this
period represented a harsher penalty than the final disposition
imposed by the court.
TABLE XIX
Time taken to daise the done/ for ail
No. of cases Average time (in days)
Bail granted 65
Bail raised at court 34 som
Bail raised at prison 6 stone day
24 12
Bail not raised 1 5-5
TABLE XX
Cases in whioh Bail was Granted t Amount Required for Bail
Aint. required for bail £1235 10 1520 25 50
No* of eases 1613510 5 5 1 1
TABLE XXI 52
Cases in. which Bail was Granted 1 Types of Offence Charged
Crimes against the person
No. of cases


























































Prison < 3 nths
Prison > 3 nths < 1 year
Prison >1 year





The casa history of 0:1® of the accused in the sample illustrates
the 'hard cases" which may result bee use of this practice. A young
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woman of twenty-one traa charged with theft of clothing valued at
thirty-five pounds and theft of two pounds from a television meter*
Both thefts were from the house of a friend. She had over a paricid
of five years, fivo previous convictions for theft for which she had
been admonished, sentenced to borstal training and put on probation.
>hen charged at the beginning of February with the thefts, she was
single, seven months pregnant and receiving unemployment benefit of
five pounds per week. She pled not guilty and boil of ten pounds was
granted. Almost two months later, at the and of ■■larch, her ease wan
put down on the court list for review aftor she had sent a letter to the
procurator-fiscal explaining her inability to raise the money, "hen
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the case was called no appearance was entered on her behalf. Jhe
appeared before the court at the end of the first week in (iay and pled
guilty. Bhe was admonished on both charges ,
Other consequences of this practice which must also be borne in
mind, are possible financial hardship caused to the family of the
accused and the strain of additional short terra admissions >n an
overburdened prison service.
Also important is the fnct fchfat the ract ice has caused or at
least contributes to the necessity for setting bail money at such low
amounts that the threat of forfeiture cannot be considered a realistic
inducement to the accused to appear, or a realistic punishment for
failure to appear. ■•■© mentioned the lot? bail amounts in connection
with the sufficiency of cautioners, fables .dC, XXI and XXII set out
this information In greater detail by illustrating the types of offonce
for which bail wan sot and the types of sentence imposed.
It ia ludicrous to suppose that an accused f »c d with a charge,
for example, of attempted murder or assault and robbery and liable to a
long orison sentence, will be induced, to appear by handing over a few
pounds for bail# Nor can the forfeiture of snail sums of money
compensate f >r the expense of legal preparation including perhaps tho
summoning of jurors, the waste of court time and the extra work for
the police who h ve to look for an accused who fails to appear, The
same may bo said about accused charged with lesser offences even if
the potential sentence is not custodial#
The implementation of the legal norms, to allow the subscription
of bail bonds in :jummary and indictable cases without the necessity of
producing the cash, would relieve some of those problems. e fire of the
opinion, however, that a more fundamental change involving the abolition
of tho money requirement is necessary, This proposed reform receives
further consideration below.^
In view of our recommend itions it is of interest to note that
release without any fin ncial condition is already part of court practice.
The extent of this practice is recorded in Table XII, This form of
release was invariably used for persons who pled guilty and whom the
sheriff was willing to release ponding a report before sentence# Such
release as granted where both property and personal injury offences had
been charged. The cases do not appear to bo atypical in respect of either
the amount or type of information available. In no case was it suggested
that release should be conditional on a money r equiroraant.
In contrast,where a not guilty plea was made, there whs a notice¬
able reluctance in the attitudes of the procurator-fiscal, the solicitor
and bhe sheriff to consider release without a financial condition. Thus
ae> vie described above the officials offered or accepted bail at token
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mounts of one or two pounds.
In one case, Y/hare a f thor and son had both pled not guilty to
a chars© breach of the peace, the solicitor save information that
neither accused had any money and that thero was nobody at home to
raise it, The solicitor offered 10 pounds as "double bail for one
accused and asked, in view of this offer, that the other accused be
ordained to appear. Opposing the motion the procurator-fiscal asked
that 5 pounds bail be given for e..ch accused. The sheriff granted the
solicitor's request. Phis was 1 of only 3 cases where the non-avail¬
ability of money was a factor in the decision to ordain the accused,
fheso cases were similar to the extent that the accused had no or
only minor previous convictions and the procurator-fiscal had no
objection in principle to release. In view of the fact that after
conviction release without bail is not restricted in this way, it is
rather difficult to justify such a limitation in pre-trial practice.
If the sheriff exercised his power to ordain accused who would
have difficulty in raising the money, then some of the objections to
the present bail system would be removed, That this does not happen,
however, is clear from the facts that only 3 of the accused who had
insufficient money were ordained and 43/u (il) of those granted bail
spent some time in prison before tine money was raised.
This does not take into account possible financial hardship to
relatives or friends who provided the money for the accused who were
immediately released.
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(b) Time soent in custody before aentenc.-a
;>o found that 50 par cent of the caaon in the sanpl© suffer ;<1
custody at some tine after their first court aopea.rance. Of these
37 per cent were continued without plea or for further inquiry and
33 per cent wore continued in custody for a report. In the former
the modal period of custody was 7 days and in the latter 14 days,
fable XXIII shows the time spent in custody by the remaining cases#
IABL3 XXIII!^
Spent in Custody due to tho da.il decision
-x „ Average tineSo. of o, see (ln
defused bail 13 64
defused bail and changed plea to guilty 5 3ame day
Granted bail but not raised 6 same day
24 12
1 until trial
It ought to be noted that 5 of tho accused refused bail intimated
to the court after refusal that they wished to change their plea to
guilty. These accused wore charged on summary procedure and 4 ere
given custodial sentences of 6 months or loss. One of tho accused,
however, was merely fined 25 pounds and allowed time to pay. It is
dis uieting to reali e that persistence in a plea of not guilty say
make a person liable to spend a Ion ,-er period in custody. This was
certainly the ooition of one accused and the other accused, if they
had persisted in their plea of not guilty, night have spent an average
of 64 days in custody awaiting trial with no guarantee that this
period would 1x3 subtracted from any sentence ultimately iiapoued.
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The periods of pre-trial custody compare favourably with the
56 t
much longer periods which often occur in other countries.
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Scotland of course, the period is limited to a maximum of 110 days
and this constitutes a valuable safeguard against protracted pre-trial
custody. Although the limitation does not apply to summary cases, we
found that the pre-trial custody of the sample c sos foil within tMs
maximum. Tha lonreat period in summary cases vras 101 days.
Another saf .guard against protracted pre-trial custody is the
provisi n for accelerating the diet of trial when the accused intimates
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to tho procurator-fiscal that he is changing hie plea to guilty. wo
found 2 accused ./ho had been refused bail who intimated such a ploa
and their cases wore disposed of within 7 days.
Although the times spent in pre-sentence custody are compar¬
atively short, tho frequency of resort to such custody compares
unfavourably with the frequency of resort to custodial sentences.
W® found that although 58 per cent of the sample suffered pre¬
sentence custody, in only 32 per cent of the compie were custodial
sentences imposed. Of those refused bail 37 per cent, and of those
kept in custody while a report was being prep red 55 per cent, were
not given custodial sentences.
These results suggest that the criteria governing pre-sentence
release decisions are /acre Likely to produce a custody decision thrai
the criteria governing the sentencing decision* he give further
consideration to this in tho last chapter when we discuss the assum¬
ptions and justifications of boil.^
Legal provisions authorise the jud;e to take into account time
spent in pre-sonbonce custody by back-dating a custodial sentence.
This dodiication ia not automatic, however, and we found only
3 cases in which the sentence was recorded as back-d>ited« This relief
does not of course benefit accused who are found not guilty or
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given a non-custodial sentence. Using our research design it was
impossible to identify casos in which the judge refrained from
imposing a custodial sentence because of the time spent in pre-sentence
custody, do did note, however, that this point was sometimes made by
the solicitor in his plea, in mitigation of sentence.^
Subotra*tin; the time spent in pre-sentence custody from the
custodial sentence imposed involves some conceptual confusion because
the reasons and justification for both types of custody are vory
different.0"^ This is reflected in the differences in rison regime
■which apply to tried and untried prisoners. The -egislation, however,
appears to recognise that the accused who is deprived of his liberty
is unlikely to appreciate the conceptual cubtleties.
(fi) x'foq ffMffleaa
Measured by the non-appearance rate, the decisions about pro-
disposition release were very successful. In only ] cases, representing
less than 4 per cent of the accused released, was a non-appe.ircnce
warrant for failure to appear issued.The accused who failed to
appear are described in Table X.J.V. None of the accused avoided
rearrest and sentence.
Tlie appearance of the accused, however, is only one factor by
which the success of bail release is judged in Scotland. The Scottish
courts not only attempt to ensure the appoarance of the accused but
are also concerned that the interim liberty is not abused, for example,
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by the accused committing other offences or interfering with witnesses,
TABLS XaIV
A Ascription of Accused who Failed to Appear
'
Past " " """ ' 'J l"' P.P.Ts dheriff s









Although difficult to estimate it docs appear that tho judge was
less successful predicting abuse of liberty than non-appearance. The
only method by which we could calculate this success was to base it on
the number of c .nee in which the procurator-fi caL had information that
the accused at the time of arrest was on bail for another offence, This
is an underr©presentation because it did not take into account offences
which were unreported or with which the accused had not at that time
been charged, •<© found that in 13 per cent (23) of the cases the
procurator-fiscal had information that toe accused at the time of arrest
was on bail.
i?he attribution of success demands not only that accused who could
not be successfully released be kept in custody bub also that accused who
could be successfully released be so liberated. It i3 not possible to
say with assurance to what extent the accused who were kept in custody
might have been sure sefully released, -'hen it is realised* however,
that many of the accused were not considered a
(S) Theft (£12) similar Ho custodial i^ne £20
< 5 convs
(P) Asa to serious similar Fines/3 mths Y0I 14 atha
injuiy >10 convs prison
(3) Theft (£3) air11 or 3orstal/3 mtha prison Found N.G.
>20 convs
(3) Theft HB olr.llar Borstal/3 mths Y0I Admonished
(£33) ->10 convs
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sufficient danger to the public to be sentenced to custody, it
seems reasonable to argue that tho risk of liberty mi ;ht have been
justified. In regard to the continuation caeca, successful appearonce
and non-abuse of liberty, was guaranteed by automatic custody. A
week later, however, 44 per cent of those c oes were successfully
released. It nay be, that all these accused posed a threat to the
investigation in the first ^ days which then disappeared. This we
doubt and believe that the solicitor should not have silently
acquiesced in custody at this stage but should have forced the
procurator-fiscal to show cause why custody should be granted.
This di-.cuasion is continued below'J^ here v»e consider in general
terms the justifiability of the present criteria of success and make
suggestions about ways in which the success rate might be improved.
U), An attafl.'t ,tq qpqepq tfre effect decj^pn on the optca»e
Someresearchers have argued that an unfavourable bail decision
may have a demonstrably adverse effect on the plea, finding and sentence.
Using Yates' corrected chi square, however, we were unable, in both
summary and indictable cases, to obtain significant correlations using
the variables bail decision and plea or finding or sentence, never¬
theless we agree with researchers 'who have pointed out that custody
before trial may adversely effect the preparation for trial and the
accused's morale, family life and employment prospects.
THS VaRA IHSTI7UTI] BAIL S^IAlLd-JiTt THh ..LfilT , PP ATTAl/flHG
A 31i!IL.\.-t ,JC .:«? IN XQTLASb
The Vera Institute in their bail experimenta attempted, with some
reported success, to devi ;e a new bail indicator. The bail
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indicator devised was based, as we described above, on a score
indicatin: the "connaaiity roots" of the accused. In England although
it was considered that the courts would bo hostile to decision-making
based on a scoring system, considerable support has been voiced for the
introduction of Vera type information sheets. It has been argued that
the use of information sheets would solve a major problem affecting
bail deoisions, that is, the scarcity of information on which to base a
go
decision about bail.
In the Scottish context we gave some attention to both these
issues. Firstly, we considered to what -xtent the introduction of Vera
type information sheets would increase the information available to the
sheriff. Secondly,we considered whether a community roots' indicator
could be used in Scotland, instead of traditional criteria, to identify
good bail risks.
(1) informfttlqr} ^e.i,AvalJ,i%fr;.c tp V'V? ,
When we considered whether information about "community roots '
was made available to the sheriff under the present system we noted
that the sheriff always had information about the accused's address
available i» his papers. The procurator-fiscal and solicitor were able
214.
to supplement this information but in 84 per cent of the cases we
found that no information about "community roots" was made available
by them#
Table XXV shows the information spread in the 16 per cent (j())
of the cases in which some of this information w s available. Only
1 case ftas found in which all the information was revealed.
TABLE XXV
"Community doots ' Information Available to the sheriff
1 = person with who® accused lives
2 » time spent at address given
3 » employed
4 =» marital status
5 = dependents
6 = source of income
Information not available 1 2 3 4
Number of cases 3 1 9 2
Information not
available 1/3 2/3 i/5 4/5 3/6 5/ 6 II
Number of cases 1 1 1 3 1 1









1/3/5 3/4/6 3/5/6 4/5/6
1 1 1 1
1/2/3/4/5/6
Despite thi3 great lack of information about the "community roots"
of the accused,the sheriff did not appear to bo conscious of any
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deprivation as ho sought further information of this kind in ohly 6
oases, These inquiries .11 related to the acceptability of the
70accused's address.
Increasing tho availability of this type of information only
makes sense if the sheriff is to be persuaded to place less reliance on,
or even abandon, traditional criteria. Accepting that this is tossible
for the purposes of argument, we doubt whether tire preparation of
information sheets covering this or any other type of information
would bo necessary or helpful.
It may be remembered that although information about "community
roots" was not given to the sheriff, it was available in many cases
71
to the procurator-fiscal. In addition, the accused had the opport¬
unity in all oaoee to give this information to his solicitor.
Hie preparation of an information sheet to be given to the sheriff
involves many administrative problems not least the decision about
who is to prepare the information. Various bodies have been suggested,
for example, social workers, court officials and the police. In
Scotland the collection of this information would involve unnecessary
duplication of the work of the duty solicitor. To counter the argument
that the strength of the information sheets lies in the fact that it
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contains verified information, it may be said that the procurator*
fiscal has some of this information verifiou by the police and tho
sheriff, if he doubts the word of the accused, may ask for confirm-
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ation. Nor is there anything to pr'evont the solicitor, except
perhaps lack of tine, from obtaining confirmation by telephone in
oases where this is possible.
i&cpense, unnecessary duplication of work, possible delay in
bringing the accused before the court and judicial Inability to digest
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more paper information within a very short period are soma objections
to information she .ta. In addition wo believe that if the procurator-
fiscal and the solicitor are both adequately Informed, if the judge is
receptive and willing to seek further information, information sheets
are superfluous.
To sumariaet we found information about "community roots" was
not generally available to the sheriff. '■Vo ore of the opinion,
however, that in the event of partial or complete acceptance of
"community roots as a bail indicator,tho iaffirmation could bo present¬
ed to the 3hcrifi' without the introduction of information sheets. -<e
considered information sheets to be an inappropriate method of
presenting information to the judge in view of the duties and role
played by tho procurator-fiscal and solicitor in the existing
accusatorial system.
(-) "^9 ftf "CfflmniUfrf fopW -v; a ^disfrtq*
The underlying assumptions of the Vera scheme were explained in
Chapter II*^ and the point system was reproduo d in -ochibit I.
To assess the utility and merits of tho Vera acheiae in the
Scottish situation we computed scores, based on the Vera scoring system,
for the cases in the sample. We wished to discover firstly, whether the
scheme would achieve its objective of increasing the number of persons
released. Secondly, to discover to what extent the scheme would
recommend the release of persons who were x'eloased under the tradit¬
ionally accepted criteria and thirdly, whether the recommended persons
and the non~ rocoimnended persons appeared or did not appear, if they
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were In fact released.
We amended the scoring to take into account Scottish differences,
for example, Icota lav? does not distinguish between felonies and mis¬
demeanours. -a also simplified some of the scoring because detailed
information about, for example, unemployment record was not available
for the sample cases. We excluded trio discretionary point to avoid
introducing bias into the sample scores. We consider that the scoring
system which we constructed was marginally more favourable to the
accused. This scoring system is set out in fable XXVI,
TABLE XXVI




* 1 More than p convictions
F^LY TO
3 lives with family
3 lives in military service quarters




1 deceiving uneraployiaont benefit
or social security benefit
2 Has a fixed address
1 Address for less than 6 months
The results based on this scoring system are set out in Table XXVII*
We found that there was only a 3 per cent incroase in the number of cases
who qualified on the basis of the point system for a release
recommendation. Indeed when we excluded the continuation report and
roviow c COB, to which some specialities attach, only 55 .por cent (59)
of the cases qualified for a release recomnendation in comparison with
71 per cent (73) who were grntod release under the present cystem.
TAB13 XXVII
A Comparison of the Ccorinj docosaiaendations and the -jocisions Heda
Helaaaed jn sample Not released in sample
NG(3)/FC CWP/CFF. G(.;) NG(d}FC CV/P/CHI G(It) Total
Ccore 5 or >5 50 1 6 3 16 12 93
Score 5 28 0 4 17 13 8 75
Total 73 1 10 25 34 30 163
A concordance was found between the results of the Vera recomm¬
end tians ■ nd the present criteria in the cases for which a trial date
was 3©t• Of the cases whose scores merited a role so recommendation,
50 were in fact released. This means, however, that only 8 custody
cases benefited from a recommendation and that 28 oases which were
role .sod did not qualify for a recommendation. The sco ing favoured
49 per cent of the continuation cases* A special problem affects
continuation cases because custody is almost automatic at this stage.
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e criticised this above and it is this problem which must be tackled.
Of the continuation cases in the sample for which a trial date was
set 44 per cent were released on thoir second court appearance. Cases
in which the accused pled guilty end a re %ort was ordered f red better
on the scoring system but again we found that the scoring denied a
recommendation to 4 (14 per cent, of the report case ; released.
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The success rate which would have been achieved on the basis of
the "community roots' recommendations compared unfavourably with the
success of the c--.aes released in the sample. v.© found that on the
basis of scoring* 31 cases did not qualify for a rolease recommendation
although they were in fact successfully released. In addition, 3 of
the accused who failed to appear, achieved a score on the "community
roots" scale which qualified for a recommendation.
In our experiment with the bample cases the "community roots"
indicator achieved little success in increasing the number of persons
eligible for release, The lack of success may be explained by the
difficulty of transplanting the indicator, which was designed and its
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success confined, to legal systems with problems and legal provisions
differing from those of Scotland. We are of the opinion that these
differences are sufficiently fundamental to prevent a successful
transplantation oven with substantial modifications to the "community
roots" scoring.
In America a right to bail is given and the problem which inspired
the Vera scheme was not the refusal of bail but the inability of many
accused to raise bail money set at a prohibitively high figure. This
led to the various iniquities of the bail bondsman system. Vera
personnel highlighted the injustice of release being dependent on the
possession of wealth and tried to construct a new indicator. Scotland,
however, has two major problems which probably demand different
solutions. The first problem is that some accused are refused bail and
this decision is entirely discretionary. Secondly, although bail
amounts are comparatively very low some accused cannot even raise
very small amounts of money and thus remain in custody. Unlike the
American situation there is no need in -Gotland to mani.mlate the
bail systa^ by demanding high bail mono,/ to prevent accused from
obtaining role&se,as the judge can easily refuse bail.
Not only ori the problems different but the American criterion
of success of bail has only limited a plicr.tion in -cotland. In .1series
the success of bail is judged by the appear xtco rate of the accused.
Other factors, however, affect tho question, of success in Boatload
notably whether the accused has committed other offences while on bail
or whether the recused has attempted to intorfo a with witnesses or in
other ways pervert the course of justice. The "coramunity roots" scale
sras designed to predict merely the likelihood of appearance of the
accused and this has also been the measure of its oueco3o. There is no
evidence to surest that any reliance can be placid on 'community roots"
when the success criteria include additional f ctors. But evon if
success in 'cotlend wore to ba judged by rofo ertce onlf to the a ponu¬
ance of the accused, the scores of the sample oases suggest that fewer
persons would bo released without any improvement in the identification
of persons likely to abscond.
'The r suits we obtained indicate that tho Vera scale could not bo
used successfully in Scotland as it has boon in raany different states of
America. It would, of course, be possible to attempt to create a new
scale. To bo of practical value such a sonlo ought to take into account
all the success criteria. Many studies, however, have illustrated t e
difficulties Involved in attempting to predict ;hethor an accused is
*7 Q
likely to commit other offences. This would be only one of the f ctors
which tho bail, sc la would have to take into a ccount. We are very doubt¬
ful whether a scale could be developed which would give a better
prediction than a decision based on tho decision-maker's assessment of
the individual circumatanoas of the csa. The inevitable complexity
of such a scale ould in any event probably prevent its use in the
daily routine of ball setting*
VIII
BAIL LOCISIGNS
IN IHi'J HIGH COUNT OF JUSTICIAR
The High Court of Justiciary, with few exceptions] considers
the question of bail only when an appeal is taken from the bail decision
of an inferior court. Although the sheriff courts are responsible
for a much gre ter number of bail decisions, the decisions of the
High Court of Justiciary are significant as the appelate jurisdiction
of this court provides an opportunity to develop and standardise the
grounds on which bail is granted or refused.
In contrast, however, the grant of bail pending appeal against
conviction or sentence is decided at first instance by the High Court
of Justiciary. 'This is true also of interim liberation in summary
procedure, where appeal againut conviction or sentence is by suspension
but not if the appeal is by st ted case.^
THiS SUBJ-jCT OF THh' NCSSARCH
The decisions of the High Court of Justiciary wero of interest
for a number of reasons, not least because of the secrecy surrounding
the deliberations which were heard in the privacy of chambers. In the
vast majority of cases'^ the conduct, procedure and rationale of the
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decisions were unknown. In addition as appeals could originate from
an/ of fcho ~cottish sheriffdoms,we ere able to examine for the first
time bail decisions from parts of Scotland outwith the Lothians and
Peebles area.
Many of the issues which we examined in the lower courts again
engaged our attention. Thus in studying the decision-making situation,
we considered what information was made available to the decision-maker
and attempted to assess the effect of this information on the decision
to grant or refuse custody. In bail appeals and bail applications
pending appeal against conviction or sentence we identified the judge
as sole decision-maker, in contrast to the inferior courts where we al30
identified the prosecutor as a decision-maker^ In the appeal situation,
however, ihe Crown representative does not have the freedom of his coun¬
terpart in the inferior courts to agree the terras of liberty or decide
whether to oppose a motion of bail. In bail applications after
conviction the exclusion was obviously required because, unlike the
pre-trial bail provisions, the law does not vest any discretion in the
Crown representative nor does it confer any right to make representations.
In considering the judge as decision-maker we examined his attitude
towards receiving and seeking further information and tho reasons or
lack of reasons given for his decision. The information given by
opposing counsel was also evaluated. In examining sorae of the
consequences of the appeal decisions we concentrated on the following
issues:- bail money, time taken to have an appeal considered and the
success of the appeal decisions. Lastly ome astention was given to
the justification and consequences of the secrecy surrounding the
proceedings.
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m; ; ten m.^iojology
(1) ^ Y*V\?4 9f Jb:pary^a,ofl
Ho preliminary study waa carried out in the High Court of
Justiciary because permission for this study was granted almost a year
after the beginning of the research by which time we had become very
familiar with the bail practice.
fhe study covered bail appeals and bail applications after
conviction hoard in the winter session of 197J.
Bail appeals may be heard in court or in chambers before a
single .judqe or a quorum of the court. As a matter of practice the
appeals were always heard in chambers before a single judge, The
hearings in chambers did not take pi co every day but were act as
required on any day except dunday.
Before the hearings the various people with an interest in the
petitions congregated outside the judges* chambers. Attendance at the
hearing of the petitions was strictly limited to the parties contesting
the petition. Present at a hearin?» therefore, were tho accused's
counsel and sometimes a representative of the instructing solicitors,
6 7
a Crown assistant and an advocate, usually one of the Advocates-depute,
representing the Crown, ?he Clerk of Justiciary or a depute was also
in attendance. The judgo was made swore by the clerk of our research
interest in bail. On no occasion was tho accused or any other inter¬
ested party present.
■e did not use information sheets to record tho debate in
chambers but attempted to note fully the verbal interaction in the
sequence in which it occured. After tho hearing of the petitions we
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completed an information sheet, reproduced in Appendix II, based on
information contained in papers held by the Clerk of Justiciary and
tho Crown assistant.
Ud -ecor^ deflQqqcfr
Although we had full access to the court records there was
unfortunately no record kept in the High Court of Justiciary about
much necessary information concerning, for example, the raising of the
bail money, the success of bail and the final outcome of the case, fhis
information could be obtained from the clerk of the sheriffdom
in which the accused had made his first appearance. We wrote with some
success to request this information.
( V ^ceparrUon for th? Ugp of t,hte ~?I3 ZfOfFim
In Appendix V we list the variables created raid coded on computer
cards bo cover the information obtained by observation and record
res-arch. Vie used the 3 '33 programs to provide descriptive statistics
and to test 3ome relationships between the variables.
TIL, .L-J.-,UCtI &;JOLTS
(,t, ^cript,j. aq of the Sqmflq
During our period of observation 65 petitions were hoard in
chambers. The results of tho petitions are described in Table XXVIII.
The low success rate of 17 per cent for appeals against the refusal of
ball should be noted.
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TABLE XXVIII
Type and desalts of Petitions
Petition Petition m t .
Granted dismissed °
Appeal against refusal of bail (summary) 3 4 7
(solemn/ 6 39 45
Crown appeal against grant of bail 2 1 3
3ail after conviction 7 0 7
No appearance entered • - 1
Petition abandoned - - 1
Missing case «■» - 1
Total 19 44 65
lgLiaiaaaa&lsa apd the jgassiaa aOjggsaiiaa
■Cvw 3?ju pvtitfong
,U), ,->¥■? decigfloq-Bafrora
<e found that the role of the judge as decision-maker in bail
appeals in the High Court of Justiciary assumed a greater importance
than comparative roles in the inferior courts. We attributed this
increase in importance not only to the higher status and appelate
powers of the judge but also to the effect of the role played by the
Crown representative in bringing or opposing appeals.
The Advocata-Hepute when representing the Crown in bail appeals
did not enjoy the extensive discretion of the prosecutor in the inferior
courts. The decision to appeal did not lie with the Advocate-neputs
but with the procurator-fiscal in the inferior court, or the accused.
'The Advocate-depute merely received notification of the appeal and was
given a summary of what was thought to be relevant information by the
appropriate procurator-fiscal. This summary was generally the only
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information available to the Advocat3-Be ute. Because of this the
Advoeate—De jute appeared to adopt the vie./ that, until further information
was available, ho would support the procurator-fiscal who was familiar
with the circumstances of the case including the police report and who
had perhaps proco^nosed witnesses. In addition at the appeal stage the
opportunity of reaching agreement between the Crown and the accused's
representatives had usually passed.
In contract, therefore, to the burgh court where in many cases
only the prosecutor mode representations about bail, and to the sheriff
court //here in many cases both parties reached an agreement which was
merely endorsed by the sheriff, the judge hearing bail appeals was
confronted with two disagreeing parties who were briefed to present
their respective cases.
(44) Ipfpr^tiyp pade gy^l^e .$9 .fche. Judy)
The petition presented to the judge contained information about
0
the name and age of the accused and the offence charged. Additional
information was given to the judge by the Advocate-Depute and the
accused's counsel. Table XXIX shows the information available to the
judge when ho aide his decision.
The judge was informed in all cases about the nature of the
accused's record and in 21 (38 per cent) of the cases a copy of the
criminal record was given to the Judge. A comparison of Tables X.IX
and XXXIII shows that with few exceptions the Advocate-Depute emphasised
the same characteristics of the accused's record as the procurator-
fiscal, and gave the same information to the judge which the procurator-
fiscal had given to him. Some of the omissions wore, however, inter¬
esting. Thus in 2 cases the Advocate-Bei/ate did not repeat
judge the procur tor-fiscal's allegation that there was a risk the
TABLE XXIX
Type of Information Made Available to Judge by A.D. and Counsel
Advocate-
Type of information depute Counsel Total
Ho. of Ho. of Ho. of
cases PttfMS,, ,
Criminal record given to judge 21 0 21
Length of record 30 16 46
Seriousneoa of previous sentences 2 5 7
decently rale .sod from prison 5 0 5
decent convictions 5 4 9
Possibility of re petition of offences 6 1 7
On bail 6 1 7
On licence/parole 5 0 5
Seriousness of charge 5 9 14
Circumstances of offence 11 0 11
Appearance of a cuaed for trial 4 IS 22
Interference with witnesses 5 4 9
67A 31P -
Bate of trial 12 0 12
Further ch rges ponding 3 0 3
Recovery of property 7 0 7
-ieview refused 3 0 3
Strong evidence 2 0 2
Admission by accused 4 0 4
Accused pleading not .guilty 0 10 10
Other 0 14 14
Address 4 27 31
Marital status 6 24 30
Dependents 5 12 17
Employment status 5 24 29
Family commitments 0 19 19
Third party will supervise 0 4 4
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TABLE XXX
Information nought by Judge from .avaeate—epute
Type of inforsaation Ho. of cases
Ask8 to sea record 3
description of record 3
Any recent record 2
Any similar convict!>na 1
I>ato of release from prison 1
Any admission from accused 3
Value of pro erty 1
Seasons for sheriff's refusal of bail 5
Type of trial procedure 4
Trial date 3
Address of accused 1
Paai ly circumstances 1
Acceptability of bail amount 2
Other 4
TASLB XXXI
Information ought by Judge from .caused* a counsel
Type of information No.
Address of the accused 4
Appearance of accused for trial 2
Trial plea 2
Anytliing in favour of the accused 2
Amount earned 5
Amount of bail offered 1
Acceptability of bail amount 1
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accused might not appear. Recovery of property end the strength
of evidence -.gainst the accused were also not brought to the
attention of the court.
dome information about "consnunity roots" was given by the
accused's counsel in 30 per cent of the cases. A comparison of
Tables XXIX and XXXIII shows that although the Advocate-Depute was
not fully informed about this type of information, he did have some
information in 36 per cent of the eases though he rarely gave such
information to the judge. Bearing in mind that in some cases infor¬
mation from defence counsel and the Advocate-Depute referred to the
same cases, it may be appreciated that the judge was far from fully
informed about 'community roots" factors. The judge was given no
information about the accused's address, marital status, dependents,
employment and family commitments in 47 por cent, 48 per cent, J2
per cent, 53 per cent and 67 per cent of the cases respectively.
Other information which was notable by its absence was the length
of time the accused was likely to spend in prison before trial, cds3ing
in 60 per cent of the oases and the ro sons for refusal or grant of bail
9
in the sheriff court, missing in 65 per cent of the cases.
(All) Acffl.t;l,oiaal ipiformafrApn sou fot fry tfro jpdgq
The judge took an active part in seeking information from both
counsel and continued the heoring in 2 cases to allow tha parties to
obtain further information about a disputed point. A continuation .90
granted in tho first caso to enable information requested by the judge
about the trial date to be supplied, and in the second case to allow
verification of information about the accused's family circumstances.
The judge sought information from the Advocate-Depute in 29 cases
and in 17 cases from counsel for tho accused. The type and frequency
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of the information requested is set out in fables XaX and XJCXI.
fhe information requested by the judge is interesting because it
is likely that it illustrates the type of inforsaation which the judge
considered important. It may bo noted that despite the judge's lack of
knowledge about community roots" factors only 10 per cent of his
questions were designed to elicit such information.
(iv) fhe inl'-u nco of the Information variables on the decision of the
iudg>a
Unlike fclio sheriff and bailie, tho judge in the appeal cases gave
reasons for his decisions in 16 per cent of the cases. Although the
reasons given c.-nnot bo considered ao necessarily reprasen'.stive of the
crucial factors in the decision, they give an important insight into the
factors which the decision-maker regards as acceptable to the public or
that part of the public, the court personnel, with whom he is concerned.
In fable ^.JQI we describe the type and frequency of the reasons
given, despite the fact that 30 per cent of the reasons referred to the
exercise of the sheriff's discretion,we discovered th'at in 65 per cent
10
of the oases the judge was not informed of the grounds on which the
Sheriff bas d his decision. If our research in the Edinburgh sheriff
court i3 to name extent representative, this lack of information may be
explained b/ the fact that reasons were given by the sheriff in loss
chan 2 per cent of the sample c;.ses. fhis is one of the considerations
11which influenced our recommendation mode below that both judges of
first inaton e and appelate judges should always give reasons for their
bail decisions, fhe criminal record of the accused was particularly
prominent and reference was made to this in 40 per cent of the cases
in which reasons ware given. From the context of the r .'fused petitions
it appeared that a lengthy criminal record has ier se become a round
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for refusal and was not considered merely an indicator of the
likelihood of the accused committing further offences while on bail.
It is notable that the judge made reference to "community roots"
factors in only 3 (6 per cent) of the cases and in 2 of the cases
only to Say that his decision had not been influenced by such factors.
Hie emphasis on factors relating to criminal record rather than
'community roots" was borne out by the statistical correlations which we
obtained using Yates* corrected ehi square.
•hen vfe tested a number of null hypotheses, that is, that
different information variables were not related to the judge's
decision, we were able to reject the null hypothesis with three
information variables. We concluded, therefore, that the judge's
decision to allow or refuse the accused's bail appeal was do pendent
12
on firstly, tho number of previous convictions. docondly, the
decision was dependent on whether the accused had ever been given a
13
custodial sentence and lastly, on whether the accused's record
showed that he had on another occasion abused his freedom on bail by
14
committing offences, by absconding or by tampering with evidence.
■UB) .3^1 appHc-jtion? penftta;
In bail applications ponding appeal tho judge was again prominent
as tho decision-maker but for reasons different from those applicable to
bail appeals.
In solemn procedure discretion to grant bail to a person
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appealing against conviction or sentence is vested by statute exclus-
15
ively in tho High Court of Justiciar/. Although a practice has
grown up whereby a representative of the Crown always attends,this is
considered to be purely for the convenience of the court which may
wish to request some information.
The information available to the judge from the petition was the
name and age of the accused and the grounds of appeal. Additional
information vas given to the judge by the accused's counsel.
We found a change in emphasis in the information given with
counsel stressing that the petitioner would serve a substantial period
of his sentence before the hearing of tho appeal, that the petitioner
had been successfully released before the trial and the grounds of
appeal, deference was also made to tho follov/ing types of information,
marital status, employment status, dependents and fixed address. In
only 1 case was information given about the accused's previous
convictions or lack of convictions.
Additional information sought by the judge was limited to the
date of the appeal hearing requested from the clerk of court and the
ability of the petitioner to raise the bail money, requested from his
counsel. The Advocate-Depute, represent in: the Crown, did not
contribute information until requested by the judge. 3ueh requests
occurred in 6 cases and related to tho grounds of appeal specified in
the petition. In 2 of these cases the Crown representative, referring
to his laei: of locus standi, declined to comment.
In tho 3 cases in which the judge gave a reason for his decision
it was based on the prima faclq merits of the appeal or the length
of time which the accused was liable to spend In custody before tho
appeal hearing.
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In addition to the non-accusatorial role of the Crown we identified
two striking differences between the attitude of the participants in
the bail application cases compared with the bail appeal cases. Firstly,
the preoccupation with cr.'minal record and fear of repetition of
offences which we described in the section covering bail appeals was
16
absent in the applications for bail made on behalf of convicted persons.
This may be because of the great difference between the criminal records
of the two types of petitioner, Hie convicted petitioners had no or
only minor previous convictions unlike the majority of the bail appeal
petitioners who had records of some length including serious convictions.
An explanation for this difference in the criminal background of the
17
petitioners is put forward below, Secondly, more prominence was given
to the merits of the convicted petitioner's grounds of appeal than was
given to the merits of the accused's defence to the charge in bail
appeals. 2his may be one oonsequonce of the application of the pres¬
umption of innocence. The presumption does not apply after conviction
and the demonstrandi therefore lies on the petitioner to show
cause why he should be released.
Cc) An evaluation of the information made available to tlx*
18
■•e argued above that to be satisfactory the information made
available to the decision-maker mu3t satisfy the tests of accuracy,
relevance and sufficiency.
v/e formed the opinion that the debate in the appeal situation
did not guarantee, to the same extent as the sheriff court procedure, the
accuracy of the information given to the judge. This was due entirely
to the fact that the Advocate-Depute and the counsel for the petitioner
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were not as fully informed nor did they have the same opportunity
of acquiring first hand knowledge as their sheriff court counterparts.
19
In the case of the Mvocate-bepute we have pointed out that in many
cases lie had little or no information about the family and background
of the accused and had to rely on the procurator-flocal'3 assessment
of what wa3 relevant infcnaation. His briefing, however, compared
favourably with that of the petitioner's counsel whose instruction by
2Q
tho accused's solicitor was in many cases, as we show below, very
inadequate. Counsel, of course, had no opportunity to supplement
his information by questioning the accused and he was also denied
access to the criminal record of the accused compiled by the police.
The remoteness of both counsel from the primary information
sources is perhaps inevitable as long as appeals are heard by the
High Court of Justiciary. , An improvement in the briefing of counsel
would, however, substantially increase the likelihood that accurate
information was given to the judge, as information about the same facts
would be available from two different sources.
Information is relevant, we believe, if it relates to the criterion
adopted by &he decision-maker. Great emphasis was placed by the judge
on certain factors relating to criminal record, and we found that this
type of information was well supplied by the Advocate-leputo. In many
c sos, however, counsel for the accused was unable to give or interpret
such information.
In the appeal situation we found that the Advocate—»eoute and
the accused's counsel always adopted an accusatorial role. It may be
21
recalled that in many cases in the sheriff court there was no contest,
but where a contest was joined the information made available to the
sheriff increased. This was true also of the High Court of Justiciary
where wo noted that in the characteristic conflict situation of the
appeal the judge was given a much greater amount of information in
22
comparison to the sheriff. In theory this contest ought to have
resulted in sufficient information being male available to tho judge but
as the op.osing counsel themselves were not fully informed the
information made available was liable to be insufficient, To some
extent the judge coped with this by adjourning cases to enable counsel
to obtain further information considered necessary by the judge. We
did not note any cases, like the continuation cases in the sheriff
court,where ne party failed completely to contest the case, although
on a fov? occasions counsel for the accused did not press tho appeal
with any enthusiasm. Indeed in 2 cases counsel admitted to the judge
that he considered the appeal to bo hopeless. Not surprisingly the
judge did not grant these petitions.
The presentation of and source of information about applications
for bail after conviction differed considerably from the pre-trial bail
appeals. Although the Advocate-Depute attended, he was not legally
entitled to contribute to the discussions unless asked some question by
the judge. Because of this there was no double check of the accuracy of
the information. The Advocate-depute did receive some information about
the petitioner and the circumstances of the case and in the sample
cases this information was not contradictory to the information given
to the judge. HVen if the Advocate-depute had possessed conflicting
information we believe that he would not on his own initiative have
pointed out the discrepancy.
Because there were so few of those cases in the
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sample (7) we were unable to draw any reliable conclusions about the
relevance or sufficiency of the information given to the judge.
U) gq ^5 mod,QX
The model of bail decision-making in the High Court of
Justiciary differed considerably from those described as applicable
to other procedural stages. In Figure VI we represent the judge as
arbiter between the competing su gestions but illustrate his frequent
acceptance of the submissions made by the Advocate-Depute.
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This pattern, as when it occurred at the sheriff court level,
may to some extent be due to the fact that the Advocat ^-Depute in
comparison to the accused's counsel selected information which was more
likely to influence the decision-maker. The contribution of another
factor is,however, perhaps even more important. In the appeal
situation, the judge is not making ;m original bail decision but ha3 to
decide whether the judge of an inferior court hus wrongly exorcised his
discretion. The appelate judge is unlikely to conclude that the
discretion has been wrongly exercised -where the sheriff has refused
or granted bail according to the accepted criteria. It is arguable that
the Crown were more realistic than the accused,who raised 95 per cent
of the bail appeals,and the dominant position of the Crown in the
appeal pattern merely reflects this* We are of the opinion that if
the Crown appealed a much greater number of bail decision this
dominant positi-n ?/ould be reduced and would possibly disappear*
Counsel for the accused was necessarily in a dominant position
when presenting applications for bail after conviction because the




however, does not in our view explain the high success rate of
petitions raised on behalf of convicted persons. The success, as we
argue below> is best explained in terms of the non-availability of
legal aid for cases considered to have a poor chance of success.
(l) The Briofin: of the Advocate- ueoute
The Advocate-Depute, unlike the procurator-fiscal,had no first
hand knowledge of the case but had to rely on information made
available to him by the procurator-fiscal of the sheriffdom from which
the appeal originated. The procurator-fiscal was required to make a
report to the Crown office and it was this report, together with a
copy of the petitioner's criminal record,which was given to the
Advocate-Depute by one of the Crown assistants.
Co found that with the exception of information obtainable from
the criminal records, the Advocate-Depute did not always have full
information on which to base a decision using traditionally accepted
bail criteria.
From Table XaXIII it may be seen that the Advocate-Depute was
informed of the c reumstances of the case in only 5 cases. Due to this
ho was not able to make an independent assessment of, for example, the
risk to the public or victim. Similarly he hud to rely on the
procurator-fiscal'e assessment of the risk of non-appearance or
interference with witnesses. In the majority, though not all of the
cases in which the procurator-fiscal based an objection on these ;rounds,
he also specified the information on which his bjection was based# But
the assumpti >n c nnot be made that this represented full Informanti n
about the f cts, as different evaluations of the relevance of the
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available information may have been made by the various procurators-
fiscal. Regarding1 information about the family and background of the
accused which bears some relevance to the "community roots" criteria, we
found that such information was available only to a limited extant. In
4 of the cases in which the Advocate-^eaute did have this information he
challenged tho submissions of the accused's counsel. The challenge
revealed serious discrepancies in information ranging, for exacnle,
from counsel's submission that the accused, was aged fifty and married
with throe children whom she looked after hile her husband was at work
to the Advooote-depute's reply that the v/oman was aged twenty-two,
24
divorced with no dependents. the Advocate-depute was handicapped,
however, because in JO per cent of the cases he had no information about
two or more variables relating to the family and background of tho
25
accused. He was thus often unable to contest effectively or verify
information given b' the accused's counsel.
TABLE XXXIII
Infomat ion Made Available to tho Advocate-depute by the 2.F.
Type of information Ho. of cases
Circumstances of offence 5
disk of non-appearance •5
itisk of interference with witnesses 2
decently released from prison 5
On bail 0
On licence/parole 5
Further charges pending 4
Admission of charges by accused 4











(4) Legal loorojentatlon and Legal Aid
(a) Le,-?al ro reuentation and the briefin: of counsel
All the petitioner:; in the sample were represented by counsel at
the hearing of the petition. Solicitors have no right of audience before
the High Court of Justiciary and must therefore instruct counsel to
present tho petition. This, of course, involves additional expense.
Provision is made, however, in the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 19^7 to meet
in certain circumstances the expense of both the solicitor's and
26
counsel's foes out of the legal aid fund. The accused as a matter of
practice was not brought from prison to attend. We raised the question
with court officials of the procedure adopted if the petitioner wished
to represent himself. This we were informed was a situation which had
never arisen but it was considered competent with tho consent of the
court.
In bail appeals counsel instructed to a pear for an accused raast
rely for his infozonation on the instructing solicitors. Counsel does
not interview the accused and only in rare circumstances would he have
any knowled ;e of a case before receiving instructions.
•hile raiting outside chambers before the hearings we noted that
counsel on occasion consulted the Advocate-Jonute or th© Crown assistant
to discover the nature of the accused's criminal record. The clerk of
court was also consulted, in some cases about the most basic information
that is the charge against the accused. This pre-henring experience
made us suspect that counsel might be inadequately briefed. -e
decided, however, that because of the number of different people
involved a.;d tho fact that they often formed separate groups engcged
in private consultation, it would be impossible to attempt to record
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consistently these requests for Information. Another practice which we
noted but were unable to record with any degree of accuracy was the
handing over of instructions by counsel who left to attend other
business. Counsel who received the instructions often made his first
acquaintance with the case, therefore, only a few minutes before
presenting the petition.
Attendance at the hearings confirmed our suspicion that acne
counsel wore inadequat-ly briefed. In 38 per cent of the cases counsel
prefaced their pleadings with remarks indie tin that little inform¬
ation was available to them or admitted their lack of information in the
face of judicial questioning or representations by the Advocate-.Cemite.
This percentage is we would argue an underroprosent r»t i on. Some counsel
no doubt managed to supplement their information outside chambers and
others may have been poorly informed but able to avoid drawing attention
to this at the hearing.
fhe 38 per cent comprised 4 cases in which counsel in Ms
pleadings said he had little information available, 5 cases in which
the family circumstances of the accused were left in question and 3
cases in v7hich ignorance of the accused's record was admitted. In one
of these cases the Lord Justice-Clork was very critical about the
ignorance of counsel and the instructing agont who had failed to supply
27
this information. In the remaining 4 cases counsel admitted ignorance
of the charge libelled, the existence of a a.A plea of guilty, the
sentenced imposed on a co-accused and threatening letters to a witness.
In only 3 cases where counsel admitted hie inadequate information
was the oetition of the accused .granted. Ihic is a very low success rate
(14 per cent) but the success rate for the sample was also very low
(17 per cant). It cannot, however, be c.included that the admitted
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inadequacy of the information was irrelevant to the outcome of the case.
Of the 3 successful cases* the Alvocate-Depute withdrew his
objection to bail in one, and in another he was able to supply the
information requested by the judge about the family circumstances and
address of the accused. In the third case, counsel for tho accused
was unable to supply the information about the income of the accused. The
judge who had requested this information set an amount for bail without
this information and without, theroforo, any knowledge of whether the
accused would be able to raise bail. »'e concluded that in these cases
bail was granted in spite of inadequately informed counsel. Indeed we
woujd aigue that one reason for tho high dismissal rate of the petitions
may bo the f et that counsel were inadequately briefed. Another possible
23
contributory reason is considered below.
Despite a lack of information in some cases, counsel for the aco-
used did give much information to the judge. The frequency and type of
information given was described in Table XXIX. de noted that counsel,
like the solicitor in the -sheriff court, emphasised "community roots"
factors rather than factors tending to show that the accused, despite
any criminal record, was a good bail risk and unlikely to abuse his lib¬
erty. Thus 59 P©£ cent of the information given by counsel related to
"community roots" and 31 per cent rol .tod to criminal record. In contrast
13 per cent of tte information given by the Advocate-Depute related to
29
"community roots" and 67 per cent related to criminal record. "Conm>-
unity roots" factors were not disregarded by the judge but it is clear
from the information requested and the resons given by the judge that
greater importance was placed on other criteria. It is also clear that
the Advocate-Depute, unlike counsel for the accused, concentrated on the
information which was given i>riority by the judge.
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(fr) ffyt£lftfril;Mty of.Aywft
Where an appeal is taken against a bail decision in a ease which
is to bo tried by solemn procedure, legal aid is not available to the
accused automatically as it is when the accused is in custody until
30
committed until liberation in due course of law. Legal aid is made
available for bail appeals, however, if the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is unable without undue financial hardship to himself or his
31
dependents to meet the expense. The only criteria to be satisfied is
this financial one and the petitioner does not need to show that it is
in the interests of justice that legal aid should be made available.
In cases to be tried by ouramaxy procedure legal aid is also
automatically available to an accused in the early procedural stages
32
until the conclusion of the pleading diet. For a bail appeal, however,
legal aid is made available only if the accused satisfies the court
that it is in the interests of justice that legal aid should be made
available.
Legal aid is never automatically available for applications for
bail ending appeal against conviction or sentence. To receive legal
aid for such petitions the petitioner must satisfy the financial criteria
and satisfy the Supreme Court Committee firstly, that he has substantial
grounds of appeal against conviction or sentence and secondly, that it
is reasonable that he should receive legal aid in the particular
34
circumstances of the case.
For the legally aided cases the success rate for bail appeals
relating to petition oases »a3 15 por cent compared with a 75 per cent
success rate for summary cases and 1CC per cent success rate for bail
applications after conviction. It would appear, therefor:.', that in the
latter categories only thosewith a strong'ease were^enabled by-legal
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aid to present their petiti >ns. Although this prevents the pre,st¬
ation of petitions which oven counsel admit arc hopeless, which happe¬
ned in two of the bail appeals in solemn procedure, it means that many
of the boil decisions are effectively decided outwith the High Court
of Justiciary. It also means that persons who are to be dealt r?ith
under summary oroeedure, who in most cases pose less of a threat to
the saf ty of the public, are .given loos op ortunity to petition for
bail. The quest! n must be considered whether accused in summary
cases should, assisted by legal aid, bo given more opportunity to
obtain bail, or whether some discretion should bo given to the court
to refuse legal aid for "hopeless" bail appeals relating to c sea to
be tried by solemn procedure.
In Table X CCTV we sho.v the number of eases an which legal aid was
granted in respect of the potition and the result of the petition.
Unfortunately some uncertainty attaches to these legal aid figures
because it is not clear to ./hat extent officials from different sheriff¬
doms followed a consistent practice in recording thi3 data. Any mis¬
representation is we think likely to have resulted in an inflated /lumber
of legal aid c .see recorded. The difference in the number and success
rate of the various types of petitions, wo would argue, may be
accounted for to some oxtent by cliffer /nc :o in the availability of
legal aid.
(ft) c93t of ipp,l roprqoe^htiQft
'Jherc legal aid was refused on the ground that it was not
necessary in the interests of justice, the cost to the accused of
financing the appeal himself may in moot cases have been dissuasive if
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not prohibitive# It may be recalled that we found th st some
accused experienced difficulty In raising very low aaounto of money
for bail. It id also relevant to point out that 54 per cent of the
accused in the sample were unensloyod at the time of their arrest.
?or the purposes of legal aid, the fees for the instructing
solicitor's work in relation to an intarim liberation petition are set
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at a sum not exceeding 16 pounds. There is not aot sua for the work
involved in bail appeals as this will usually form part of the
solicitor's work in preparing the dofonce. Counsel's foes aro said to
be 'ouch 0UJ3 as appears to the Lrs? ociety to represent fair resaunar-
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ation for the work actually and reasonably done.1 Correspondence
with the Law Society revealed that the sums paid were in the region of
4 pounds to counsel and 5 to 10 pounds to tho instructing solicitor for
each appeal•
TA3T.E XXXIV
Typo and desalt of Petitions for which Legal Aid was Oranted or liefused
Type of petition Petition Granted Petition defused
3ail append
( sunaa ry)
Legal aid 3 1
No legal aid 0 3
Bail an >eal
( soleaxo)
Legal aid 6 33
Bo legal aid 0 6
Crown bail appeal Legal aid 2 1
No legal aid 0 0
Bail after
conviction
Legal aid ^ 0
No legal aid 0 0
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(3^ ~jl;q liaolloatlone and ion ,»-.utmcoa o£ the Decisions of the
Cqqrt 4
U;. v>,9 i«m:r for ml
ii< :l\9 ff'-xfflt of EUftiffl r^j^d
It my be roraonberad that for reasons discussed in Chapter III
the High Court of Justiciary may not release a person merely on his
promise to appear but must fix a sum of money as the amount of bail or
caution. In fable MXV wo show the amount of money required and the
offence charged,
TA3LH XXX7
Amount of Honey Required and Offence Charged










25 Assault and Jobbery* Assault (5)8 Death
Perjury 2 dangerous driving 6
30 Att. murder* Perjury 2
Although the average amount of bail set was higher than that set
"5Q
by the sheriff court, it may be appreciated that the bail amounts wore
still low in comparison to the gravity of the charges for which other
legal systems set much higher bail figures.
In sotting the amount of bail th© judge tended to sot the amount
himself rather than fix an amount suggested by th© accused's counsel.
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In view of this there was no guarantee that the petitioner would be
able to red so the amount 3et. Some inconsistency in judicial approach
was apparent in this natter as in one case counsel, who said he left
the amount of boil to the discretion of the judge, was told that it was
counsel's .responsibility to suggest an amount. The judge, like his
counterpart in the sheriff court, also consulted with the Advocate-
Depute as to the acceptability of the bail amount. 3uch consultations
occurred in 3 of the cases. This led to agreement between counsel in
the first case and to the setting of the amount suggested by the
Advocate-Depute in the second case. In the third case the Advooate-
Deputo made we would argue the realistic comment that if the accused
was being released the amount did not matter.
It appears, therefore, that the High Court of Justiciary applied
a rough tariff linked to the seriousness of the offence. This had the
double disadvantage that the bail amounts if they were to be found could
not reflect the gravity of the crime, and yet low as the amounts were,
there wns no guarantee that the accused would be able to raise the money.
39In at least one case where bail was granted on appeal the accused was
unable to raise the money and regained in custody until his trial.
In the case of bail applications after conviction the amount
fixed v/as similar to the bail amounts fixed for comparable offences.
There was no evidence to suggest that as the petitioner had been conv¬
icted and no longer enjoyed the presumption of innocence higher amounts
of money were required.
In 6 of the 7 cases the judge suggested and fixed the amount of
bail,although in 3 cases he inquired whether the petitioner would be
able to raise the money. The Advoeato-Depute was not consulted about
this matter in any of the cases.
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(U) fftaflfrre tiaU
The amount of raoney sat as bail was not accepted by an official
of tho High Court of Justiciary but had to be found to the satisfaction
of the sheriff clerk of the sheriffdom from which the appeal
originated, fho discussion in Chapter VII is, therefore, applicable
also to bail granted by the High Court of Justiciary, Officials
stated that the sheriff clerk generally waited until he had received a
copy of tho successful petition before he accepted the bail money but,
if delay was foreseen, it was considered that informal communication of
the result by the Justiciary Office vrould persuade the sheriff clerk
to proceed.
0i< ir\ QHStpftY frefoira qofiifeqq,?
After the refusal of bail there was often a considerable time
lag before any bail appeal was decided. The longest delays occurred
prior to the raising of the appeal particularly where the bail decision
was reviewed under the 19&3 Act. From Table XXXVI it may be seen that
the average or mean time token to hear a bail appeal after it wa3
raised was 6.3 days and in bail application cases 3.7 days. This
comparos unfavourably with the maximum of 3 days^® within which Crown
appeals against the grant or the amount of bail must be hoard. There is
no maximum time within which an accused's bail appeal or bail application
after conviction must bo decided. For those refused bail after an
appeal tho average total time spent in custody was 77 days. For those
granted boil after an appeal the average time spent in custody was
35 days. The accused who were eventually released on bail would have
been liable to spend on average another 24 days in custody if bail had
not been granted and raised.
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T..3 a xxxvi
Time Spent in Cu3t ody Until Appeal was -decided
Bail Appeals Bail after Conviction
Average tine No. of Average time No. of
(days) cases (days; CQ30S
Time taken to raise roetition 3 40 6.7 7
Tine taken when bail decision 24 15 - -
reviewed
lino taken to hear oetition 6.3 40 3.7 7
Time taken when bail decision 6.7 15 - -
reviewed
(c, A success of the bail decisions
All the accused who were granted and raised bail appeared to
answer the charge. '<«e were unable to obtain information about whether
they had abused their liberty in any way, for example, by committing
offences while on bail.
Only a small number (1? per cent; of the bail appeals made by
accused, however, were granted and this raises the question whether
more bail appeals could have been ranted successfully. It is true that
the appeal w s refused in no cas. where a non-custodial sentence was
A ^
imposed. Nevertheless about 52 per cent of those refused bail on
a >pe; 1 were sentenced to 6 months or less in custody and 17 per cent were
acquitted.^ «e argue below^ th t where the act for which the accused
was bx*ought before the court is not likely to be considered serious
enough to warrant a long terra of impris anient then the risk to the public
of the accused abusing his period of freedom is not sufficient to
justify depriving the accused of his pre-trial liberty. In view of
this wo would argue that bail night have been granted successfully in
a greater number of cases.
01? U?grx Tlld Villi PdOM THU CIU;3-. ;:j IIi,AHIHJ5
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(1) A -l.cusslon of the Merits of the Private He aJin?
The private nature of the bail appeals and applications for bail
after conviction stems from considerations similar to those which affect
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committal proceedings in serious cases, that is, the desire to prevent
possible prejudice to the case of the prosecution or defence.
Prejudice may arise because representations about bail are not
governed by the rules of evidence which apply at trial and therefore
statements may be made whioh might not be proved or might be excluded
in formal tidal proceedings. Counsel at the hearing of the bail appeal
may also reveal some factor which night prejudice the outcome of the
case if it was published or oven if heard by potential witnesses
present at the hearing.
•e found in practice, that in only 9 per cent of the cr:ses could
the publication of the information voiced in chambers be construed as in
any wa potentially prejudicial to the prosecution case. Potentially
prejudicial information we interpreted, for example, as information
given by the Advocate-Depute about the finding of incriminating letters
in the possession of the accused and details of further charges which
wore boing prepared against tho accused. In 25 per cent of the cases
we construed the information as potentially prejudicial to the accused.
In these cases the information ranged from the unsubstantiated allegations
about the accused's involvement in I.P.A. activities,to arguments
about a statement made to the procurator-fiscal by the accused and which
his counsel submitted would be inadmissable at the trial. In many cases,
ho /ever, there was 3ome discussion about the criminal record of the
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accused and this might also be construed as potentially prejudicial to
the recused.
Although the private hearings did effectively prevent potential
prejudice they also had some less desirable con3 quences.
For example, the inevitable secrecy which has developed
su--rounding the deliberations in chambers which ia broken only by an
occasional reported case. This may cause a situation to develop in
which the sheriff court personnel are unaware of the factors considered
influential by the High Court of Justiciary. <'• e did find some evidence
which we discuss belo.v, that in some respects the practice of the High
Court of Justiciary differed from that expected by the personnel of the
inferior courts and differed also from the law as outlined in the
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reported cases. This problem, however, could be alleviated and
night p osibly be overcome by effective feed-back through formal or
informal lines of coanaiiiicatian. in the courts.
A different line of objection may be bused on the argument that
the chambers hearings offend against the legal ideal "that justice
should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done".^ The chambers hearing takes place in the absence of the
i»7
accused. Sith accused imprisoned in different parts of -Gotland
attendance is arguably impractical n the grounds of expense and
inconvenience. Unless, however, counsel takes special pains to acquaint
the instructing solicitors of the deliberations at the hearing and the
solicitors convey this to the accused, the accused will merely be
informed that his petition has been dismissed or granted. Interested
friends and relatives of the accused are also excluded from attendance.
To allow justice to be seen to be done we fa .our an innovation which
would give the accused the ri :ht to request that hi3 appeal be heard in
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open court and the choice of lifting or Implementing reporting
restrictions.^ i'his choice would allow the accused to decide
whether his Cass was best aerv d by publicity or privacy# To
safeguard the Crown's position we would support a right of objection
on the basis of prejudice to the Crown case.
In view of the fact that bail applications in summary cases are
heard in open court without any undesirable consequences it would
appear that private hearings are nob a pro-requisite to promote the
free oxchunge of information. It must be remembered also that in the
case of appeals relating to suraraaiy bail applications the question of
bail has previously been considered in open court.
( -,/ Jqdftclql Djpta and thq -Tpquiqqt^h
On a number of occasions we heard the sheriff state the view
that in some serious cases the bail decision should be left to the
High Court of Justiciary before which court the case would come for
trial. This was stated alao by a sheriff in a case in which a bail
appeal petition was later lodged. At the hearing of the appeal, counsel
for the accused referred to this statement. '2he statement was critic¬
ised by the judge who emphasised that the sheriff should not abdicate
his responsibility but make his own deoioion. Vj'ithout a reported
decision or a practice directive, ho>7evor, it is unlikely that sheriffs
will beoorae aware of the attitude of the High Court of Justiciary on
this matter. This is particularly unfortun- to as, according to the
views given expression to by the appeal judge, it may be more
difficult to succeed on appeal than on application to the sheriff.
This follows from the position adopted by the High Court of Justiciary
that in an appeal the onus of proof is reversed and the petitioner
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must show that tho sheriff wrongly exercised his discretion.
omo ofchor oxpreasions f opinion wore also of interest,
deference was nado above to judicial displeasure with the >ractice
whereby full details of the accused's criminal record .cere not .given
to tho accused's counsel and in some esses no details at all were given.^
There was alao some indication that tho .judge would perhaps not be
adverse to some fuller inquiry into the merits of a ca30. Indeed, in
one case dissatisfaction with tho information available was expressed,
as it was thought that the matter could bo dealt with properly only by
judicial consideration of the full precognitions.
Lfr) erooixioti-on of Ipnqqeuw
In tho reported case of MachooO, v. ri ±rt it was stated that
"the matter of printing bail was not a question which raises issues
50
regarding tho presumption of innocence. Thio view reappears again
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in the reported cues and in academic writings. *®e found, however,
that in the privacy of tho chambers bail hearings the presumption of
innocence was treated as a relevant consideration by both the judge and
opposing counsel, dpoclfic reference wis made to tho presumption in 5
cases and tho context made it clear that the presumption was not
regarded aa mearaly a meaningless formula. In cm case the judge, in
rejecting the argument of the Advocate-heput© that appeals wore never
allowed when tho offonoe charged was committed while on bail, pointed
out that such a submission was contrary to tho presumption of innocence.
In another two cases the judge said that in view of the presumption of
innocence he was reluctant to refuse liberty and he inquirad of the
Advocate-b©put© whether any statements had been mad® by the petitioners.
In reply the information was given that statements admitting guilt had
bean made. Counsel for the petitioners said that objections would
be taken to the admission of these statements at the trial because they
were obtained under duress and submitted that he was entitled to rest
on the presumption of innocence. Counsel for the accused in another
case similarly rested on the presumption of innocence. In the last
case the judge, on receiving information from the Advocate-Depute that
52
a Section 31 letter had been tendered, pointed out that this was
rather awkwrd for the accused's c. se and based his dismissal of the
bail appeal partly an this ground.
Che application of the presumption of innocence does not
necessarily load as some judges and writers have thought to the concl¬
usion that all persons must be allowed the liborty of the innocent.
Because they have found such a conclusion unacceptable they have
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argued that the presumption does not apply to the question of bail.
We have demonstrated, however, that this is not barns out in practice.
It is possible we would argue to recogn. so the applicability of this
presumption to the question of bail without reaching the conclusion
which has been found unacceptable.
The dffect of the presumption is wo think to make bail available
to an accused even if any evidence adduced tends to indicate that he
is guilty of the offence charged. A full inquiry into the merits of a
case is not now accepted practioe b t the presumption ensures that a
person pleading not guilty will not be treatod as guilty on incomplete
evidence without a full trial, fhe benefit of the presumption may be
lost, however, if the accused indicates officially that ha is pleading
guilty, for example, by tendering a S. 31 letter. Although presumed
innocent and therefore prima facie entitled to bail there are consider¬
ations of public interest, for ex;.;.pie, whether the accused is likely
■*y 1 :■'} jp
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to interfere with tho process of justice which amy
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"Although ideally the system of low
is based on equal justice for all men, in
reality this is not alv/ays so. ihere are
times when the scales of justice are
weighted or tipped in f vour of the rich
and the "connected", and even at times
in favour of the guilty, while the poor,




"... the system of bail was never
intended a3 a denial of justice, as a
sentence before trial. It was
intended as a device to av.he sure that








Most of the reforms which we recommend were prompted by defects
which we identified in the practical operation of the law rather than
by defects in the common law and statutory provisions regulating bail*
This was in some measure due to the fact that the letter of the law
was sometimes distorted in practice* Also important, however, was the
fact that in many circumstances the operation of the law resulted in
undesirable consequences which could not be deduced merely from an
examination of the legal framework.
In this final chapter we attempt to draw together the discussion
and findings of previous chapters in order to present our major
recommendations.
(1) %U
Because we considered it important that the bail decision should
be ba ed on accurate, relevant and sufficient information"' and that the
interests of both the accused and the public should be fully protected,
we were concerned to identify any defects in bail decision-making. We
looked at bail decisions, therefore, not in isolation but in their
organisational setting.
There is no evidence to suggest that the patterns of decision¬
making which we identified wore peculiar to bail decisions, or even
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peculiar to decisions made by official responsible for the administration
of criminal justice. The decision-making patterns and their functional
or dysfunctional effects, therefore, may be of some interest to'those
more generally concerned with organisational decision-making.
At the police level the general pass pattern,^ which we identified
using Guttman scalogram analysis, effectively reduced the opportunity
for the exercise of discration. This was due to the fact that the police
decision-maker had merely to assess whether certain criteria, settled
in advance, were satisfied. He did not have to evaluate the weight to
ba attached to the different variables. In the general pass pattern,
failure to satisfy any of the criteria was sufficient to prompt a
negative decision. In addition, the criteria were specific rather than
vague and open-ended and this reduced further the discretionary area.
'The police decision-maker did not suffer from lack of information.
A great deal of information was available to the police, and in all the
sample cases the d cision-maker had information concerning the variables
7fhich were considered relevant. Indeed, because of the nature of the
docision pattern, it would be impossible to reach a decision without
5
such information.
Ifte general pass pattern is, in our opinion, well suited to any
organisation in -which it is desired to encourage uniformity of decisions,
or to minimise the decision-maker's discretion and hence minimise the
possibility of abuse of ouch discretion. There are, however, limits
on the extent to which narrov/ criteria, laid down in advance, can deal
satisfactorily 'with future cases find adherence to the criteria may
result in "hard cases". There is also the danger that when the
criteria become outdated the decision-maker will have little or no
experience of the effect of applying new solutions.
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At the police level, these dangers uvre minimised because the
police had the power to release only persons charged with minor
offences, and they appeared to form a fairly homogenous group. <e were
in favour of the general pass pattern in view of the restrictions it
placed on police discretion. If, however, the categories of person
eligible for bail were widened to any great extent wq .are doubtful
whether the same decision-making pattern could bo successfully retained.
The danger of "hard cases' would increase while the necessary widening
of criteria would erode the restrictions on discretion.
The non-consensual suggestion-acceptance pattern which was
typical of the burgh court^ was one in which the official decision¬
maker, the magistrate, rubber stamped the decision of another official.
This may be functional in some organisations, in that it protects the
official who effectively make the decision from undue influence and
criticism, or because it preserves the formal hierarchy while reducing
the workload of the more important officials. The existeiice of such a
pattern in the burgh court and in some cases, notably the continuation
7
cases in the sheriff court, i3 however, open to serious criticism.
In these cases the effective decision-maker was th© prosecutor and
the interests of the accused were not sufficiently protected. In the
burgh court, the lack of protection was due to the fact that almost all
accused lacked legal representation for which legal aid was not avail¬
able. In the sheriff court the duty solicitor made no attempt to
obtain release for the accused. This regrettable failure an the part
of the solicitor may, as we argued above,8 be due to the solicitor's
experionce of judicial sympathy to the prosecutor's notion at this
procedural stags, and the absence of any right of a jpeal•
The official decisionmaker had no information on which to base a
decision on the merits of a particular cr.se, ncr generally did the
prosecutor give any Information from which tho decisionmaker could
assess the merits of his motion, -e consider below some possible
9
improvements.
'The same objections do not apply to a similar pattern, the
consensual surestiondecision pattern which often occurred in the
10
sheriff court. In this pattern also the sheriff rubber-stamped a
suggestion when he had little or no information available. There wa3,
however, an important difference in that the suggestion re resented an
agreement between officials, the procurator-fiscal and th.Q solicitor
who ..ere appointed to protect the different interests involved. -here
the interests of the affective decision-makersare together congruous
with fcho interests of the official decision-maker, as they are in bail,
11
we have argued that it is not a defoct if the official decision¬
maker does not have sufficient information about the relevant variables,
provided the effective deciaion-makers -ire so informed.
It is open to question, however, whether in the bail situation
the rubber-stamping of the agreement serves any justifiable function.
It does assure that responsibility for the release or imprisonment of
the accused is vested in the sheriff, which is we think appropriate
when the representatives of the different interests cannot agree, -'here
agreement has been reached, however, waiting for the automatic accept¬
ance by the sheriff could cause avoidable delay in the release of the
accu3od, without any countervailing benefits. It is doubtful if much
delay was caused in the sample cases, because the solicitor generally
interviewed the .accused only a short time before the accused1 s appear¬
ance in court. If there was any agreement reached between the
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solicitor and procurator-fiscal, it was reached after this interview
and in many cases agreement was reached in court. But if the
12
solicitor and procur".tor-fiscal had, as we recommend below, an
earlier opportunity to discuss a case, then the practice of waiting
for the sheriff's approval would cause delay. In such circumstances
we would advocate dispensing with the sheriff's consent. a do not
think that this would require any change in the law because although
discretion to [grant bail is vested in the sheriff, the Crown also has
wide powers of release.^
The last major pattern which wo identified wa3 typical of the hail
appeals in tho High Court of Justiciary"^ and also occurred to a more
•r?;
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limited extent in the sheriff court. "Phis pattern was distinguished by
the fact that the officials representing the different interests adopted
their traditional adversary positions, and gave information to the decision¬
makers to support their opposing motions, The official decision-maker for
the first time took an active part. He decided between the competing sug¬
gestions and in some cases sought further information on which to base a
decision. Lawyers of the common law tradition have long proclaimed the
merits of the adversary system. They believe that if the strongest possible
case is argued in support of the different interests, then the judge is in
16
the best possible position to make his decision. Obviously such a
pattern can only be successful where the decision-maker .iocs not have
to assess any interests which ara not represented. Success also depends
on the representatives of the different interests being fairly equally
matched in proficiency and on their being fully briefed. Although
the bail representations in the sheriff and High Court of Justiciary were
made by qua ifiod lawyers, their briefing was in some cases far from
adequate. e criticised in particular the briefing of counsel at the
17
appeal stage.
As in this study, inadequate information has been highlimited as
4
a serious problem in many bail research projects in other jurisdictions.
The remedy which has been applied with considerable success in
America, and by which we are very impressed, is the 'Vera "community
19roots" scheme which involved the use of information sheets. This
scheme was designed to give information to the judges which was
independently verified, and which was proved by experiment to be
relevant to the criterion binding the courts, namely whether the
defendant would appear for trial.
In Sngland, there has been considerable support for the introd¬
uction of similar information sheets to overcome the problem of inadeq¬
uately briefed magistrates, ^ost recently this has been advocated in a
Home Office report, although it is suggested that the forms would only
provide information which*
"would in the great aajox'ity of cases be no more than could be
elicited from the defendant himself in court, but it would take up a
groat deal of scarce court time to obtain the information by questioning
an often inarticulate defendant in court ... The information on the
form would be confined to the defendant's community ties. It would
not cover details of his previous convictions} we consider that it
would be preferable for this information to continue to be provided
by the police who are in the best position to obtain it quickly and
accurately".20
Any improvements to be gained by the implementation of such a proposal
would we think be illusory. The police, who may both investigate and
prosecute in England, cannot be considered independent. The accused
would be much better served by free legal representation. In addition,
granted that the magistrates are inadequately informed, there has been
no attempt to find out what missing information is considered relevant
by the magistrates# There would be little gained by supply.: ng
information about the defendant's community ties if this information
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is considered irrelevant, or of ninor importance,by the magistrates.
There may be a case for arguing that the existing criteria used by the
•English courts should be changed to the criteria of community ties,
but such a far reaching refers has not been put forward.
The lack of independent verific tion and inad .quate concern about
the type of information which is considered relevant by the magistrates
are we insist major defects of tho -nglish proposals. ":e also have
reservations about whether the use of information sheets is the best
method of putting information before the court. In both .merica and
England, free legal representation is often not available to the
defendant at the bail hearings. This, is not true of Scotland as, in
the overwhelming majority of cases in which a decision about bail is
made, the accused has free legal representation. The provision of
information sheets by some third party does not fit easily into the
21
traditional accusatorial system. This system, as we have discussed,
should provide a check on the accuracy and sufficiency of the information
given to the judge. It is true that reports such as social background,
borstal and medical reports are regularly given within tho context of
this system but these reports are distinguishable, in that they are
prepared by persons, who have specialised braining and knowledge not
possess d by the prosecutor or solicitor. <e are unable to see any
advantages in introducing information sheets to the Scottish bail hearing,
even if the information was relevant and independently compiled. Indeed,
it is difficult to conceive what status they could be given. If, as
might well happen, information given by the solicitor or procurator-
fiscal differed from the information on the information shoot, it is
unlikely that preference could be given to the information sheet rather
than the representations of the prosecutor or solicitor, as this would
make a mockery of such representations. In our opinion the best method
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of protecting the accused and ensuring that informed bail decisions are
made is to improve the system of legal representation at bail hearings.
This would not always result in the judge being fully informed where the
22
solicitor and procurator-fiscal agreed. But where the different
interests are protected and the effective decision-makers are fully
informed, the official decision-maker's lack of information is not in
our opinion a defect.
••'here there is disagreement, however, the operation of the
adversary system should ensure that relevant information is made avail¬
able to the judge. »e found that, with some exceptions, this happened
2>
in practice. The system of legal representation in .cotland is,
nevertheless, open to improvement. Major defects which we pointed out
were firstly, the lack of legal representation in the burgh court, and
OA
we emphasised the great need for legal representation in this court.
Secondly, we criticised the passive role played by the solicitor at some
bail hearings, especia. ly the continuation cases, which we thought might
be improved if the accused was given a right of appeal t that procedural
25
stage. Thirdly, we argued that the briefing of the prosecution and
2(3
defence representatives was inadequate. Generally the procurator-fiscal
and advocate-Depute were very well informed. They did h we less inform¬
ation about the family and background of the accused than other matters
but this information,and indeed any other information, could easily be
provided by giving appropriate instructions to the police in the case of
the procurator-fiscal, and instructions to the various procurators-
fiscal in the case of the Advo te-Depute. The briefing of the solicitor
appeared to be reasonable. One improvement which we suggested was that
the solicitor should have a right to receive a copy of the police record,
identical to the one made available to the procurator-fiseal•^ «e were
however very critical, as wag one of the judges, of the briefing of
267♦
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counsel at the appeal stage# In many cases the advocate appeared to
have received little or no information from the instructing solicitor and
this was not improved by the practice of handing over instructions to
another advocate a few minutes before the bail appeal. It is difficult
to see how this could be improved as judicial criticism did not produce
any noticeable improvement. Presumably, however, if judicial criticism
was sufficiently frequent and severe, counsel would ensure that they
were adequately briefed. The provision of a copy of the accused's
criminal record to the solicitor might help as this would probably be
forw rded to counsel, The final criticise referred to the lack of
emphasis which the accused's solicitor and counsel placed on factors
relating to criminal record which the judge obviously considered
29
relevant and wliich the prosecutor emphasised. Phis might hove been
due partly to inadequate briefing, and partly to a lack of appreciation
on the part of the accused's representative about the importance att¬
ached try the judge to the different criteria. The improvement in
30
briefing which we oecoramended above, and the provision by the judge
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of reasons for his bail decisions would probably produce a marked
improvement.
( d) 4)0 t to Challenge Custody and Apply for Bail
The right given to a person in custody to challenge his custody
32
at various procedural stages i3, we have argued, the main source .of
projection afforded in ^cotland, as -cots law no longer gives an arrested
person any right to be released before trial.
33
•e have described above the fairly numerous opportunities which
the accused has been given extending from application to the police, through
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application on court appearance and including review and appeal. Never¬
theless, during our study we identified some areas in which changes would
give the accused additional protection without jeopardising the public
interest.
leaking available opportunities to challenge custody is of little
help to nn accused if he is unaware of or does not unuerst nd the prov¬
isions. This is not a problem for accused who are legally advised and
represented but it is a problem at the police and burgh court level. It
is possible for accused to be unaware of the oolice porer to grant bail.
The notices which informed the accused about bail and other rights were
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we reported missing from the police cells. A simple change in procedure
would overcome the alleged dostructivenoss of accused in the cells. The
details of the notice could bo incorporated into the fom which the
accused signs when he hands over Ms property. Signing such a form and
rec living a duplicate copy would ensure that the arrested person knew
about bail.
Tho magistrate in the burgh court is under no duty to consider
bail where the issue i3 not raised. An accused uninformed about bail
or overawed by court procedure may find himself remanded in custody without
any consideration given to the need for custody. Ona vray of overcoming
this would be to place a duty on the magistrate to consider bail even if
it was not requested. The lay magistrate, however, shoved no enthusiasm
for inquiring into the question of bail and we would, therefore, suggest
that this is yet another reason to support legal representation in the
lay magistrates courts.
There 13 also a need to extend the opportunities to challenge
custody which are presently available.
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Ono extension which we believe to be necessary is the extension
of release provisions at the police level. The existin; law limits the
possibility of release before first court appearance to arrested persons
charged with very minor offences. The effect of this was that any person
who was to be brought before the sheriff* even on a summary charge, had
no opportunity to obtain release until ho appeared in court, llany of
these accused were later released by the sheriff and could, we are
convinced, have been equally safely released before appearance in court.
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Although, under o^aglish law the police have wider powers of release,
we do not favour such an extension, in dcotland. Extending the police
powers would involve an unacceptable increase in police discretion and
provide .renter opportunities for the abuse of such discretion. Also
important is the fact that this extension of police power would conflict
with the wide discretion of the prosecutor who is always in -cotland,
though not in England, an official independent of the police. Instead
we favour soma extension of the existing practice whereby police
consult the appropriate procurator-fiscal to discuss release.^ 3uoh
mi extension is particularly deferrable to cover the weekend and holiday
periods. Ideally, a procurator-fiscal should be on hand to discuss all
cases but even directions from the procurator-fiscal's office to
consult in the case of accused who are likely to be tried on summary
procedure .-aid who have a fixed address, would represent an improvement.
Another way in which release before court appearance could be
extended would be to introduce the -nglish procedure of backing a
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warrant for bail". 3y this procedure the magistrate, when granting a
warrant to arrest, 61so directs the police to liberate the accused on
finding a certain bail. With ono reservation we favour introducing such
a practico in Scotland. The reservation concerns a matter which we
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discuss uore fully below, that is, whether the person ought to be cited
to appear r ther than arrested. If there are, however, circumstances
justifying arrest on warrant rather than citation, then backing a
warrant for bail is compatible with Scottish procedure, This practice,
which ,vc think requires statutory authorisation, would ensure an early
release from police custody without extending police discretion.
Under the existing law the accused has no right to appeal a bail
decision in colo n procedure at the stage of continuation for further
examination. This may be due to the influence of older ideas about
further examination. It was not thou ;ht necessary to give the accused
a right to apply for bail at this stage because further examination was
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considered to be for the protection of the accused. '
How, hovsever, no effective judicial examination takes place and
we suggested that the lack of this right of appeal perhaps inhibited
solicitors from asking for bail at this stage. In viow of this, and
the fact that a right to appeal has been given to the prosecutor and to
the accused in summary procedure, we recommend that in solemn procedure
the accused should be given a similar right.
The review and appeal provisions -yore in general adequate. Two
improvements, however, could be made.
The first which we strongly urge, is that the judge should always
give a re son for his decision to refuse or grant liberty. These reasons
should be specific to the case and not merely a standard phrase like,
'not in the interests of justice''* To be successful on appeal it is
necessary to show that the sheriff or magistrate wrongly exercised his
discretion. If specific reasons were given, both the decision to
appeal by the procurator-fiscal or the accused, and the determination
of that appeal by the judge would be greatly facilitated.
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A second improvement which night be made would be to make public
the chambers hearings, particularly in appeal cases where the accused is
41
not generally present. Subject to safeguards which we discussed above
this would allow the accused, if he desired, to have publicity for his
bail application and enable his friends and relatives to attend.
(V The Criteria Governln ? teleaae
Although the conferral on the accused of extensive rights to apply
for bail does provide some protection to accused from pre-trial custody,
the protection is essentially a formal one. If the criteria adopted by
the decision-makers result in the refusal of all or mo .t applications
for release, the accused's right to re-apply will afford little relief
from custody.
In our study we found that, at ell levels, the release rates which
resulted using the existing criteria were net high.
The police granted bail to only 22 per cent of those arrested
42 _
person::, whom they had the power to release. This lo~; release rate
was partly explained by the fact that many persons were arrested loos
than 12 hour3 before the morning court session and many were under the
influence of alcohol. We criticised the police criteria, however, as
unnecessarily restrictive in two major respects. Thus we pointed out
that the chief constable's directions prohibited role .se where certain
•13
types of offences, notably property offences were charged. secondly
we criticised the police insistence on money as a requirement of release.^
The amount of money dssifflided was closely related to a scale of seriousness
of offence as perceived by the chief constable, be argued that by aban¬
doning these criteria the number of persons released could be increased
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without undermining the existing police success rate.
The decision-maker in the burgh court relied entirely on the
recommendation of the prosecutor. e consider this to be an abuse.
Our reasons and criticisms have been given above in some detail.^
Very few accused, only 17 per cent of the sample, wore granted
liberty on appeal after refusal of a bail decision. This must to some
extant be explained by the fact that the judge considered whether the
sheriff had wrongly exercised his discretion using the accepted
criteria. Host of the decisions could be easily justified in the light
of these criteria.
Tho great majority of the pro-trial release decisions made in
court were made by the sheriff. The criteria adopted by the sheriff
were described above where we noted the importance attach d to the
accused's criminal record. Fixed address vies also considered as an
indicator of appearance for trial. In the majority of cases, however,
the cruestion at issue was not whether the accused would appear but
whether he would commit offences during the pre-trial period. We are
of the opinion that the bail decision has in effect turned into a
decision about whether preventive detention is merited in view of the
accused's past record of criminal involvement.
The sheriff's refusal of bail resulted in 50 per cant of the sample
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cases spending sometime in custody. V/q did not find any significant
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relationship between the bail decision and the plea, finding or sentence.
We did comment unfavourably, however, on the cases in which the pra-
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trial custody represented a more severe penalty than the final disposal.
Using the criteria which we described, tho sheriff was tolerably
successful in oredieting non-appearance which occurred in loss than 4
per cent of tho cases, but he was much less successful predicting the
commission of further offences which occurred in at least 13 per cent
51
of fcho cases. There was no clear answer to the question whether
sose of tli® accused refused bail could have been successfully released
though <e did note in some oases that the offender's conduct was not
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considered serious enough to merit a custodial sentence.
The operation in offset, if not in name, of a system of prevent¬
ive detention before trial has attracted little interest or criticise.
This is difficult to understand in view of the controversy aroused by
and resistance to preventive detention sa a form of sentence after
53
conviction.
The ayate® of criminal justice in Scotland is influenced by the
ids s of reformation and deterrence but we think that retribution
is still generally accepted as a Halting principle. Thus the extent
of the deprivation of liberty which is impose! as [«mA4hsent is limited
by the seriousness of the offence ecsaaltted. Preventive detention has
attr cted criticism because it offended against thi3 principle and
authorised the imposition of Ion* custodial sentences on 'persistent
criminals, even though the offaace charged was not itself serious. It
is true that the public must be protected but the law provides prot¬
ection by attaching sanctions to certain types of behaviour and not by
rounding up and detaining in advance persons thought likely to commit
offences. The system of criminal procedure has been developed to deal
with the difficulties of ascribing criminal guilt and numerous protect¬
ions have been incorporated to prevent the conviction of an innocent
accused. Ascribing guilt is a hazardous task which palos to insignif¬
icance in comparison with the problem of predicting future criminal
activity.
Sophisticated attempts to predict the commission of criminal
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offences h ve not been particularly successful. It la not surprising,
therefor©, that the sheriff's simple attempts b. sad on lixdtod inform-
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ation and unverified criteria were not successful, -hat is surprising,
is that the justification of his attempt to prevent hypothesised criminal
conduct has not been seriously questioned. If the principle, that
society must bear the risk of certain types of conduct for the greater
good of individual freedom, is accepted then pre-trial preventive
detention cannot be justified in cases where, even if the accused is
convicted of the offence charged, he is unlikely to bo removed from
society for any length of time. If society can stand the potential
harm of freeing, after the completion of their sentence, convicted
prisoners, many of whcsn are likely to commit further offences, then it
can also bear the lesser potential harm of harbouring a erson who is
merely suspected of an offence.
We take the view that the criteria which are presently used by the
courts are neither justified nor successful. 4inor changes in the
criteria would be unlikely to produce any noticeable improvement.
Reform, if it is to be successful, must be far reaching, fhere are
two major directions such reform could take.
Firstly, the attempt to use ba: 1 as a method of preventive deten¬
tion could be abandoned and the likelihood of appearance for trial could
be made the only relevant consideration. In America, likelihood of
appearance is the only legal ground and release programmes based on
"community roots" have had considerable success. <>e have raised some
doubts, however, about the appropriateness of "community roots" in the
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Scottish situation. In addition, as the merican experience has also
shown, there is a need felt in some circumstances to protect the
56
community from the defendant during the pre-trial period#
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The second possibility which we support is to recognise that
factors, other than the prevention of flight, are important consideiv
ationo and to mafce the preventive detention decisions explicit,
incorporating safeguards for tho protection of the accused, This
involves abolishing the traditional bail hearings and introducing
preventive detention hearings. Such a system may be more or less
restrictive than the present bail hearings, depending on the grounds
of detention which are adopted, we take the view that detention before
trial con only be justified where there is a serious risk to the public.
Such a risk does not, in our view, exist where the accused is to be
tried by summary procedure anu is liable to a sentence of imprisonment
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of six months or less. Preventive detention hearings should be
restricted to solemn procedure, This means that in sunmiury procedure
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there would in effect be automatic release before trial. There may
be circumstances, even in summary procedure, where the prosecutor
considers that there is a serious risk to the public, or a risk that
the accused will abscond. To take account of this we suggest the
introduction of another new procedure. The prosecutor should be given the
right to apply to the judge both for custody and an accelerated diet of
trial to be fixed not later than tho third lawful day after the
accused's appearance in court. If granted, the accused would be kept
in custody but only for a very short period. The accueod should have
the right to delay trial if the period was too short to allow him to
prepare his defence. The prosecutor would be unlikely to abuse this
procedure because the pressure of work created would be considerable.
One difficulty of this proposal is the fact that the prosecutor has
discretion whether to follow suram: ry or solemn procedure. Although the
prosecutor might be tempted to avoid the release provisions by charging
accused on solemn procedure, the additional work of preparing for jury
2?6.
triala would probably be an effective deterrent.
As r 'gardu solemn procedure, it is necessary to da terrain© the
circumstances which would justify the issue of a detention order.
Using the present criteria adopted by the courts, it is possible to
justify refusal of liberty for any fear, no matter how ^anote, that the
accused might commit any type of criminal offence. We recommend that
the type of circumstances justifying preventive detention should be much
more closely defined. Wq support limitations along the linos of those
59
put forward by the American Bar Association. Thus, we suggest that
the prosecutor should have the right to apply for a detention order only
in the following circumstancest 'where the accused is charged v?ith an
offence involving the infliction of, or a threat to inflict serious
bodily ham on another, and there is a risk that, if released, he will
threaten or inflict such harm; where the accused is charged with any
offence and there is evidence from his criminal record, or other
evidence, that there is a risk that he will threaten or inflict any¬
body with serious bodily harm; where the accused is charged with any
offence which he is alleged to have committed while at liberty pending
trial; where the accused is charged with an offence and there is reason¬
able cause to believe that, if released, he would leave Scotland for
the purposes of avoiding prosecution ox' hiding or disposing of the
fruits of the alleged offence. Generally, the fear of repetition of
offences not involving violence, would not justify detention. There is
always the power to arrest accused if they do in fact corcmit 3uch
offences.
The detention hearing should replace the present bail hearing,
and the existing rights of legal representation, review and appeal,
should be retained,subject to the improvements suggested above.^
•here the prosecutor dooo not seek a detention order, the accused
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should bo released subject to any security which is authorised by the law.
It may be appropriate at this point to voice some doubts about
the underlying philosophy of the existing system which makes decisions
about pre-trial release necessary.
Arresting persons reasonably suspected of an offence who pose a
serious continuing danger to a particular individual or public order is
obviously justified. Less justifiable, however, is the use of arrest,
whether with or without warrant, merely as a method of bringing persons
before a court. Doubtless arrest may be the only way of compelling
attendance in some cases. tlany accused, however, as both bail and
cit-tion experience show, will attend in response to a court order,
"here necessary arrest for non-appearance is always possible. Perhaps
the main obstacle to extending the use of citation is that arrest has
considerable attractions for the police when they are investigating an
offence, fhe major attractions are the opportunities which arrest gives
to search and question the accused. In many cases, however, search will
be irrelevant where the offence was not committed about the time of
arrest and statements in response to police questions obtained from the
accused after arrest will not be admitted as evidence by the court. Nor
does the police investigation necessarily de end on arrest, The police
have the power to ask questions and may search a person if they have
obtained the person's consent or have successfully applied for a
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warrant. desort to arrest should be reserved, we submit, for
situations where it is the only reasonable alternative.
(4) 'foe, .^yugj-ty .^emggded Pgr
ilie criteria of release adopted by the decisiun-makor did not
necessarily determine whether the person would in fact be released.
•>e found that the release rate was also affected by the form of
security which was demanded, whatever provisions are adopted to
govern release, therefore, attention must be given to the security aspeot
At all levels we were very critical of the Scottish system in
which money had to be deposited as security for release.
With the possible exception of some cases in the burgh court, we
did not find that the deliberate demand of bail money in excess of the
means of the accused was used, instead of refusal of bail, to ensure
that the person remained in custody.
'fhe amounts of money required as security were in fact very low.
Bail amounts of 10 pounds or less were common, even whore serious
offences were charged. Pear of forfeiture of such small sums cannot be
consider d an effective inducement to appear especially as many accused
were liable, if found guilty, to receive substantial sentences of
imprisonment. Indeed in some of the more trivial cases the security
was a positive disincentive, as the accused might become aware that if
he failed to appear, the bail money might be forfeited and that might
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be the end of the matter.
Despite the low bail amounts, many people spent a period in prison
because they were not immediately able, and in some cases were never able
to raise the money. This was aggravated by the fact that many of these
C. "5
persons did not eventually receive a custodial sentence.
In view of the difficulties which many accused have in raising the
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present low amounts of bail, it is obviously impossible to raise bail
money to a level where fear of forfeiture might be an effective induce¬
ment to appear. We are of the opini n that deposit of .Money is at
present irrelevant as a form of security. It is also distinctly harmful
in the way it discriminates against the poorer accused who are condemned
by lack of money to remain in custody, despite the fact that a judge has
decided that in principle they can bo 3afely released.
One method by which money security could be increased would be to
operate in practice the bail bond system authorised by the law. We
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described above how tliis legal form was converted into a deposit
system due to the practice of the clerks of court. The clerks of court
havj for long demanded that,in order to provo that he has sufficient
fund3» a cautioner must deposit the money guaranteed in the bail bond.
After this deposit, the clerk allows the cautioner to sign a bond
promi ;ing that the money will be paid over in the event of the non¬
appearance of the accused. If the bail amounts were raised, however,
some accus d would inevitably find it difficult to find cautioners able
to guarantee the larger amounts, tor example, under the present system
a woman receiving stats benefits will be permitted to sign a bond as
cautioner, provided she is able to deceit the small sum required. Such
a woman, however, would probably bo unable to persuade the clerk of court
that she was a cautioner of sufficient means to guarantee a bond for a
much larger amount. The bond system we think suffers from the same
defect that characterises a system b cod on the deposit of money in
that it favours those accused who have associates of some wealth and
property. Neither the middle class accused not the professional criminal
are likely to experience difficulty in providing cautioner/, but the
sane cannot be said about the unemployed unskilled labourers who form
the majority of custody cases.
£he abolition of bail» based as it is on the provision of
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financial security, would relieve police and court officials of work,
would reduce the strain on prison facilities^ and would remove one of
the more blatant examples of legal discrimination against the poor.
Liberating persons without financial security is not a novel method
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of release, fhe sheriff, as we described, sometimes released accused
before trial merely on an order to appear and thi3 was the standard method
of release for those accused who pled guilty and sentence was deferred
to all of? a report to bo prepared. Hon-uppe. ranee in these cases w$s
no pro tor than for those released on bail.
»e hove argued that amounts of money set as bail camot be cons¬
idered an effective deterrent of non-appearance and yet non-appearance was
rare. e are of the opinion th t the majority of accused re unlikely
to abscond because of the practical difficulties involved in disappearing
in modern society and because of a reluctance to leave family and friends
to live under the threat of re-arrest. Although we do not believe that
the number of potential absconders is high, we think that the judges
might be more willing to take a risk and release an accused if a more
effective deterrent existed. For this reason, therefore, we recommend
that a new offence should be cr ated to replace finruicial security.
se suggest that wilful failure to appear after release from
custody and in defiance of an order of a judge or designated police
officer to appear in court at a specified time and date should be made
an offence, ihe offence should be prosecuted on summary or 3olenn
procedure at the discretion of the procurator-fiscal and should carry a
maximum sentence of 12 months imprisonment. In order to impress upon the
accused the importance of his attendance and the penalty att chcd to
281.
failu.ro to appear, wo suggest that before release the accused should be
required to sign and should receive a copy of a document, which sets out
the date and time of appearance and the penalty for non-appearance.
ilsny countries have experimented with other methods of ensuring
a person1 s appearance. These methods range through a wide variety of
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forms of conditional release to forms of supportive release.
In general we do not favour a system of release to which conditions
may be attached for the purpose of discouraging non-appear nco. «e are
not convinced that there is any need to restrict the liberty of persons
to prevent them absconding. Secondly, we suspect that if a person
intends to disappear only custody will prevent him. Attaching condit¬
ions such, as confinement to the city boundaries, or weekly or even daily
reporting to the police will not prevent a person from absconding.
Conditions, we fear, may be unnecessarily restrictive and involve
considerable problems of enforcement. Par example, how are the police
to ensure that an accused complies with the reasonable restrictions
placed on his activities, movements, associations and residences.
This is a form of conditional release recommended by the meriean Bar
6q
Association. It is also possible that the accused might break a
condition such as residence at a specified address, without any intent¬
ion to abscond. If, for example, on accused is thrown out by his family,
i3 he to be brought before the court for breaking a condition, even if
he has found alternative acconsaodation?
Hon-appearance in any event is not the most frequent issue before
the courts, they are more often c ncorned with the question of whether
the accused will abuse his liberty by, for example, committing offences.
Conditions are not appropriate in this context. There would obviously
be no point in making the non-consaission of off aces a condition of
bail, as ooaaalsalon of an. offence oar ae makes a person liable to arrest
and revocation of release.
e are more sympathetic towards attempts to develop for:,is of
supportive release. Such attempts include the Vera employees who
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attempt to keep in touch with released defendants? modified surety
systems where the surety does not incur any financial liability but a
responsible friend or official arranges to supervise the released person
and help him, for example, to find work or accommodation during the
71 « 72
pre-trial period; the Japanese form of suspension called Oaauket
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and the provision of accommodation such as bail hostels. There is
we believe a need for some form of supportive release in Scotland.
lissistance during the pre-trial period should be generally
available but especially to those accused who have difficulty in coping
with life in society and end up without any fixed address. She Social
Work department should be given responsibility for the provision of
such help which would include arranging accommodation. This would mean
that the accused or his solicitor when applying for liberty would also
have the opportunity to ask for pre-trial assistance. Bio judge would
then have some alternative to orison to consider. An interview with a
social worker could easily be arranged, as at present a social worker
always attends court in case the judge orders a social background
report. The contact with a social worker, at the request of the accused
before trial, might possibly have more effect than the imposition of
his services after conviction. In addition this service would
probably be less expensive than keeping the accused in prison.
(5) ?hQ Condition^ of Pyo-irj,^ Cus^r
233,
'here imprisonment is considered to be necessary the consequences
of pre-trial custody should be mitigated as far as possible. Pre-trial
custody i3 not in theory a punishment and the period and conditions
of custody should be as favourable as is consistent with security.
3uch a principle has been accorded some recognition by the low
which imposes a maximum period of pre-trial custody and by the privileges,
for example, of not being obliged to wear prison clothes or do work which
have been given to untried prisoners.
Hie strict limitation of 110 days imposed in solemn procedure on
7.
the pre-trial period is a very important safeguard. 4 In this respect the
Scottish system compares very favourably with many other legal systems.
Ihere is, however, no limit imposed in summary procedure and in a few
eases the period of pre-trial custody approached 110 days. In view of
the tendency of increasing delay in summary procedure due to a backlog
of cases, we think it important to fix a maximum period. Hie preparation
of cases in summary procedure generally involves much less work than the
preparation of a case for jury trial, fhe maximum sentence in summary
procedure is limited to imprisonment of 6c days in the lay magistrates
court :.nd 3 or 6 months in the sheriff court. If our recommendations
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limiting the imposition of custody at the pre-trial stage' are not
accepted, r?e would recommend that the maximum period of pre-trial
custody in summary procedure should he fixed by law at 23 days.
Another time limit which we recommend is a limit of 72 hours after
notification to the High Court of Justiciary, as the period within which
appeals against refusal of liberty raised by an accused must be heard. It
may be recalled that this limit presently applies only to bail appeals
76
raised by the prosecutor.
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Although there are theoretical differences between pre-trial imprison¬
ment and imprisonment after sentence, the accused is unlikely to appreciate
the conceptual subtleties. Because of this, we recommend that the deduction
from the period of sentence of time spent in pre-trial custody should be auto-
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matic, and not left as at present to the discretion of the judge.
(6) Suggestions for Further Research
Due to limitations of time and resources we were unable to explore some
practices which seemed to merit further research. Some of these were directly
relevant to bail. These included the circumstances in which arrest was used
instead of citation, the exercise of police discretion to release arrested
persons when no charge was made, the Lord Advocate's discretion to grant bail,
the conditions of unconvicted accused in prison and the release of children
after arrest.
The research also raised many other issues which attracted us as research
subjects. For example, our finding that some bail decisions were based on
inadequate information made us question the adequacy of information made avail¬
able for other decisions. The inability of the unrepresented accused to cope
with the bail hearing raised doubts about his ability to cope with more com¬
plicated procedures especially the trial. Bail money, like the non-provision
of legal representation, are examples of financial discrimination in the
criminal justice system and we became interested to discover if any other dis¬
crimination existed. The question whether the prosecutor dominated procedural
stages other than bail also seemed worthy of further consideration.
The administration of criminal justice has not yet attracted much
research in Scotland. It is hoped that this study will help compensate for
this neglect not only by providing valuable information about release pending
sentence but also by provoking further research about the issues to which we
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3 weeks.
111. 124; Act 3.27 (1). Ibid.
112. 1946 J.Co.
113. H. of c. Deb. 9th May 1932, 1685.
114. 1924 Act 3.71 (5).
115. Ibid., S.64.
116. Ibid., 3,65 (1).
117. fhia is implied eg. in the 1963 Act 3.37 (5) which states
th t any reference to bail includes a reference to caution
for interim liberation.
112. 1954 Act -.55 (1).
119. Ibid., 3.55 (2).
120. Ibid,
121. Ibid., 3,71 (5;.
12-, Ibid., s.63 C3)♦
123. Ibid., 3.71 (6).
124. 1926 ct 3, 9 (l).
125. Ibid., 3.9 (2).
126. Ibid., 3. 9 (4)t as substituted by 1249 Act 3. 30 (1)# and
amend -d by Social or!: ( cot Ian,":, Act 1961 (c. 42) heroin ftor
referr.-d to as fcho 196 ; Act, Schcd. •
127. (1115) 3 App. 160 at 173.
123. sheriff court internal circular, fob. 1972 H. •» 3506 3 (1,.
129. Degal Aid (Scotland) Act 1967 (c.4i/ hereinafter referred to
so the 1967 Act, 3. 1(7)(») nd 3. 2(d). Special provisions
relate tr accused appearing in the inbur jh burgh court,
infra, 162.
130. Legal Advice end Assistance ct 1973 (c. 50). An accused
aay receive advice and assist nee under 3.2. of this Ant
up to a financial limit of 25 pounds (I. fhio doon
not, however, extend to leg: 1 ro rosontation of an accused
before a justice of the peace or burgh court (S,2( >))• fhe
accused rauet be financially eligible i.e. hiri disposable
income mat not exceed ;0 pounds a wook or he oust be in
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receipt of supplementary benefit3 or of family income
guppleiaent. (3. 1).
131. 1967 Act 3, 2(5) (b). Legal aid includes advice find repre¬
sentation* At this procedural stage the accused does not
have to satisfy any financial conditions.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. 1967 Act S. 1(7) (a) and 3. 2 (2) (a).
135. Ibid, 2 (5) (a).
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid., 3,2 (4) (b).
133. Ibid,, 3.1 (7) (b;.
139. Ibid,, 5, 2(4; (a).
140. fhe ten: 'surety' is used in Acts regulating police bail
bub the term"cautioner ! is used in reference to bail
granted by a court. In boil forms both terms appear, The
term "cautioner' is used in the text unless "surety" alone
appears in an Act,
141. it is not oloar from the use of the terns bail" and
"deposit" in the 1954 Act whether 'deposit" is used
synoncraouoly to mean "bail ; (see eg. 3.77) or whether bail
and deposit are regarded as different alternatives. The
latter interpretation gains some support from the fact that
although both terK3 appear in 3.10 (".) (3) and (5)» in
3.10 ( .) the term 'deposit alone is used end 4.1 3,10 (4)
the term "bail" alone is used.
142. 1954 Act 3.10 (1).
143* Ibid., 3.77.
144. Ibid., 3.51 (1) (a).
145. Ibid, It is clear from S.51 ( i) that the cautioner is
regarded as a person different from the accused,
146. 4v-, -4y. y» lygotot c^toAr-o (1364) 4 irv. 556,
lord Heaves at 553.
147. Infra, 202.
143. uuno, -.pigment rles on the Lew of cotlund. deaoectInT
Crineo ou planent by 3.3, Bell (Adirfcurgh s 1344;
Jupploxnent 175 { Kennedy 1677 quoted in Hume (1300) op, cit.
133*
149. 1949 Act 3,27 (2),
150. Ibid.
151. 1954 Act S.30 (d).
152. Ibid,, 3.JO (c).
























!<..,♦ Adv. v.. Uvtwah (l38j) 5 Coupor 346»
1954 ,.ct 5. 51 (1; (b).
Ibid. G. 51 (1) (c) •
U. Adv. v. with nd Cautioner (1836) 1 3w. 301 «




E.g. Illinois, New York.
G.H. Gordon, Jfrg i#ja;tafil, Qf -fioUfiBft (ddinbu gh J
Croon and Gon Ltd., 1967) 1018.
Renton and Brown, op cit., 74. Infra, 97.
-■jOA'trtWA Yi (1854) 1 Irv. 599. fh« ground of
suspension argued was not, however, accepted by the High
Court of Justiciar/.
Arbuckle v. Javier (1315/ 3 Wo Aop, 160
1954 Act 3.75.
1954 tot 3.10 (3).
E.g., France. See M. King, Bail or Custody (London: Cobden
Trust, 1972).
1954 ct 3,10 (1).
1837 Act 3. 34 t 1949 Act 3, 27 (2).
3r/aon v. E.ti. Adv.. 1961 J.C. 57.
In the majority of cases thero is no continuation at this
procedural stage and where there is a continuation, bail is
rarely granted} supra, chs. 71 and VII.
1954 Act 3. 29 (e). despite the maximum this form of
release appears to bo the closest -cofctish equivalent
to the -ngii'd}) form of release wiiere the accused promises
to pay a sum and no sureties are required, in Scotland
where the accused is released on his own bail at: a matter of
practice lie is required to pay over the money in adv. nco.
A child for the purposes of the 1963 Act is (a) any person
under 16 (b) any person under 13 in respect of whom a
supervision order by a children's hearing exists (1963 Act
3. 30/ (c) a child who becomes 16 after the date on which a
children's hearing first sit to consider his case (Jocial
Jork (Scotland) Act 1972 (c. 14) 3,1.)
1963 Act S. 33 (2).
Children and Young 'arsons (3cotland) Act 1937 (1 Gdw. 3 & 1
Geo. 6 c. 37) as amended by the 1963 .'ct -Ached. 2, part •
1937 Act 2.40 (j) and (4), inserted by i960 ct ched. 2.,
part 2.
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178. 1930 Aot s, 37 (4)#
179. Ibid., *** 37 (5).
180. Ibid., 40 (4).
181. Ibid,, *? 40 (7).
182. Ibid., s# 40 (0).
183, Ibid., 3# 43 (4).
184. Ibid., 49.
185. Ibid., 50 (1).
186. Ibid,, 3* 42 (2) (c).
187. Ibid., c 42 (3).
189. Ibid., c?H*# 49 (1).
109. Ibid., C 49 (7).
190. Ibid., 3# 31(1).
191* A place of safety is defined by the 1963 Act S. 94 (1)
"as any residential or other establishment provided by a
locrd authority, a police station, or any hospital, surgery,
or othor suitable place, the occupier of which is willing
temporarily to receive a child*M
192» 13 37 Act 3,40 (1) as amended by 196 Act -chad* 3, part 2.
193. 1967 Act 3.1, (6a) inserted by 1063 Act, -ched. 4.
194* 1967 -MDi 3,1, (6/>) (b), inserted by 1968 <>ct, .ched. 4,
195* 1967 Act S«5, (5A), inserted by 1963 Act, -ched. 4*
196. 1967 ct 3, 1 (6A) (c), inserted by 196) Act, 3ched. 4,
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CHAPTER IV
1. K.N, Llewllyn, Jurisprudence: uealism in .'hourand Practice
(Chicago t University of Chicago Press, 19o2).
2. In 1972 9,504 persons representing about 2$/« of total
receptions. cotti3h Home end Health Department, Prisons in
Scotland 197P> Cand. 4349•» App. 3.
3. Uupra, 70 et seq.
4* G. Schubert, Judicial Behaviour 1 A deader in Theory and
liesearch (Chicago * Rand iicHally & Company, 1964/.
5. Ibid., 443. The legal norm model ignores the personal and
social characteristics of the judges and defines the law in
normative terms. Decisions are deemed to be made by applying
the rules of deduction and inference of traditional logic.
6. Ibid., 444* The legal fact model is a modification of the
legal nom model and emphasis is placed on the interrelation¬
ships of norms, facts and decisions. Decisions are said to be
dependent on what facts the judge selects as relevant. The
facts selected are considered to determine which norms will be
applied.
7» Ibid., 445* The legal-discretion model denies that full
knowledge of the facts and norrs is sufficient to predict
decisions, This model recognises that the decision depends
also on psychological, social, political and other variables
which influence the judge.
3. The writer's insertion.
9. ochubert, op. cit., 444*
10. For further reading see A.H. dubenstein, omo Theories of
Organisation (Illinois : Homewood, 1961). II.A. Simon,
Ariml tp' strativo Behaviour : A Study of decision--oakin.g Process
in Administrative Organisations fork : Hie llacmillan
Company 1957; * Alexis and C.A. Wilson, Orranisational
Decision Making (Haw Jersey : Trentice-Hall Inc., 1967; *
C.W. Churchman, Prediction md Optimal Decisions (New-
Jersey : Englewood Cliffs, 1961;.
11. For further reading see ochubert, op. cit: J.3. Grossman and
J. Tanenhaus, frontiers of Judicial research (New York s John
Wiley and Cons, inc., 19&9; : S.S. Ulmer, *I4athematical Models
for Predicting Judicial Behaviour' in Berne ed., M,.them tical
Applications in Political cience (Charlottes ville J
University of Virginia Pres3, 19&7).
We found few attempts to create prescriptive theories or models
but see e.g. R.W. Burnham, A Theoretical B".j13 for a sational
Case decision System in Corrections, 1969 Ph. D. thesis for
school of criminology, the University of California.
12 dubenstoin, op. cit., 579*
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13* Below we give soma examples of research dealing with these
different aspects.
(a) The decision: D*A* Thomas, Principles of sentencing
(London! : Heinemann, 1970)J
A.0. Dawson, ientencing : The Decision as to Type.
Length and Conditions of sentence (Boston t Little,
Brown and Co., 1969).
(b) The decision-maker :
Jehubert, op. cit., chs 5»4 1 0. ochubert, The Juuicial
-■ind t The Attitudes a-id - leolo-les of Jujreae court
Justices 1946-63 (U. .A. » Northwestern University Press
1965).
S.S. Nagel, 'Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases'
1962 J, Crim. . 333.
(c) The decision process :
.R. LaFave, Arrept 1 S&SLaa t? Mg 3 ^3 ;pct .into.
Custody (U.S.A. t Little, Brown and Company, 1955) !
D.J. Newman, Cqflylqtjon 1 J.-.g ^eterrajnatjoip ,q>f fol^t ,o,r
Innocence .ithout "rial (Boston « Little, Brown and
Company, 1966) t
B.A. Grossman, The Prosecutor 1 An Inquiry into the
xorcise of discretion (Toronto s University of Toronto
^33, 1969) 1 L. Radzinowicz and R.B. Colfgang,
oriae -.nd Justice (London J Basic Books, Inc.,
ublishers, 19719% Vol. 2.
14* Landes, 'The Bail System « An economic Approach*
Journal of Loral Studies, vol. 2, 79,
15* >}> Goldfarb, Ransom i A Critique of the American Bail -asternR. u iiu ro, .tanao * « orltfo o 01 ti
(New York » Harper & Row, 19c5/'» 109*
16. F. Buffet, 'Bail Setting » A Study of Courtroom Interaction'
Crime . Dslin.. 1966, 318.
17. Ibid. 319*
13. 3.M. Cchur, Law ,aqd C.pc.i.eijy t A York »
daadoa House, 1963), 161.
19* Cur pre-survey experience of the bail decisions encouraged us
in thi3 approach as we noted that there was a marked similarity
in the way different individuals acted as prosecutor
solicitor or judge in a particular decision-making situtation.
20. Although a justice of the eace court sits occasionally in
-.dinburgh and deals with offenders from the county area, the
burgh court deals with the great majority of offences and
our study was confined to this latter court.
21* Letter from the Clerk of Justiciary written after consultation
with the judges.
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22, For ex&nple» it was sometimes obvious that the accused from
his bearing or actions in the dock was being disrespoetful to
the judge. Recording this consistently was difficult, as
wo were not able to observe all the participants and record
what was said at the same time. Our interpretation was of
course subjeotive and we had no means of ascertaining
whether the judge had made a similar interpretation.
Although we would accept that in some cases these subtleties
might be factors influencing the judge,wa considered it to
be less distorting to exclude this type of information than
to include it, subject to the dangers of incompleteness and
subjectivity.
CHAPTER V
M.L. Friedland, detention sefore Trial > A Study of
Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magistrates' Courts
(Toronto t University of Toronto Tress, 1965), 45* This
was the only literature we found which dealt in any detail
with the problem of custody before first court appearance.
Supra, ch. III.
It is possible for police bail to be granted for cases which
in practice are heard by the sheriff court provided the
burgh or justice of the peace court have jurisdiction to try
the offence. This may arise (a) where the procurator-fiscal
or Lord Advocate gives a direction that offenders charged
with an offence committed in certain circumstances must be
brought before the sheriff court. In Edinburgh such a
direction was applied to persons charged with breach of the
peace committed within a football or rugby ground. After
the completion of our research a similar direction was
applied in August 1574 to breach of the peace committed on
buses or involving the drivers or conductors, (b) where there
are co-accused and the offence libelled against one must be
heard by the sheriff, it is competent for the police to grant
bail to another co-accused provided the offence libelled
against him may be tried in the burgh or justice of the
peace court.
The police for administrative reasons kept a separate record
of the cases in which bail was granted and the accused was
brought before the sheriff. In 1972 bail was granted in
33 cases.
In February 1973 a police spokesman suggested that all
arrested persons ought to be taken directly to the central
police station but this proposal did not attract much support
and was not adopted.
For details of police apprehensions in Scotland in 1972,
Scottish Home and Health department, Criminal Statistics
sggttanfl 5464.
Ho statistics were available about the number of cases falling
into the different categories. We based the total of the
burgh court custody cases on our count of the number of
custody cases entered on the burgh court daily disposal sheets.
We excluded accused who nade a formal appearance in the burgh
court when the sheriff court was closed on holiday. We were
unable to exclude from the total, accused arrested on a warrant
issued by a court outside Edinburgh. These accused were not
eligible for police bail. We estimated, however, that the
number of these accused wa3 less than 100.
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3. In 1972 police bail was granted in 324 cases out of JJ26
eligible cases* i.e. 22a of the cases.
9. For further discussion so® 2.3. Torgerson, Pheorv and
•"'athods of Scaling (Haw York J -iley, 1953) ; L. Fostinger,
'Phe Treatment of vaiantitstive Data 3y Jcale Analysis',
r^yci^r'jcal DuUat^ft* vol. 44, 149*
10. N.H. Hie, D.H. Bont, C. Hadlaihull, J&S
the ocial Gciences (U.j.„. j McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).
11. .'hero the JGB.tlA'TY coding was 'drunk ' ;ind the CPU23 coding
was "greater than 24 hours" the :~3 JffY coding was changed
to 'sober". -here the SOBRIilPY coding was "had been
drinking ;md the CTHB3 codin: wan .greater than 12 hours '
the 3Q3.JGTY coding was changed to sober '.
Phis change does not mean that no person arrested in a
drunken condition was released before the expiry of -4
hours. It means that if e.g. a person was drunk and the
tine to the next court was 17 hours then that person was not
consiao.:ed for release. If, however, a person was drunk but
the time before the next court was 35 hours, that person was
considered eligible for release ,;nd might be released when
the police considered him sober and able to go home safely,
perhaps after 13 hours and usually before 24 hours had elapsed.
12. Phis variable combined the variables MDNAVS, MONAVA, MONAYP,
13. Infra. 331.
14* Phis is similar to practice described by H.A.Simon.Admini.:trative
Behaviour t A .>tutir of socision-. kin: .'recess in Administrative
Gr.-animation (New York t Phe Macmillan Company, 1970;, 38.
'Habit ... has an artificial counterpart, which has boon
termed by 3tens 'organisation Routine'. In so far as methods
of handling recurring questions become matters of organisation
practice, perhaps embodied in manuals of procedure, they
cease to be objects of reconsideration when these questions
arise it might bo said that a matter has become part of
tho organisation routine when it is settled by reference to
accepted or approved practices rather than by consideration of
the alternatives on their merits."
15. Infra,334, 336.
16. Ibid, Phis is discussed fully in the explanations given
about Gcalo A.
17. Plie police list of custody cases for 1972 was numbered
sequentially but burgh court coses were interspersed with
sheriff court and other casos. As the list did not have any
particular order it was considered sufficiently rigorous to
use a systematic sample based on a random selection of tho
fir t case. The sampling figure chosen wa3 1 » 60. All
cases not destined for the burgh court .fhich were included
in tho sample were disregarded as they were not eligible for
police bail.
13. Although 4 of the cases i.e. 1107, 2607, 2967 end 5367 would
have passed the second revised sobriety coding they failed to
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pa. s other variables and still, therefore, fitted into the
refusal of bail pattern.
19. In i.lay 1974 Edinburgh police moved to a new headquarters which
is to bo U.for tho new ^outh-east Scotland itegional Force.
The coll accommodation at tho old U.U* in Parliament square
where .c carried out our study will, however, still be ful.y
used in the future. It was reported that 215,000 pounds is
to be spent to upgrade this accommodation. The -cot oiaan
25th Juno 1974.
20. An -dinburgh councillor was reported as saying, 'conditions in
the colls aro absolutely deplorable - not even fit for animals
to be put in." evening hows 13th January 1. 74.
21. Infra, 336.
22. Supra, reference 11.
23. Our finding was not common knowledge. But as some of the
accused had over 40 previous convictions it is not
inconceivable that they may have become aware of this.
24» Faroons charged with theft were not usually considered by the
police as eligible for bail. The 2 cases in Table IV were
exceptional as both referred to foreign nationals who wore
visiting Scotland. The city prosecutor may have been
consulted about bail.(infra 146,157)though this was not
recorded. e may also speculate that these were cases whore
tho officials were willing to accept a forfeited bail instead
of court appearance.
25. Supra, 138 et. seq.
26. upra, 137*
27. Supra, 127.
2-3. No such power is given by the authorising statute, tho unmary
Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1954 ( 2 * 3 Gliz. 2, c.48)»
29. Supra, 84.
30. Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 -dw.3 &
1 Geo. 6, c. 37), S.40.
31 • For this purpose the police appear to take 16 as the atgo at
which bail will be required.
32. iioad Safety Act 1967 (c. 30), 3. (1).
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CHAPTER VI
1. The ..■cotaaan 31st Aiarch 1S>73.
2. Scottish Officef Justices of the Peace and Justices'
Courts. Cmnd. 5241
}• Supra* 62 et. seq.
4. Published criminal statistics do not reveal the number of
cases each court considered. The statistics do reveal*
however, that in 1972 about 40/■> of all summary cases were
proceeded against in the lay courts. Scottish Home and
Health Apartment Criminal Gtatiatlcs Scotland 1972 Cmnd. 5464,
Table 2. We found that in Edinburgh the burgh court dealt
with more than 5<V of sill arrosted persons brought before
a court in 1972.
5» These criticisms are not confined to members of the lego!
profession. A journalist, George -.sunders, has said that the
exploits of the lay magistrates have become part of Scottish
folklore. He relates the tale of th bailie who told an
accused who was being difficult about his plea, "But you
must have done it, or the police widna' have brought you
here", The -cotsman 31st "larch 1973.
6. Supra,107.
7. Infra, 329.
8. Applications for review vfore an exception and these wore
considered by the bailie in private.
9. The 4 remaining cases were accused who had been arrested on
a warrant issued by a court outwith Edinburgh. These cases
wore not considered by the Edinburgh burgh court.
10. In 2 cases bail was refused during our period of observation
but we discovered that the accused appeared for trial on
bail. W® concluded, therefore, that the accused had applied
successfully for review of the bail decision.
11. A case which attracted considerable criticism in the Scottish
press concerned a woman who was remanded in custody for 7 days
by a Glasgow bailie on a charge of failing to wash a tenon znt
stair. After spending 7 days in custody she wa3 brought again
before the court and on this occasion was represented by a
lawyer. The lawyer told the court that the woman had no
previous convictions and was the mother of ten children whom
she looked after at home. The bailie who remanded her was
later reported as saying "If I had even the slightest idea she
had one child, never mind ten, this would never have happened."
tp.-ittj.gli bqjjy -d^yegg 30 th larch 1972.
This c se illustrates that 'blind' decision-making is not
confined to the lay magistrates in -Edinburgh.
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12. Infra, 213 et. 3eq.
13. Supra, 146.
Unlike solemn procedure no specific right to make represent-
ations is given.
15. Supra, 126
16. Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1972 (c. 50)»
This Act extends legal aid in England to cover representation
in magistrates court but in its application to -Jeotland for
the words 'magistrates courts' the Act substituted the words
'a sheriff'• A. 2 (5)(b). The effect of this Act in
Scotland was to make legal advice available, subject to
financial limits, up to the cost of twenty-five pounds. The
provision for representation in the sheriff court was
unnecessary because a duty solicitor scheme had operated in
these courts before the Act was passed. Thus although an
accused may be eligible for legal advice under this Act, he
is not eligible for legal representation.
17. Johannoasan v. dobertson 1945 146 at 150. "It is not
the duty of the assessor (clerk) to aid by his counsel and
advice or by putting questions, either of the parties".
The position in England appears to be different, B. Harris,
'Justices Clerks', 123 &ew. T.J. states, "Already the High
Court have accepted that tnere are some matters concerning
evidence which should be dealt with by the olerk inviting his
bench to adjourn and advising on unrepresented party in that
absence".
13. Edinburgh Corporation Confirmation Act 1967 (c.v.) par. 440•
The honorarium specified is a sum not exceeding five hundred
pounds in any financial year but tho Secretary of State nay
approve a higher sum.
19» deported in The .cofcBman 19th January 1974.
20. deported in uVenliprr Npw« 27th February 1974.
21. Infra, 139 et. seq.
22. In our 4 weak sample, a burgh court bail receipt was
issued in 13 cases which gives an estimate for the year of
169 cases. This gives some indication that numerically the
sample was representative of the proportions in the annual
population.
23. Because of the difficulties of collection we had to estimate
this figure from the sample (3 x 13;. We are aware that we
cannot estimate to what extent the sample was representative
in this respect.
24. Ibid, i-sfcimate (5 x 13 + 34)•
25. Percentages based on estimated fibres.
26. Summary Jurisdiction Scotland Act 1954 ( 2 & 3 Sliz. 2,
c.43) as amended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland;
Act 1963 (0*39) 5.23, 3.3(d).
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27. The table is based on 26 cases (instead of 64) because in
3 cases we were unable to ascertain either the tine or the
sentence. The work involved in basing this table on the
annual figures was too great.
23. The table is based on 11 cases (instead of 16) because in 5
cases we were unable to ascertain either the time or the
sentence, The work involved in basing this table on the
annual figures was too grant.
29. This sentencing policy of the burgh court is worthy of
investigation. In many cases the burgh court unlike the
sheriff court fixed a prison alternative to the fine and
refused time to allow the convicted person to pay the fine.
'The result of this is unfair discrimination against persons
with little or no available money to pay a fine. The policy
also contributes to the overloading of the prison service with
persons imprisoned for very short periods.
.jee also «.b. Smith and J. Gordon 'The Collection of Pines in
Scotland* 1972 3.L.T. (news) 181.
30. In the sample we found the same result in cases in v/hich the
bail money was not raised. Tuprn, "able VI.
31. Cee e.g. i1.1. Fried!and, retention Before Trial : . Ttudy of
Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto ilaftlstr tos* Courts
(Toronto * University of Toronto Press, 1965)» 110*
Gibson, Time ~<pent ■/ it in -* .'rial (London J il 0 *.!• . • 0 • y i960)
32. The organisation of the records male it impossible to obtain
this information.
33. Supra, 139*
34» The burgh and justice of the peace courts are to be replaced
because of local government reform. In 1973 the Conservatives
proposed setting up justices' courts staffed by three lay
magistrates. The proposal was severely criticised especially
by members of the legal profession. The Conservatives
eventually agreed to abolish the .lay magistrates system and
extend the sheriff court system. hen the Labour government
was elected, however, in 1974 they wore persuaded by
representations by bailies end others to retain the lay
magistrates. The district Courts (Scotland; Bill proposes
a mixture of lay and stipendiary magistrates. Training is
suggested for the ley magistrates. One proposal which we
welcome is an extension of the availability of legal aid.
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CHAPTER VII
1 . wstimate based on the samples collected in the course of
the research project*
2. Supra, 149.
3. This may have been due to the comparatively minor nature of
the offences charged and the fact that the accused did not
generally have access to a solicitor to advise him about
his plea*
4. Estimate based on the samples collected in the course of
the research project.
5* The most serious crimes are genorally tried before the
High Court of Justiciary* This court has exclusive
jurisdiction to try crimes of treason, murder, rape, incest,
deforcement of messengers and breach of duty by magistrates*
6. A few categories of accused e.g. those charged with breach of
the peace within a sports ground night have been considered
for an earlier release. 8upra,ch. V., ref. 3*
7* Jupra, 76 et. seq.
3. bupra, 68.
9* Sapra, 46 et. seq.
10* The Scottish section of the Home Office Research Hnit have
instituted a research project which deals with bail in the
sheriff courts* No remits have yet been published but we
have had come discussion with tho organisers of the project
2. Hideott and 1. Helvin.
11* 3upra» 69.
12, Infra, Appendix II t 330.
13* Infra, 3^0.
14* Infra,134 et. seq.
15. Supra,158.
16. Supra,36 et. seq.
17# Supra,46 et. seq.
18. Infra, 189 et. seq.
19* In only 3 cases did the solicitor attempt to obtain the
release of the accused for the continuation period. In the
first and second case the procurator-fiscal objected because
valuable property was missing. The value of the property
was about 160 pounds. In tho third case when the solicitor
informed the sheriff that the accused was a married woman
with children and a husband who worked the procurator-fiscal
raised no objection to release.
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20, Table XVI does not include continuation cases (CY.'P and CFE)
because at this stage little or no information was given. The
table also excludes one case bectjuso of missing values.
21. Supra, 182 et. seq.
2 . Infra, 200. I
23. Infra, 198.
24. The continuation and resort cases (CY»P, CPE, C(ii)) wore not
included. The former were excluded because no information
wa3 given and the latter because the accused had pled guilty
and this might be considered to place them in a different
category from the other cases.
25. To do this we divided the information made available by both
the procurator-fiscal and the solicitor into information
favourable to liberty and information unfavourable to
liberty. Generally the information given by the solicitor
was classified as favourable to liberty and the information
given by the procurator-fiscal was classified as unfavourable
to liberty. »e had to make some exceptions, however, to take
into account e.g., the circumstance where the procurator-
fiscal giving information about criminal record said the
accused had no previous convictions. This was classified as
favourable. Similarly where the solicitor said the accused
had no fixed address, this was classified as unfavourable.
26. x2 0 70.9 P 0.0001.
•IS04 x , « 16.6 D 0.0001.
23. x2 - 8.01 p 0.005.
29. X> a 36.93 p 0.0001.
30. Supra., 185 et. seq.
31. In this we differ from J. Hogarth, 'Towards the Improvement
of sentencing in Canada' 1967, Canadian Journal of Correct¬
ions. 124.
Hogarth evaluated information contained in pre sentence reports
according to the criteria of reliability, validity, relevance
and efficiency. The main difference lies in our omission
of validity as a criterion. According to llogarth at ^0
information is valid if it accurately represents what it
purports to represent that is if e.g., it makes genuine
distinctions between offenders and non offenders. <0 do
not think the distinctions between validity and relevance is
acceptable in this context. <e are of the opinion that validity
may properly be used as a test of the criterion adopted by the
decision-makers but not to ovaiuato the information itself.
Thus it is possible to conclude that a decision-maker has
satisfactory information on which to base a decision using
the factors he considers crucial. The question whether these
factors distinguish what he wants to distinguish, however,
raises a different question. Hogarth's criterion of
318.
efficiency is designed to assess whether the least number of
information items have been given without sacrificing
predictive potential. He appears to assume that sufficient
information will have boen given to enable the decision¬
maker to make his decision if he assessed the accepted
crucial factors, This is not an assumption which can bo made
with any confidence in many decision-making situations. In
adopting sufficiency as a criterion wo again differ iron
Hogarth.
32, Cupra, 189 et. seq.
33* Supra, 155-
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oy&.ie Hp 14%,, 1965, 313.
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40. Supra, 195*
41. Supra, 189 et. seq.
42. Supra, 138 et. seq.
43* Se noted that in 3 cases the procurator-fiscal referred to
convictions which were not libelled.
44. Supra, Tables XV and XVT.
45. The procurator-fiscal sometimes obliged the solicitor by
showing him a copy of the police record of irovious convi¬
ctions against the accused but the solicitor does not have
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51* Ibid.
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one offence was libelled. Only one offence is shownt howeverj
319.
where there are multiple charges, for example, three
chiirges of theft.
53* were unable to find out why no appearance was entered,
54. Infra, 278, et. seq.
55. fable ->1X111 does not include review (il) cases.
56. Italy introduced a "4 year limit'' law in 1970 after an
obviously innocent man had been held in gaol for more than
4 years without trial. It has been reported, however, that
this limitation has now been increased to 9 years.
fne -undav Telegraph 7th April 1974.
57. Criminal Procedure (Scotland; Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict, c.35)
3. 43.
50. Ibid., 3.31.
59. Infra, 271, et. seq.
60. Criminal Justice Act 1967 (o.OO) 3,63,
61. The fact that the accused has spent time in pre trial custody
may, however, persuade the judge to iaposo a nan custodial
rather than a custodial sentence.
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who .fere sentenced at that first court appearance.
63. hiacussod infra, 284.
64. Phirs does not necessarily mean that 4 accused had absconded
as the failure to appear may have been due to illness or
mistake about the data or some similar reason. The rate of
wilful failure to appear may, therefore, be less than 4*-.
65. Supra, 209.
66. Infra, 271 et. seq.
67. Supra, 47.




72. In England the Working 2arty on 3all Procedures In
.iaaii-.trataB* Courts (London » Ii.M.3.0., 1974) were so attached
to the idea of information forms that they recommended their
use even though they were forced to conclude that verification
would not be feasible, par. 137.
73* In 1 case where the procurator-fiscal and solicitor gave
different information about the ddress of the accused, the
sheriff said he would grant bail if the solicitor's account
was confirmed.
74* oupra, 36 et. seq.
75. dupra, 186.
Bupra, Tables XII and XIII.
In /«ierica a major problem was considered to be the
comparative ease with which a person could disappear in the
densely populated cities which had high rates of population
movement• The Scottish situation is in no way comparable.
Two classic examples of attempts to predict future criminal
behaviour are C«W* Burgess, 'Factors ^etoxmininj success or
Failure on Parole' in the -orkln-a of the Indeterminate-
wonftgnqq *wflp j-g i^ugoja (Springfield, 191s)
and S. and 2. Glueek, ££8&&&M, i&Li&mzm. 3fl4 UyfeW
(Cambridge, Mass » Harvard University ress, 1959)*
See also referencos and discussion in L» iladzinowicz and
M. i-i# ..olftgang ed., Crime and Justice (London « Basic Books,
Inc., 1971) vol. Ill, part 3.
CHAPTER VIII
tthere the crime charged is murder of treason the High Court
of Justiciary is the only court which can competently consider
bail#
Oupra, 36#
The most important reported cases sere discussed supra, 70 et seq.
Supra, chs. VI and VII,
•Petitions were heard from 31st Oct 1972 to 2Gth Dec 1972
inclusive.
Although appointment as a Crown assistant requires a legal
qualification, a Crown assistant does not hove any right of
audience before the High Court of Justiciary, A Crown
assistant is a member of the Crown Office. 'This body super¬
vises the system of criminal prosecution in Scotland with the
exception of prosecution in the lay magistrates courts.
An Advocate-Depute is appointed by the Lord Advocate from
members of the Bar to re resent the Crown in criminal cases.
Although the appointment is a political one, current practice
ha3 tended to favour appointments which are not dote mined by
political allegiance.
The address of the accused was given as the prison or other
institution in which he was held in custody.
In the sheriff court study, we found that the sheriff gave
reasons for his decision in less than 2 /'-■ of the bail cases,
supra, 192. We suspect, therefore, that of the 35/- appeal
cases in which counsel related the grounds of refusal in
the sheriff court, some nay have been .22 >ost facto




Supra, 192 : x^ «* 6.49 P 0.01. This was the result when 10
was used as the cut-off oint for number of previous
convictions.
2
X; » 8.09 P 0.017
^ « 3.99 P 0.045
Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act 1926. (16 & 17 loo. 5, c. 15) J«9»
Supra, 231 et seq.
Infra, 244 et seq.
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Infra, 241 et seq.
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21. 3upra» 137 st seq.
22. An average of 2.6 information variables was given to the
sheriff in applic tions for bail in summary t-nd indictable
cases after the continuation 3tage. (110 cases/. This average
was based on infomati n contained in Tables XV and >171. In
the bail appeals, however, an average of 7»2 information
variables was given to the judge, This average was based on
Table XXIX. The criminal record of the accused contained a
great deal of informati ;n and wo estimated that this might
be counted as 4 variables. This estimate took into account
the fact that in some c .ses all the variables were not
relevant, and that some v:iriables were reseated later in
Table XXIX.
23. Gupra, 195«
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26. Supra, 90.
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access to police information about the accuse ds criminal
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informal co-oparamon with the advocate-depute or procuretor-
fiseal.
It should bo noted, however, that the accus d will generally
have received notice of the convictions which nay be libelled
against him. Although this does not necessarily describe
fully the accused's criminal involvement, it does provide
useful information which the solicitor ought to convey to
counsel.
23. Infra, 244*
2p. Supra, Table aXIX.
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31. Ibid., S. 2 (2) (a).
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40. Supra, 31.
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decided by the court.
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50i 1959 J.c. 12.
51. T.3* Smith, 'Scotland : Bail 3efore Trial' 103 b. PA. L. dev.,
305.
52. This refers to the procedure authorised by the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland; Act 1337 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 53/ 3.31.
An accused may indicate that he intends to plead guilty and
desires to have his case disposed of immediately.




1. il. Goldfarb, A.^UfflV? ?f ttW "Bfflrtolin 2U),
(How York* H,irpar& Saw, 1965j> 1*
2. Ibid. ,
3. Oupra, 193 at. seq.
4. Oupra, 121 et. soq.
5. Although the decision-maker could not keep to iho pattern
without this information he could of course depart fxcaa the
pattern.
6. Supra, 155 et. 3eq.
7. Supra, 136 et. acq.
3. Supra, 136.
9. Infra, 264 et, seq.





15. Supra, 133 et. seq.
16. For an attempt to assess the claims of supporters of the
adversary system, J. Thibaut, L. Walker, &.A. Lind, * Adversary
Presentation and Bias in Legal Reelsioiv-raakirjg' 36 H-.rv. L,
Rev. 336 (1972).
17. Bupra, 242 et. seq.
13, Supra, 46.
19. Supra, 36 et. seq.
20. Home Office, ffaU ?*ftg?4M4Q3 ill M^Ckgtigfttaa* {U>n&>n 1
H.K.3.O., 1974), par. 136.
21# 3upra, 193 et. seq.
22. Supra, 137.
23. Aupra, 139 et. seq.
24. Oupra, 161 at. seq.
25. Supra, 136 et. seq.
26. Rupra, 101-133 * 199-200 1 240-244.
27. Oupra, 200.
23. jupra, 243.





3j* Supra, 69, 7G—00*
34* Supra, 133.
35* Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Mlis. 2,
0.55.)t s.33.
36. Supra, 146-147.
37» Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, 8,93.
38. Infra, 277.
39. frbuckle v. Taylor (1315) 3 Bow's App, Lord Sidon at 133-4.
Commitment for examination "was a proceeding with a view to
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54. A. Sampson, 'Post-Prison Success Prediction', Criminology
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SHERIFF COURT OFTHE LCTHTFo AND PEEBLES ol cD'\
T Alexander Brown, bricklayer of 19 Greentrees Avenue, Edinburgh
Do hereby judicially, ENACT, and BIND and OBLIGE myself, my
Heirs, Executors, and Successors whomsoever, as Cautioners and Sureties acted in
the Sheriff Court Books of Midlothian
for Charles Doe, labourer of 19 Brownbark Avenue, Edinburgh
hereinafter called "the accused", that the accused shall appear and answer, or that
I shall present the accused at all Diets of Court in, and until the final
issue of, any action, process, criminal charge, or prosecution already brought, or
which may, at any time within six months from this date, be brought, against the
accused, at the instance of a proper Prosecutor, before a competent Court, for the
alleged Crime of theft
all as more fully set forth in a Petition or Complaint presented to the Sheriff of
EC" Ah'O P"FB' ps EDINBURGH at the instance of the Procurator
Fiscal ofCourt for the Pufrfic Interest, against the accused, whereon did proceed the
Warrant of Commitment against the accused, of date -|st fUy 19 ??
and that under the penalty of ten
Pounds sterling, to be paid by me or ny foresaids in case of failure.
And I, the accused, with consent of me the said Cautioner , do hereby
consent and declare that all Citations or other intimations in reference to the said
action, process, criminal charge, or prosecution, or to this Bond, which may be left
for me, the accused, within the (Sheriff Clerk's Office, Edinburgh or
other address specified by the accused)
shall be sufficiently and equally binding on me, the accused, and on me
the said Cautioner , as if delivered to me, the accused, personally, which place I,
the accused, with consent and concurrence foresaid, do hereby sist as my domicile.
And we consent to the Registration hereof in the said SheriffCourt Books, or others
competent, for preservation and execution. In WITNESS WHEREOF, these
presents.
(Signed) E.F. Witness. Eliza Praser, typist,1 Black Road
(Signed) P.G. Witness Francis Gill, tyoist, 1 Brown Road
329-
APPmSLX ii
iflfrWUPfl ^5^ iji Cp.iygtj,
Bate of Observation Character of proceedings
Prosecutor's attitude
Information given to judge by prosecutor
Legal representation of accused yes/no
Information given to judge by solicitor
Boas judge seek additional information yes/no
Prom whom is information requested prosecutor/solicitor/accused
■Vhat information is requested
■hat information is given
Sheriff's decision bail granted/bail rofused/O.T.A»/continuation
in custody
Amount of bail £
deasons given for decision
Application for legal aid yes/no
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The division points ghown were chosen to produce the following
scale*- bail rranted* had money available* sober* fixed address* no
special circumstances surrounding the offence* no chief constable's
objection to bail.
MUaaUaa of cutoff
Had m.nev available means that the arrested person had suffi¬
cient money in his property to cover the standard amount of bail for the
offence charged or his relatives or friends had been contacted and had
provided the money.
-lobar means that the arrested person was sober when arrested or if
he had been drinking it wis moire than 12 hours before the mxt court or
if he was drunk it was more than 24 hours before the next court.
Fixed address moans that the arrested person was not described as
having no fixed address, or an address outside Edinburgh and district,
or an address indicating torn orory lodgings within a common lodging house.
la aassial jzLsamM&assm 3&a o££m& noma that the
following circumstances were absent*- (a) Hie victim or complainant
expressed fear that another offenc might oocurj (b/ Hie ar.eafced
person lived with or in close proximity to the victim or complainant!
(c) The arr stod person lived in the ho;so where the offence took
place} (d) The arrested person injured a policeman (this did not
always form the basis of a separate charge) or committed an offence
in the police station} (e) Hie arrostod person was wanted for further
inquiries in relation to the offence charg-d or some other offence.
ho chief constable's obiaction to bail means that the following
circumstances were absent*- (a) Hie offence charged involved dishonesty}
(b) The person was arrested on warrantj (c) The offence charged
involved serious injury to person? (d) A wife was assaulted and she
did not consent to the release of her husband.
:^p3-ama1?*9n ft A
Mne & of the scale shouts that when the variabl08 -®hoim. "Were
included in doale A all the cases which passed the bail decision,
that is, all those cases in which bail was granted, also passed all
the other variables.
Mas 5 illustrates that no case in which bail was refused
passed all the variables.
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52 CASES *ERE PROCESSED
0 (OR 0,0 PCI) WERE MISSING
P.
Scale B illustrates in Lino 7 that when an additional variable
offanco (OFI-'idMCK) was added to -cale A all the oases which passed the




BAILUEC LIVISTCU PCILT = 3x0
S033IEEY LIVI3I01I POIIT2? = 5.GO
SPCIBCS LIVTSIOIT PCTi'T = 2.00
ALBBnSS , 3IVISIOIT pons = 3. CO
CCOBT Or/IoIGiT POI1TT = 2.00
RES? = 1 FOR VALUES EQUAL TO DIVISION POINT AND ABOVE
ITEM, * 5A ILDEC SOBRIETY SPCIRC S A D D R ESS CCOSJ
R E 5 P „ o 0 1 I 0 1 I 0 i I 3
1 f
A X 0 1 I TOTAL
pi| I* a M J. ** ERR- «• — " ~ I — ERR~ ~ -1
■» E R R a I "ERR-- •***•* J
G I T T I I I
U 5 I 0 231 0 231 0 231 0 231 0 231
23
T I - I
T I I
p I I I x 1 I 1 1
0 4 T 1 1 01 0 111 0 111 2 111 0 111
L T I" CON«M ~ERR I x I
I
1 I A T I
T
a. I
5 3 46 01 18 281 6 401
< cr
I 0 311 7 391 4 6
T
X
7 | M W M »"»< O R RI
V I
r i I I I I
2 I 1 i 0 I ie 11 9 21 2 9 I 1 101
11
I T I I
M n a M a -ERRI I
y I I I
T I
1
1 I 1 01 l 01 1 01 i 01
0 1 I
I x I X
Y ERRI
I I I I I I
16 1 0 01 0 OI 3 01 0 01 0
01 0
I " ma at mm - - - - I" M am F* w M u M » 1 *4 t* mm ru
W P« « « W ■»MW» J m a M M M> w « «• J
SUMS 69 23 29 63 16 76 IS 74 6 84
92
PC T S 7o 2b 32 68 17 S3 23 80 9 91
ERRORS 0 0 M 29 6 2 17 0 8
0 62
52 CASES WERE PROCESSED
E (OR POT) WERE MISSING
Ercnlgrntion of Scale C
Scale C illustrates in line A that when the variable had money
availaole (xiOUAVj was dropped from Scale A, 23 plus 11 cases successfully
passed all the variables except the bail granted variable. Only 23 cases
passed the bail granted variable. This suggests that if the police had
not used the availability of money for bail (i'lOUAV) as a decision
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Explanation of Scale U
In Scale D the had money available (llONAV) variable was removed
(c/x Scale C). The sobriety (SOBRIETY) variable was given a new coding
for sober. Thus sober was coded when the (SOBRIETY) coding was sober
or the (SOBRIETY) coding was had been drinking and the (CTHRS) coning
was greater than 12 hours the (SOBiilSIY) coding wua drunk and the
(CKLiS) coding flag :reator than 24 hours or the ( >Q3.c[2!Kf) coding vras
drunk - nd the (CTHiS) codin; was greater than 12 hours end (MONAV)
coding was positive. Line 4 of dcale D illustrates tint /hen the
effect of the had money available (dONAV) variable on t'ne sobriety
(jOBkliSTY) variable was taken into account, the number of cases
which failed due to the non-availability of money rose froio 11 to 15*
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APPENDIX IV
Variables Used in Study of Police Bail
For some variables no coding is given below, the coding is fully described
supra, page 332.
Offence charged: assault; malicious damage; theft; breach of the peace;
drunk and incapable; nuisance; prostitution; other.
Circumstances of offence
Police objection to release: yes; no.
Chief constable's directions about release
Address




Has money to cover standard bail amount: yes; no.
Has money to cover bail amount asked: yes; no.
Contacts someone who provides bail money: yes; no.
Bail decision: granted; not granted.




Variables Used in oheriff Court otudy
The codings "not specified", "not available" and "other" were reserved far
all variables. Where relevant, "not specified" indicated that reference
was made to a variable but no further details were given in a particular
case. Where relevant, "not available" indicated that no information
about a variable was available in a particular case. Where relevant,
"other" indicated that the information could not be coded under the
classifications described.
(1) Information Made Available to Sheriff
(a) Information given by procurator-fiscal
Procurator-fiscal's attitude to release: asks for G.I.A.; agrees to
G.T.A.; a.sks bail; accepts bail offered; asks high bail; asks for custody;
opposes O.T.A.; opposes bail; opposes but drops opposition.
.Seriousness of offence: serious injury; drugs.
Circumstances of offence; domestic, accused may return; victim still at
risk; risk to public; circumstances indicate medical examination needed.
Length of criminal record: long list of analogous offences; long list of
offences; long list, number of convictions given.
Recent conviction: less than 3 months; more than once in past year;
recently released from prison; on licence from borstal or approved school;
on probation; within period of deferred sentence.
Seriousness of previous sentences: served number of prison sentences;
served long sentence; custodial sentence for similar offence; record
includes approved school and/or borstal.
Non-appearance warrant issued in connection with previous offence: on one
occasion; on more than one occasion; history of absconding.
On bail for another offence: charge to be heard in High Court; sheriff and
jury trial; for similar offence; on high bail; bail set for two different
appearances.
3VU
Further inquiries to be made: to trace co-accused; to trace property;
release would hinder inquiries; further charges pending.
Address: accused sleeping rough; common lodging house; lost address
because of charge; no address in Edinburgh. Ho fixed address
(unspecified) : fixed address (unspecified).
Employment: unemployed; unemployed therefore no job to lose.
Medical history: history of mental or nervous disease; previously in
hospital because of mental or nervous disease; drink problem; drugs
problem; bad health; pregnant.
Other information: rejected by family; has money for bail.
(b) Information given by solicitor
Legal representation: yes; no.
Solicitor's attitude to release: asks O.T.A.; asks bail; offers bail;
offers higher bail; accepts procurator-fiscal's motion; asks full
committal; asks report.
Seriousness of offence: minor offence; motoring offence; small amount of
property involved.
Circumstances of offence: not returning to address where offence
committed; no risk to victim; no risk to public.
Length of criminal record: first offence; no convictions for analogous
offence; only a few convictions; only a few convictions for analogous
offence; long record but petty offences; no convictions for serious offence;
offence referred to not libelled.
Recent convictions: no convictions for over a year; no convictions for
analogous offence for over a year; long periods between convictions;
unfavourable circumstances when recently released from custody; supervised
by social worker.
Seriousness of previous sentences: admonished; fine; probation; no
custodial sentence; no custodial sentence for similar offence; short
custodial sentence.
Appearance of accused in view of non-appearance warrant issued in past:
forgot date; prevented by family circumstances; reasonable excuse.
Likelihood of abuse of bail in view of fact that accused presently released
on bail for another offence: first charge dropped; different type of
offence; offence now charged occurred prior in time to other offence;
innocent of charge.
Address: fixed address; described as no fixed address but has fixed
address; suggest alternative to outweigh no fixed address; wishes to return
to family; changed address from locus of offence; changed address from
victim of offence.
342
Length of residence: all his life; many years; short but no reason to
believe that accused will leave.
Co-residents: parents; other relative; spouse; children; friend.
Employment record: regular employment; employed; lost job recently;
start job soon; may lose job if custody; unemployed.
Occupation: profession; trade; services; labourer; school; housewife.
Marital status: single; married; cohabiting; widowed; divorced;
separated.
Dependents: spouse; children; other family; none.
Income: from employment; unemployment benefit; social security; supported
by parents or spouse; pension; none.
Medical history: history of mental or nervous disease; drink problem;
drugs problem; bad health; pregnant.
Other information: bail agreed with procurator-fiscal; O.T.A. agreed with
procurator-fiscal; innocent of charge; has already spent some time in
custody; youth of accused; needed at home by family; new responsibility
because of marriage or child; no person to raise money; no money for bail.
(c) Information given after specific inquiry by sheriff
Sheriff seeks additional information from procurator-fiscal: yes; no.
Information sought: see variables procurator-fiscal's attitude to release
to medical history inclusive.
Information given: see variables and coding procurator-fiscal's attitude
to release to medical history inclusive.
Sheriff seeks additional information from defence: yes solicitor; no
solicitor; yes accused; no accused.
Information sought: see variables solicitor's attitude to release to
medical history inclusive.
Information given: see variables and coding solicitor's attitude to
release to medical history inclusive.
(d) Information in papers made available to sheriff
Address: address specified; no fixed address.
Age: coded in 10 year periods.
3^3.
Occupation: professional; trade; services; labouring; school; housewife.
Type of offence: crimes against person (murder, attempted murder,
assault, incest, rape, attempted rape, lewd and libidinous practices);
crimes against property with violence (theft by housebreaking, house¬
breaking, theft by opening lockfast places, robbery); crimes against
property without violence (theft, reset, fraud, uttering); motor vehicle
offences (driving under influence of drink or drugs, driving while
disqualified, driving without insurance); miscellaneous offences (breach
of the peace, malicious mischief, resisting arrest, prevention of crimes
act).
Number of charges: actual number of charges for each offence.
Procedural stage: continued without plea(£); continued for further
examination ; guilty plea(£); not guilty plea(g); full committal ;
guilty plea report(S); continuation report; review application.
Report information available: yes; no.
(e) Bail money
Amount of bail offered by solicitor: actual amount in pounds.
Amount of bail acceptable to procurator-fiscal: actual amount in pounds.
(2) Result and Later History of Case
Sheriff's decision: bail granted; O.T.A.; Q.T.A. social background report;
C.T.A. medical report; bail refused; continuation in custody; custody for
social background report; custody for medical report; custody for borstal
report.
Bail set by sheriff: amount offered by solicitor; amount acceptable to
procurator-fiscal : amount agreed by solicitor and procurator-fiscal.
Amount of bail set: actual amount in pounds.
e -
Time before trial: coded in periods of 28 days.
Legal aid granted: yes; no.
Appearance by accused at trial: yes; no.
Bail forfeited: yes; no.
Non-appearance warrant issued: yes; no.
irocedure at trial: summary; solemn (sheriff court); solemn (High Court of
Justiciary).
Plea: guilty; guilty as amended; accelerated plea of guilty; not guilty;
changes plea to guilty; no plea.
Finding: guilty; guilty as amended; guilty to some charges only; plea not
guilty accepted; not guilty; not proven.
Sentence: case deserted; admonished; fine; borstal; probation; custody.
Amount of fine: coded in amounts of 10 pounds.
Length of custody: 3 months or less; >3 months <1 year; >1 year <5 years;
> 5 years.
Sentence back-dated: yes; no.
(3) Information Available to Procurator-Fiscal
Where no coding is given below, the coding follows that of the appropriate
variable in 1(a).
Type of offence: based on official classification of criminal offences.
Victim: spouse; family member; acquaintance; stranger; policeman.
Severity of injury: death; serious injury; medical treatment required;
minor.
Amount of property: bands of 50 pounds up to 200 pounds; >200 <1000; >1000.
Amount recovered: bands of 20 up to 100 per cent.
Locus of offence: accused's family home; other house; shop; pub; police
station; street.
Length of criminal record
Recent convictions
Seriousness of previous sentences
Date of release from custody: <week; <month; <3 months; <year.
Non-appearance warrant issued in connection with past offence
On bail for another offence
Risk of interference with witnesses: threats to witnesses; domestic crime;
conviction for interference with course of justice.
3k5
Further inquiries to be made
Co-accused: yes; no.
Address of accused: fixed address; common lodging house; outside
Edinburgh; no fixed address.
Co-residents: spouse; children; parent; other relative; armed forces
personnel; friend; co-accused; none.
Time spent at address: life; >5 years; <5 years >1 year; <1 year > 3 months;
<3 months.
Employed: yes; no.
Employment record: regular employment; temporary employment; unemployed.
Occupation: profession; trade; clerical; unskilled; school; housewife.
Income: bands of £10.
Marital status: married; cohabiting; divorced; single.
Dependents: spouse; children; parent.
Family circumstances: separated from spouse; parent rejects accused because
of offence; only person available to look after children.




Variables Used in High Court of Justiciary Study
The codings "not specified", "not available" and "other" were reserved
for all variables. Where relevant, "not specified" indicated that
reference was made to a variable but no further details were given in a
particular case. Where relevant, "not available" indicated that no
information about a variable was available in a particular case. Where
relevant, "other" indicated that the information could not be coded under
the classifications described.
(1) Information Made Available to Judge
(a) Information given by advocate-depute
Advocate»deputets attitude: opposes release in principle; wants higher
bail money; agrees to bail.
Seriousness of offence; serious offence charged.
Circumstances of offence: violence used; risk to victim; risk to public.
Length of criminal record: number of previous convictions in bands of 10.
Typicality of criminal record: actual number of previous offences, the
same as offence charged.
Recent conviction: <3 months; >3 months <1 year; >1 year.
Recently released from custody: < 3months; >3 months <1 year; >1 year.
Seriousness of previous sentences: prison; borstal; approved school;
probation; fine; admonished.
Longest custodial sentence: approved school/borstal; <3 months; >3 months
<1 year; >1 year <5 years; >5 years.
Record shows abuse of liberty; on bail for another offence; on parole; on
probation.
3^7 •
Record shows risk of defeating ends of .justice: non-appearance warrant
issued in past; previously charged with perjury; previously charged with
attempting to defeat ends of justice.
Further charges pending: yes.
Ample evidence: yes.
S. 31 letter? yes.
Delay before trial; bands of 28 days.
Address: fixed address; no fixed address.
Dependents: wife; children; other relative.
Employment status: employed; unemployed.
Other information: known to police as successful criminal; involved in
I.k.A. activity; drug addict.
(b) Information given by petitioner's counsel
Counsel's attitude to release: asks bail; asks interim liberation.
Seriousness of offence: minor; no serious consequences; summary complaint.
Length of criminal record: no convictions; few convictions; no convictions
far violence; no similar convictions.
Recent convictions: no recent convictions; no recent serious convictions.
Seriousness of previous sentences: no custody; only short custodial
sentences; many but short.
Appearance of accused: explanation of circumstances which suggest non¬
appearance; never failed to appear in past; third party promises to ensure
appearance; gives assurance that accused will appear.
Likelihood of abusing bail: released on bail without incident on more
serious charge; no likelihood,of abuse of bail; no likelihood of inter¬
ference with witnesses; no likelihood that further offences will be
committed.
Grounds of refusal of bail in lower court: lengthy criminal record; risk
to public.
Presumption of innocence: pleading not guilty; outlines defence; will
contest admission; relies on presumption of innocence.
Address: fixed address; contests description of no fixed address.
3W.
Employment status: employed; unemployed; has been offered job.
Marital status: married; divorced; single.
Family commitments: recently married; hopes for reconciliation with
family; needed by family; wife ill.
Other information: in pre-trial custody for a long time.
(c) Information given after specific inquiry by .judge
Judge seeks additional information from advocate-depute: yes; no.
Information sought: copy of criminal record; recent convictions; similar
convictions; recently released from prison; description of record; trial
date; type of procedure; admission by accused; family circumstances; age;
address; value of stolen property; reason for refusal of bail;
acceptability of bail amount.
Information given: coded as in (a).
Judge seeks additional information from defence counsel: yes; no.
Information sought: plea; criminal record; family circumstances; employed;
income; address; likelihood of appearance; amount of bail offered; can
accused raise bail set.
Information given: coded as in (b).
(d) Information available in judge's papers
Type of offence; based on official classification of criminal offences.
Number of charges: actual number•
Procedural stage; bail appeal (summary); bail appeal (solemn); bail appeal
after conviction; crown bail appeal.
Copy of criminal record shown to judge: yes; no.
Other information: social background report.
(e) Bail money
Amount of money offered by defence counsel: actual amount.
3^9 •
Amount of money acceptable to advocate-depute: actual amount.
(2) Judge's decision
Judge's decision; petition granted; petition refused.
veason given by .judge: none; one; two; three.
Sheriff's discretion: insufficient grounds to interfere with sheriff's
discretion; agent must show discretion wrongly exercised; discretion
wrongly exercised.
Criminal record; persistent criminal; bad record; record 3hows serious
risk of further offences; record of similar offences; not very serious
record.
Presumption of innocence: section 31 letter; admission of guilt;
conviction unlikely.
Offence charged; nature of offence; circumstances of offence; number of
charges; not very serious results.
Trial date: early trial date; late trial date.
Perverting course of .justice; likely in view of past conviction; unlikely
in circumstances.
Community roots: decision not affected by accused's background; release
not necessary because of family circumstances; address now satisfactory.
Sentence: likely to be custodial sentence; recently released from custody.
Abuse of liberty: on bail for another offence; on licence; recently
released from custody.
(3) Later History of Case
Legal aid granted: yes; no.
Appearance by accused at trial: yes; no.
Bail forfeited: yes; no.
Non-appearance warrant issued: yes; no.
Plea: not guilty; guilty; guilty to reduced charge.
350.
Finding: not guilty; not proven; guilty; case deserted.
Sentence: non-custodial; <3 months; >3 months <1 year; >1 year <5 years;
>5 years.
(*f) Information Available to Advocate-Depute
Where no coding is given below, the coding follows that of the appropriate
variable in 1(a).
Procurator-fiscal's reasons for opposition to bail: seriousness of
offence to other information inclusive.
Sheriff's reasons for bail decision: risk of non-appearance; risk to
public; long criminal record; further offences.
Circumstances of offence to other information inclusive.
